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CHAPTER I 
 
A TRIAL OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
Introduction 
By “a trial of philosophy,” I intend that the Book of Job (hereafter italicized as Job 
to distinguish the text from the character) offer a way that the issue of undergoing in 
contemporary philosophy may be re-examined.  That philosophy begins by what the 
philosopher undergoes seems to be the proper level at which to reinvigorate discussion 
between competing philosophical orientations.1  For at that level, portraits emerge of the 
experiences that condition the possibility and character of philosophical reflection. Or to put 
the matter differently, the possibility of experience itself becomes a contested site.  Just as 
philosophy registers a fracturing between orientations, so too our political and social world 
appears as fractured within these philosophies, but with important differences. Job – itself a 
fractured text – becomes a way to explore these differences in detail.  Job places the issue of 
innocent suffering and its misidentification under intense scrutiny within the dynamic of a 
trial.  Like philosophical reflection under conditions of a damaged capacity to experience, 
Job’s trial faces obstacles of a predominant order.  This order has dimensions relating to 
law, administration and intelligibility.  Each of these dimensions plays upon particular 
philosophers differently, as well as upon the very distinction between philosophy, literature, 
and art.  In an attempt to keep Job central, I draw liberally across these distinctions, showing 
no particular allegiance to any orientation but rather allowing Job to help me reorient my 
disposition regarding each philosophical, literary or artistic figure.  As a consequence, the 
 2 
 
discussion will develop as a montage, which is fitting in that both Job and Job’s trial also 
display a lack of “proper” arrangement.  Job’s trial must find and make its way against the 
pull of this predominant order, which threatens to dominate order altogether, thereby 
preempting the possibility of a trial in the sense of an order that binds together Job’s 
suffering in a way that might allow innocent suffering to register in its own terms.  
Consequently, Job’s trial shares a feature with philosophical reflection in that it must – 
against the grain – discover a mode of composition that does not default into normal, 
occlusive conditions.  A trial thereby becomes a way to examine the conditions and 
possibility of success of another kind of arrangement of “material evidence” that does not 
renew suffering by perpetuating the very damage to experience that reflection attempts to 
disrupt.  In short, “trial” becomes “radicalized” as an evidentiary mode that takes its own 
conditions of possibility immanently into account.         
 The first chapter, “The Trial of Philosophy,” sketches out the stakes of this trial: 
Predominant forms of law have both historical and contemporary dimensions (theodicy, 
eschatology, the epistemological subject, the authoritarian personality). I argue that due to 
the inadequacies of several theological and philosophical treatments of theodicy, there is a 
need to renew a discussion of suffering.  I describe the critical vocabulary (hearing, telling, 
arraignment) – derived from my reading of Job – that will give shape to my treatment of 
undergoing in subsequent chapters. The second chapter, “A Homeless Cry of Pain and El 
the Un-maker,” features my reading of Job: a series of “lawful” displacements that the 
sufferer undergoes and a trial as an exploration of the possibility of form.  The third chapter, 
“A Wayward Passage,” is my attempt to emerge from two incompatible philosophies – that 
                                                           
1 I am referring especially to “critical theory” and “philosophical hermeneutics,” but also “deconstruction” and the 
“philosophy of the fragment.”  These distinctions and the representatives that I will explore become clearer in the next 
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of Heidegger and Adorno – with a reinvigorated sense of how undergoing is connected to 
philosophy’s form or manner of composition. It is here that Benjamin and Kafka, as well as 
modernist art, begin to take on greater relevance.  The fourth chapter, “Outsiders: ‘!ber" 
derek to Odradek,” explores marginality, law and storytelling. The “waywardness” of the 
previous chapter continues in the spirit of the wayfarers (‘!ber" derek) who, like Job, contest 
conventional wisdom. Derrida emerges as a potent ally to Job’s rejection of conventional 
hope, Benjamin describes the entanglement of the “outsider,” and Kafka allows a way to 
envision an arrangement of materials that forestalls the collapse into law in its hegemonic 
forms that mimes Job’s lack of narrative resolution.  I suggest a particular modernist 
artwork (Graham’s Machine for reading Lenz) as a way to thematize a question of novelty. 
In the last chapter, “Fear the Text,” I attempt to disrupt “readings” of Job that mythologize 
the text by emphasizing simultaneously several material moments of tearing in Job.  The 
“undecidable” and Adorno’s description of the modernist artwork reappear as potent modes 
of reading Job. Finally, I frame the juxtaposition of Job with contemporary social conditions 
as a mise en abyme, suggesting that a forestalling of a prioritizing of Job to read social 
conditions, or social conditions to read Job, is indicative of a transformative thinking-into 
repetition. 
 
“Contemporary” Approaches to Theodicy 
The issue of unjust suffering and theodicy is a great deal older than philosophy.   In 
the Babylonian theodicy (approx. 1000 BCE), unjust suffering is thematized as a dimension 
of human experience long before Greek philosophy enters the scene, which in its own right 
contended with mythology.  In Plato’s challenge to the poets (as to who should rightly found 
                                                           
paragraph. 
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the state), Plato set limits to theodicy.  The Symposium, for example, presents the attribution 
of characteristics to Eros as manifesting a distorted concern for the truth.       
When addressed from the perspective of traditional theodicy, suffering is a problem 
of the reconciliation between a good and all-powerful God and the occurrence of suffering 
in the world. Theodicy is an artifact of monotheism, in the sense that the problem of how to 
reconcile a single, good and all-powerful God with the fact of suffering in the world would 
otherwise not arise.2  Of course, the term “theodicy” (theos+dike) comes from Leibniz, who 
takes his cue from arguments he finds in Augustine and Aquinas with the intention of taking 
them a step further in his Théodicée. The observable fact of suffering in the world seems to 
demand that either the omnipotence or the goodness of God be surrendered. Leibniz, 
however, argues that not only does God permit evil in order to obtain a greater good but also 
God has created the best of all possible worlds.3  
Theodicy is only a formal aspect of a pervasive tendency to take particulars to be 
meaningful as instances of rules. Like Wittgenstein’s complaint that philosophy has 
hijacked the assertion from its embeddedness in ordinary practice, suffering results from the 
hijacking of meaningfulness from materiality by a set of presumptively rational 
propositions. Social integration occurs as the hegemony of intelligibility that attempts to 
legislate in advance the meaning of suffering. While I consider my philosophical orientation 
to be an ongoing project, I repeat much of the diagnosis the brokenness of social reality 
gained from “critical theory.” I pursue the thesis that theodicy is a counterpart to a perfected 
systematicity of statecraft that is inherited by and further articulated in what Adorno 
describes as our hyper-administrated world. In particular, I find that Job resonates with a 
                                                           
2 Some Manichaean theologies attempt to skirt this problem by the introduction of Satan (a figure that appears as a world-
power in roughly the first century).  
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critique of those totalizing regimes of meaningfulness that are in concert with regimes of 
political and social order. From the materiality of Job, I attempt to demonstrate a mise en 
abyme of social and textual disarticulation.  I explore this mise en abyme primarily in the 
chapter “Fear the Text.”  
My general strategy is to employ (as with the mention of Wittgenstein above) 
multiple philosophers and also “literary” figures (most notably, Kafka) that can be brought 
into fruitful conversation with Job.  For example, Job’s plight shows something akin to what 
Foucault might describe as the following: the condition for having a place to be is that the 
sufferer abandon her pain to the interpretive framework that stands in the same relationship 
as “languages of truth” do to the “disciplinary mechanisms” that cause suffering in the first 
place.4 As Adorno describes, every event is an occasion for the negation of its singularity; 
experience (always of difference) tends to be ruled out. Consequently, the predominant form 
of suffering can not be experienced in a robust sense; rather, one undergoes an excising of 
experience that is among the principal causes of suffering. As I will explore in greater detail 
in the chapter “A Wayward Passage,” philosophical engagement with the loss of experience 
requires experience: a moment when the way in which one is ordinarily disposed to a matter 
(a routine of apprehension) is at variance from how the matter appears (a heteronomy). In 
order to articulate the relationship between suffering (the result of an unlivable world in 
which subjective mastery is the rule) and a philosophy that challenges the presumption of 
subjective mastery, I explore the matter of Erfahrung (which is always bodily undergone 
rather than chosen) in its connections to the ability to envision alternatives to the same and 
the discursive demands of a transformed philosophy.  
                                                           
3 For the argument reduced to its syllogistic form: Gottfried W. Leibniz, The Philosophical Works of Leibniz, trans. 
George M. Duncan, (New Haven, CT: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1890) 194-197, 202-204. 
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Social reality in the West tends to be gripped by an overriding sense that to be really 
real is to derive from an intelligible, rather than sensible, realm of facts (a Platonic heaven). 
The Platonic rift between the intelligible and the sensible attains a concrete, social reality in 
the predominance of a rationality in which all intelligibility proceeds from a sacrifice of the 
particular to the universal. Like an actual social instantiation of Kant’s thought that an 
intuition cannot have cognitive significance unless conceptualized, materiality bears no 
intelligibility of its own apart from the imposition of order upon it. This order is a heavenly 
“kingdom of transcendent ends” that is…   
 
…willed by a benevolent wisdom, by the absolute goodness of a 
God who is in some way defined by this super-natural goodness; or 
a widespread, invisible goodness in Nature and History, where it 
would command the paths which are, to be sure, painful, but which 
lead to the Good.  Pain is henceforth meaningful, subordinated in 
one way or another to the metaphysical finality envisaged by faith 
or by a belief in progress…These supra-sensible perspectives are 
invoked in order to envisage in a suffering which is essentially 
gratuitous and absurd, and apparently arbitrary, a signification and 
an order.5 
 
Suffering is justified by an ultimately magical appeal to a “supra-sensible” 
“heavenly kingdom of ends.” Theodicy is the formal enterprise of justifying suffering in 
terms of a hidden, redeemable value.  If the legislation of meaning is by a context-
transcendent absolute, and includes a disavowed projection of inviolability upon that 
meaning, then I consider that meaning to be “theological.” Allegedly lodged in a Platonic 
heaven, the calculus that the sufferer must contest is inaccessible and permanent. 
                                                           
4 Cf. Michel Foucualt, “Two Lectures,” Power/Knowledge, trans. Colin Gordon, et al., ed. Colin Gordon (New York: 
Pantheon Books, 1980) 78. 
5 Emmanuel, Lévinas. "Useless Suffering," The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas: Re-thinking the Other, ed. Robert 
Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988) 160-161. 
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The reasonableness that assigns a redeemable value to suffering is, in ways not fully 
appreciated, linked to the “contemporary” reasonableness that evaluates optional theories 
according to timeless epistemic standards. The “problem of evil” is typically taken up within 
contemporary debates (between historicism and positivism) without offering reflection as to 
why the contours of analysis should be so delimited.  While a certain history of the 
“problem of evil” offers a corrective to the erroneous view that violence against “the jews” 
is an aberration particular to Nazi Germany, other historical approaches remain within an 
orbit that are eschatological in spirit and therefore historically blind.6   
Pojman, for example, conducts a survey of theodicies as if both ancient and modern 
versions can be brought ahistorically alongside each other and evaluated according to 
“timeless” epistemic standards.7  To approach history as an allegedly free (ahistorical) 
subject is a way our inheritance of the epistemological model plays itself out in current 
practice. An analysis of the epistemic plusses and minuses of theodicies past and present is 
insufficiently reflective as to its own history and thereby occludes the very field of inquiry it 
presumes to open up. But not just that: The loss of experience is immanent to philosophy as 
eschatological desire.  The complicity of a prevailing reasonableness with the reproduction 
of suffering lies in an authorized unreflectiveness about history. The obfuscation of the role 
of undergoing to philosophical reflection (in favor of “timeless” epistemic standards of 
reason) shares with suffering the evacuation of the meaningfulness of bodies by a regime of 
axiomatic presuppositions. As dependent response to undergoing, refection caries along the 
fingerprint of a singular undergoing, and may itself be “philosophical” in virtue of its 
alienation from philosophy’s ‘business as usual.’  It is not just philosophy’s ‘business as 
                                                           
6 That is not to say, however, that the Shoah is not singular as an ur-event; that is, it renders the myth of progressive history 
unrecoverable except on condition of the liquidation of subjectivity. 
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usual’ that constitutes a homogenization, but also the banishing of anything like a “unique” 
undergoing.  The familiar position of the rational subject (for which materiality is “for” 
representation) performs the very fixation that produces an unlivable world (e.g., the 
subjugation of bodies for the sake of extracting an intelligible value: the greatest amount of 
labor). By default, “contemporary” approaches to theodicy unreflectively exhibit the “view 
from nowhere” (an eschatological horizon) and thereby fail to live up to the concept of the 
contemporary.  
 
The story told from the eschaton 
The usual story (which appears to be un-revisable because its origin in human 
valuation is obscured) is told from the eschaton as the alleged “necessity” of Reason, 
Nature, or God.  So-called “original” causes are hypostases of actual causes that remain 
unexplained. The “canonical” tradition distorts history through a repression.8  Whether it is 
Christianity or Cartesianism9, the governing image is that truth resides in a Platonic Heaven 
(and is accessible in the first instance by the daimonic10 Christ, in the second instance via 
the “One, True” method). The elimination of embodiment (nature) is a radicalization of 
mythic fear.11 Disembodied thought exercises power over the body as object. A mode of 
eschatological violence, the ideal rational subject (who is raced “white” and gendered 
“male”), anonymously authorizes the paring away of those deemed “incapable” of reason.12 
                                                           
7 Louis P. Pojman. Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002).   
8 The usual story of the history of philosophy depends upon the exclusion of Judaic and Islamic philosophy. 
9 The issue of kairos is less remote in its incarnation as Cartesianism.  The Cartesian effort to break absolutely from the 
past on purely self-determined grounds is an enactment of history rather than its evasion. 
10 In the “Symposium,” Eros is a daimon capable of mediating between gods and humanity.   
11 Cf. Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002). 
12 Although the sufferer in Job is male, I thereby do not intend “maleness” to be emblematic of suffering, but rather 
consider Job’s trial to include, on my reading, a disruption of gender in keeping with the text of Job, for which genre 
distinctions are hopelessly problemmatic.  
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God disappears and is hypostasized in mind, the “I” positing itself. The imperative of 
complete self-knowledge is the “philosophical” aspect of the eschaton – a final judgment 
that presumes to render the past as utterly past from a “fully contemporary” vantage. When 
an unassailable position from which to criticize history is conceived as possible, even if 
such a position is held out only as a “regulative ideal,” that position reenacts the eschatology 
of philosophical modernity and a failure of memory.13 Because eschatology is law that 
distorts history, to reflect upon how undergoing is indissoluble from philosophical reflection 
is to contest law.  
As part of a suppression of desire, sensibility is reduced to sight as a seductive 
retreat from the world.  In the ancient Greek experience of Being, a disembodied intellectual 
“vision” is first envisioned as a total response to the massively present.14 The ancients 
responded to what they experienced as massively on-hand, but never thought that 
response/relatedness itself.  For the ancients, there is not one dominant name for Being yet 
(e.g., truth, goodness, reality, the Form of forms, the Prime Mover, the four elements, Being, 
Becoming).  But all such names share the common denominator that they are names for 
permanent presence. Hence things are thought to be real in accordance with how they 
conform to a permanently real x.  And we inherit the result. What conventional truth ignores 
falls on dead ears – the fruits of a two thousand year-old tradition. Today, the disembodied 
exchange of information via the Internet has never accomplished a greater fury (a din 
without sound as in space).  The place where this exchange happens (on apparently un-
                                                           
13 This is intended to be a reference to Habermas but there is a very similar position taken by Putnam in the early 1980’s, 
which he described as “internal realism.” See Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism, The Paul Carus Lectures.  
(LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Co., 1987) 17. 
14 This is Heidegger’s formulation, which I will stray from momentarily.  For another way of stating the problem of the 
predominance of vision to conceptuality (namely, the relationship between binocularity and predation), see Theodor W. 
Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin 
Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002) 158. 
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situated) has never been in greater need of reflection about disembodiment as an 
impoverishment of experience and sociability (a matter that will return in the chapter “The 
State of Reading”).  
The pervasiveness of the eschaton does not yield to simple identification and 
subsequently relinquish its grip on the possibilities that are envisioned by the philosophical 
imagination.  Unreflectively subject to this desire, the common conception of philosophy15 
is that it proceeds by argument, that there are winners and losers, that the subject must 
possess rules for the right conduct of reason, that the unit of thought is the proposition… As 
just described, mainstream philosophy is downstream from (very roughly) the transmission 
of an impoverished Plato, its magical augmentation in theology, the search for the “One 
True Method” by which the “One True Theory” is to be attained, and the afterlife of the 
“View from Nowhere” in the melancholic response of relativism.  Philosophy as argument 
is an indication of a decadence, a regression following the disappearance of experience to 
philosophy. The disappearance of experience, or rather the impossibility that anything may 
be encountered “apart” from its hegemonic apprehension by a certain regime of 
conceptuality, brings to the fore the issue of the impossibility of reflection, which is a break 
with necessity, and imagination, which is the capacity to envision otherwise. That which 
stands for difference stands in the way of an imaginary unity (an indifference). In this 
context, to reflect is to be critical of this unity; the alternative is to repeat it. Specifically, as 
I will explore in the chapter “Fear the Text,” Job is often subject to an eschatological 
“reading” in which moments in the text are skewed in favor of anticipation of Christ.  The 
reading that I propose argues for dispersal rather than finality. 
                                                           
15 I am referring to the way mainstream “analytic” philosophy in the U.S. and Great Britain is inflected in not just lay 
understanding but also in current practice.  
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Identification with Power 
New Testament stories of suffering, as wartime literature,16 are a principle 
contributor to the pervasiveness of the eschatological model to thinking. Kairos, the eternal 
breaking into the temporal, is understood as the coming of Christ.17  While “the” kairos 
ostensibly institutes an utter difference,18 it actually ushers in an annihilation of difference: 
All events are claimed by a single, ultimate valuation, a mythical identity.19 All suffering is 
identified with the suffering of Christ.20 Humanity is allegedly always already in debt to the 
infinite gift of the death of God.  The pre-existent Logos comes to be embodied in Christ; all 
events prior to Christ are but preparatory.21 The end and aim of history, revealed by the 
Christ, is the Kingdom of God. The meaning and direction of history conforms to the law 
(the New Covenant of Acts 2:22-36).22 The Law ultimately administers selective 
extermination: eschatology falls inside Law and so must reject apokatastasis (the 
resurrection of all).23 The form of hope encoded in the enlightenment is religiously formed.  
A more thorough discussion of hope will occur in the chapter “Outsiders: ‘!ber" derek to 
Odradek.” 
In “The Dean and the Chosen People”, Richard L. Rubenstein explores the way in 
which authority is invoked to explain the Shoah.24  Rubinstein recounts his interview with 
Dean Grüber, a German evangelist minister who protested the murder of the Jews at risk to 
                                                           
16 Cf. Elaine Pagels, The Origin of Satan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
17 Paul Tillich, “Kairos,” Handbook of Christian Theology, Definition Essays on Concepts and Movements of Thought in 
Contemporary Protestantism, ed. Marvin Halverson and Arthur A. Cohen (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1964) 
196. 
18 Cf. Karl Barth insists on the utterly unique character of Christ’s appearance in the world.  John E. Smith, “”History” 
Handbook of Christian Theology, 165. 
19 John A. Hutchinson, “Being,” Handbook of Christian Theology, 34. 
20 Alexander Miller, “Evil,” Handbook of Christian Theology, 120. 
21 H.A. Wolfson, “Logos,” Handbook of Christian Theology, 214. 
22 Carl Michalson, “Authority,” Handbook of Christian Theology, 27. 
23 Paul Althaus, “Eschatology,” trans. Werner Rode, Handbook of Christian Theology, 104. 
24 Richard L. Rubinstein, “The Dean and the Chosen People,” Holocaust, Religious & Philosophical Implications, ed. John 
K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum (St. Paul, MN: Paragon House, 1989) 277-288. 
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himself and his family. Rubinstein discovers a frightening family resemblance in the Dean’s 
commitment to a just God:   
 
Even sixteen years after the close of hostilities, not only Eichmann, 
but apparently his defense counsel, seemed to feel that such 
servitude was self-justifying.  Furthermore, in both the Dean and his 
demonic antagonist, the will of the master, in the one case God, in 
the other case Hitler, was unredeemed by a saving empiricism.  
Neither man preferred an inconsistency in logic to the consistency 
of accepting the gratuitous murder of six million.  In neither 
individual was there even a trace of personal autonomy.25 
 
Both Eichmann and Grüber are both functionaries of their respective authorities. Both 
advocate for authority in the face of suffering. Regardless of the authority appealed to, that 
authority functions to justify suffering. Moreover, the appeal to authority allows this 
personality to produce its own justification in the same stroke.  Eichmann makes murder 
orderly; Grüber protests murder but sees, after all, its orderliness. By a twist of logic, 
barbarity comes to signify lawfulness.  
In “Education After Auschwitz”, Adorno states that the prevention of another 
Auschwitz rests upon a “turn to the subject,” by which he means that the roots have to be 
sought in the perpetrators and not the victims.26 Seeing the limited prospects for changing 
societal and political conditions, he proposes we come to understand the mechanisms that 
make people capable of mass murder: 
 
It is not the victims who are guilty, not even in the sophistic and 
caricatures sense in which still today many like to construe it.  Only 
those who unreflectingly vented their hate and aggression upon 
them are guilty.  One must labor against this lack of reflection, must 
dissuade people from striking outward without reflecting upon 
                                                           
25 Richard L. Rubenstein, After Auschwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1966) 284. 
26 Theodor W. Adorno, “Education after Auschwitz,” Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 193. See also Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the 
Past” Ibid. 102. 
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themselves.  The only education that has any sense at all is an 
education toward critical self-reflection.27   
 
The fact of power, rather than reflection upon its content, is the principle determinate of its 
appeal: “Authoritarian personalities identify themselves with real-existing power per se, 
prior to any particular contents”28 Identification with the whole is substitute satisfaction for 
the satisfaction denied persons by a callous world.29 Only with an improvement of the 
objective situation that renders people powerless will the real need for people to identify 
with power be eroded. 
Adorno notes the “inability to have any immediate human experiences at all” as 
characteristic of the authoritarian personality.30  As part of a habituation to a broken world, 
the subject responds to being overwhelmed by objective conditions (including a barrage of 
“news” of global suffering) by appeal to mythical forms of inevitability and reconciliation – 
and thereby relinquishes subjectivity in the process.  The inability to respond to suffering, to 
have it grip us before it is conceptualized, is part of a larger alienation from experience 
resulting from the predominance of a certain regime of conceptuality. It is the inability to 
experience, this “coldness,” this “indifference to the fate of others,” that is a precondition 
for another disaster.31 Beside the need to address the pathology that exhibits itself in the 
identification with power, theological questions as to whether suffering is in fact the product 
of divine plan must be regarded as idle or worse. 
 
                                                           
27 Critical Models, 193. 
28 Critical Models, 94. 
29 Critical Models, 96. 
30 Critical Models, 101,198.  
31 Critical Models, 201-202. 
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Preserving “the Jews” I: A Faith “Without” Theodicy 
In “Useless Suffering”, Levinas decries the atrociousness of theodicy after 
Auschwitz. The appeal to theodicy erases the horror of systematic murder. But if “faith”32 is 
relinquished along with theodicy, according to Levinas, one encounters a problem: What 
else but an affirmation of belief in God in the face of Auschwitz would succeed in 
preserving “the Jews”?33   But such an affirmation resurrects straightaway the problem of 
theodicy, for the God one affirms should have prevented Auschwitz.     
For Levinas, the problem of how to continue “in a faith without theodicy” requires 
that we recognize how suffering opens up the space of the inter-human.   
 
Properly speaking, the inter-human lies in a non-indifference of one 
to another, in a responsibility of one for another.  The inter-human 
is prior to the reciprocity of this responsibility, which inscribes 
itself in impersonal laws, and becomes superimposed on the pure 
altruism of this responsibility inscribed in the ethical position of the 
self as self.  It is prior to every contact which would signify 
precisely the moment of reciprocity where it can, to be sure, 
continue, but where it can also attenuate or extinguish altruism and 
disinterestedness.34 
 
The space of the inter-human is prior to the instrumentalization of suffering. On Levinas’ 
view, the choice is between 1) either allowing suffering to be “for nothing” or 2) 
recognizing a pure altruism that inheres in the space of the inter-human prior to its 
enculturation.  Levinas asks, “Are we not all pledged – like the Jewish people to their 
faithfulness – to the second term of this alternative?”35 To state at once my exception to the 
way this pledge seems to be conceived by Levinas: “Faith” is by no means a prerequisite, 
                                                           
32 According to Lévinas, Auschwitz is commonly taken to be a “commandment to faithfulness.” The Provocation of 
Emmanuel Levinas,163. 
33 I would add to Lévinas’ characterization of the problem that, if this call to faith is a call to a belief in God, and if belief 
in God is a prerequisite for belonging to this community “of Jews,” then there is something suspect at work.   
34 The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas,165. 
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neither for one’s inclusion to Judaism nor for its survival, for Judaism is a civilization.36  In 
addition, I maintain that Levinas’ formula for a faith without theodicy (“useless in the 
Other,” “meaningful in me” 37) avoids the problem that there can be no useless suffering.38 
Theodicy, for Levinas, invokes the proper sense of a metaphysical order, “an ethics 
which is invisible in the immediate lessons of moral consciousness.”39 Levinas makes clear 
that we are to take our responsibility to the Other as a corrective to theodicy: 
 
…the for-the-other – the most upright relation to the Other – is the 
most profound adventure of subjectivity, its ultimate intimacy.  But 
this intimacy can only be discreet.  It could not be given as an 
example, or to be narrated as an edifying discourse.  It could not be 
made a predication without being perverted.40 
 
According to Levinas, an ethical relationship inheres in the space of the inter-human prior to 
its mediation. But if we notice Levinas’ description of this ethical space carefully, we notice 
features of this space that are troubling: It is the “ultimate intimacy of subjectivity” that 
eludes narration, and so is indistinguishable from the apophatic within which the “kingdom 
of transcendent ends” is enclosed. Moreover, this preferred, immanent domain is, on 
Levinas’ view, not already mediated by factual systems of order.41  
A pure responsibility that is magically prior to mediation ignores that mediation is 
unavoidable. The fact that suffering of the Other is always already “meaningful in me” is the 
very problem, and this presumption of meaningfulness haunts the sufferer as a presumption 
of guilt. The possibility of Levinas place of a pure altruism is always already preempted by 
                                                           
35 The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas,164. 
36 This is the view of Judaism of the founder of Reconstructionist Judaism, Rabbi Mordecai Kaplan. 
37 The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas,164. 
38 The problem is one of no non-identity without sacrifice.  “The subject’s non-identity without sacrifice would be 
utopian.” Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973) 281. 
39 The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas,160. 
40 The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas,163. 
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an hegemony of uses (educative, imitative, etc.) for suffering. Contra Levinas’s “Useless 
Suffering,” I maintain that the problem to be considered is how suffering is available as 
subsumable. The sufferer confronts an a priori ‘fit’ of categories through which the 
singularity of suffering is intelligible as an instance of a rule.  The predominance of theodicy 
manifests itself in the identification with power at the cost of the reality-principle – a retreat 
from reality to a “religion” that has already devolved to magic.  However much Levinas 
contests theodicy (the kingdom of transcendent ends), he appears to have resurrected 
theodicy insofar as the space of unmediated responsibility is a mythical space. The appeal to 
a reality that is magically prior to mediation only confirms the fact of mediation. 
 Levinas has, however, noticed a problem: suffering is readily available for 
subsumption by regimes of conceptuality that repeal the sigificative weight of singularity (is 
‘inscribed within impersonal laws’).  So that a critique of these laws is possible, there must 
be a moment of non-identity to suffering (“the un-subsumable of consciousness”).  Yet 
insofar as the conditions are damaged for a self to be a self (wherein “the pure altruism” of 
responsibility is inscribed), there can be no “useless suffering.” 
 
Preserving “the Jews” II: A Value of “Sacrifice” 
For Wiesel, and not unlike innocent suffering in Job, the Shoah calls for a trial of 
God. As Wiesel tells us, three rabbis solemnly conducted a trial of God over three days in 
Auschwitz and rendered the verdict of guilty.42 After rendering their verdict, the rabbis 
                                                           
41 By factual systems of order, Lévinas refers to “the order of politics – post-ethical or pre-ethical – which inaugurates the 
‘social contract.’” The Provocation of Emmanuel Levinas, 165. 
42 The Long Search: Judaism, The Chosen People (Vol. 7), videotape, dir. Brian Lewis, narr. Ronald Eyre, BBC / Time-
Life Video, 1977 (52 min.). 
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observed evening prayers.43 Perhaps it is this moment of resumption of evening prayers that 
Wiesel attempts to convey in having his characters “choose to die as Jews.” 44   
In his The Trial of God, Wiesel presents a play within a play: a Purimschpiel within 
which three Purimschpielers play the role of judges in a trial of God. The Purimschpielers 
must confront the reality of a pogrom and a father’s demand for justice. The one who 
defends God, God’s advocate or defense attorney, is introduced as a stranger, who later 
reveals that he is God’s “emissary.”45 “Sam,” as he is known, argues for God’s infallible 
justice.46  Whether there is some other justice that exists outside the human demand for 
justice – the justice of God – is the question the father, an innkeeper, raises:   
 
I don’t want a minor, secondary justice, a poor man’s justice! I want 
no part of a justice that escapes me, diminishes me and makes a 
mockery out of mine!  Justice is here for men and women – I 
therefore want it to be human, or let Him keep it!47  
        
The oldest and wisest of the judges tells us, “Purim signifies absence of knowledge, a 
refusal of knowledge.”48 The refusal of knowledge is enacted by performances and masks. 
When another pogrom erupts, interrupting the verdict, the judges and the innkeeper choose 
to die as Jews despite a Priest who advises that they wear the mask of Christianity long 
enough to be spared from the mob.49  The knowledge that Purim shields us from – the 
reality of state-sponsored murder – breaks through the form of the Purimschpiel, so that we 
are able to say with Avrémel, another judge, 
                                                           
43 The Long Search. I can’t help but wonder what portion was read that evening. 
44 Elie Wiesel, The Trial of God (New York: Schocken Books, 1979) 152. 
45 The Trial of God,158. I read Sam as Wiesel’s incarnation of the ha##$%$n in Job.  The meaning of ha##$%$n – a title, “the 
adversary” – is adroitly captured by the sense of God’s attorney in Wiesel’s play. 
46 The Trial of God,127. 
47 The Trial of God,123. 
48 The Trial of God, 91. 
49 The Trial of God, 154-155. 
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I listen to you, innkeeper, and I imagine Purim without the miracle 
of Purim.  And I know everything.50  
 
The damage to narcissism51 incurred by broken social reality is compensated by publicly 
sanctioned violence. The abject (e.g., “the jew”52 targeted by the pogrom) is the material 
condition for the disappearance of reflection. The “jew” is an ego-dystonic idea (only 
apparently coming from outside the ego) and part of a ready-made “pseudo-orientation” 
through stereotypy.53   
By having his heroes  “choose to die as Jews” (implying that their deaths are a 
sacrifice for their “Jewishness”), Wiesel dilutes his other point of emphasis: that the trial 
needs to be ongoing in remembrance of those who cannot come back to life once the play 
has ended. Shoah attributes no redemptive meaning to systematic murder whereas a 
valuation is implied by “Holocaust.” I maintain that the deformation of memory occurs in 
the manner of Wiesel’s form of “remembrance,” especially when remembrance becomes an 
industry.  
Because a meaning of sacrifice tends to override the capacity to experience the 
suffering of the other, the valuation of suffering remains to be addressed in Wiesel’s The 
Trial of God.  Despite my objections to Wiesel, however, the scripted response of Job’s 
friends is captured in Wiesel’s character Sam. In addition, by “staging” elements (by placing 
elements in proximity to each other), the elements of a play become compelling in terms of 
inviting interpretation without allowing their meaning to become exhaustively discursively 
                                                           
50 The Trial of God,151. 
51 Theodor Adorno. Minima Moralia, Reflections from Damaged Life.  Trans. E.F.N Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2002) 65. 
52 Lyotard employs a lower case “j” so that “the jews” might be stand for any persons targeted by hate, which creates its 
own object. Lyotard, Jean-Françios. Heidegger and “the jews.” Tr. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1977. 
53 Cf. Theodor Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality. Studies in Prejudice (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) 605. 
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rendered.54 A play55 can be a way of organizing elements nonviolently into a whole without 
subjecting those elements to the demands of a logical system or hierarchy. 
 
Reading Job 
The interpretive challenges of Job are largely thought in terms of ordinary standards 
for meaning (determination of authorship, historical horizon, genre, etc.). Whereas typical 
Biblical criticism can note the difficulty with employing its categories of understanding with 
respect to Job, rarely do those categories themselves become the subject of inquiry (as 
moments in the “law” of interpretation). The fact that the value of Job can not be redeemed 
in terms of standard interests begs the question as to the genealogy of those interests: the 
matter of meaning and intelligibility that tends to drive categorical determinations in the 
first place. Insofar as signification demands that the text be “healed” of its gaps and fissures, 
the interpreted text bears the stamp of teleology: instances of suffering are to mark progress 
toward a transcendent (natural, historical, divine) resolution.  
Because it requires that we undergo the text as inherently at variance with our desire 
for presence, reading Job is an experience. The desire for presence is especially thwarted by 
Job, which contains the greatest concentration of hapax legomena in the whole of the 
Hebrew Bible. Job challenges coherence, wholeness, and integrity simply in terms of its 
materiality (an ancient text that has suffered dislocations, emendations, and an 
institutionalized “art of mistranslation.”)56 Job challenges its use for the authorization of 
suffering by its absences (e.g., the lack of narrative resolution). The significance of the story 
                                                           
54 Hence it would be too strong to assert that Wiesel insists upon a valuation, despite one being coded into his play. 
55 Wiesel attempted to write his account of the trial of God in Auschwitz many times, in many discursive forms, before 
discovering its formulation in a play. The Trial of God, vii. 
56 Wolfers describes this as “the institutionalized art of mistranslation.” David Wolfers. Deep Things Out of Darkness: The 
Book of Job; Essays and a New English Translation (Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing, 1995) 25-45. 
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of Job is one that cannot be established without some repression to the text.  But where 
violence to the text occurs, an interpretive predisposition consonant with theodicy is 
exposed, a desire to have undergoing sum to a meaningful whole. It is precisely Job’s 
fragmentary materiality that is maddening to a certain scholarly sensibility. 
Job possesses an intractable set of material difficulties to the systematic thinker. The 
attempt to distinguish “prose” from “poetry” sections, for example, is a response to the fact 
that Job confronts us with plural forms of address.  Job is rich in detail that appears as 
purposeful and meaningful while resisting interpretation in terms of rational assertions. 
Non-conceptual transitions between elements (“emended” words, “euphemistic” phrases, 
“poetic” passages, even “dislocated” chapters) reverberate not referentially, but as having 
weight in themselves. In order for criticism to adequate itself to the sensuousness of such a 
work, interpretation in its normal modes (that is, our response to the work) must be made the 
subject of investigation. The desire to place things in their proper order is “subjective” in the 
sense of overwhelming the object.  “Impartiality” in this context is to not expect that 
everything in the work must play a part in a system. 
Any criticism that prioritizes intelligibility at the expense of sensuousness57 must 
distort Job.  Like many issues for us today, Job is familiar to us by way of a screen memory: 
a history that neglects and obscures while it discloses and skews. History largely transmits 
only that which does not contravene the favored identity of those who will be wielding it: 
As the effacement of the surfaces of monuments in ancient Egypt attest, history is a 
palimpsest whose legibility is conditioned by the victors. Like those elements of our 
philosophical past that do not constitute the usual story of the “canonical” tradition of 
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philosophy, Job comes to us sealed over by a summary judgment that not only 
misrepresents its actual content but also licenses its neglect. The way in which Job is not 
experienced is the foreground of an inability to experience suffering: actual suffering is 
prohibited to appear except in terms of a theology that attempts to legislate a priori the 
meaning of suffering. The book of Job unsettles the issue of suffering for us if we are 
prepared to read (that is, experience, the text). Reading encounters many moments of 
indeterminacy in Job that disrupts the pathological58 expectation that any instance of 
suffering is determinable a priori. The neglect of Job is not entirely like that noticed by 
Nietzsche in the Genealogy: there too the philosopher (better, philologist!) must break 
through a theological prejudice and teach us again how to think historically.   
Where we stand is in a nexus of screen memories that, as Nietzsche notices, allow 
the present to live, more comfortably perhaps, but at the expense of the future. A screen is 
projected upon legitimizing (religious) texts in order that a pious sentiment may shield itself 
from experiencing anything contrary to itself.  The alleged “patience” of Job stands at the 
forefront of a screen memory of Job, ready to provide answers in substitution for reflection. 
Patience is simply not in the text.59 Job’s cries for an intercessor allegedly receive a 
prefigured answer in the Christ.60 The satan-character (ha##$%$n, who is part of YHWH’s 
heavenly counsel in Job) is conveniently assumed to be “Satan” (who doesn’t emerge as a 
world power until the 1st century) to deflect the blame for innocent suffering away from 
God. God restores Job. Case “closed.”  In short, the categories of good and evil are a way a 
pious sensibility can occlude a text like Job.  
                                                           
57 The tendency to give priority to the intelligible realm over sensibility is a tendency that goes unnoticed while one is 
being “radical” in other respects.  Take for example Descartes, who by the second Meditation has lost the world (including 
his own body) to the sole certainty of the activity of thinking itself.  
58 I refer to the authoritarian personality. The Authoritarian Personality, 605. 
59 “Patience” stems from the 1st century commentary in James 5:10-11. 
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A theological prejudice (Nietzsche’s term) that regards the categories of good and 
evil as hard-wired into “creation” is to be challenged through critical memory: a 
remembrance of the history of valuation under conditions of political subjugation. 
Genealogy contests the atrophying of historical thinking by disturbing the theological 
prejudice that disavows the work of valuation. 61  The alleged divine authorship of good and 
evil relegated these categories to a Platonic heaven.  Allegedly not within human 
jurisdiction (although we had in fact projected them there), values appear to be 
“unrevisable.” Allegedly, the divine plan to which all events contribute is inscrutable to 
humanity; the meaning of events is enclosed within an apophatic dimension.62 What is 
indefensible about the dominant way of doing things is its silence that it is, which allows it 
to rule the day. In contrast, Adorno maintains that, “The need to lend a voice to suffering is 
a condition of all truth.”63 
Job complains in 6:30 as follows: “Is there any wrong on my tongue? / Cannot my 
taste discern calamity?”  Job’s “consolers of pain/painful consolers” (16:2) seek to 
admonish and silence Job. Allegedly, because God only punishes the wicked and Job is 
punished, Job must be wicked.64 Job’s suffering is a spectacle explained: the only visible 
                                                           
60 I explore this issue of Job’s cries for an intercessor in the chapter, “Fear the Text.” 
61 Only a spiritual revenge remained as an option to those enslaved (for a real revolt would have been suicide as it turned 
out to be in 70 C.E.).  There is a fascinating history here on the topic of religious response to oppression in Ancient Israel.  
First of all, it is only accurate to speak of responses given the occupying empire and the specific conquest strategy 
involved.  For example, it is likely that the religion of Zoraster practiced by ancient Babylonians influence the development 
of the dichotomization of good and evil and its encoding in the Hebrew Bible – a consequence in no way separate from the 
Babylonian exile.  Secondly, real revolt (rather than a spiritual one) was actually successful against the Greeks – which is 
why there is the Book of the Maccabees in the LXX.  Thirdly, apocalypticism is not an independent development from the 
context of conquest: the more brutal the occupying power, the more likely that the end of the world becomes a realistic 
assessment of the situation!  The Romans, for example, lined the roads to Jerusalem with crucified Jews.  After the failed 
revolt in 70 C.E. that resulted in the destruction of the second Temple, a prohibition came into being in Judaism against 
following charismatic leaders.   
62 For example, Zophar argues for the inscrutability of God’s wisdom in Job 11. 
63 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973) 17-18. 
64 Zophar’s speech in chapter 20 is a good illustration of this reasoning: the wicked alone are punished; Job is punished, 
therefore Job must be wicked.  For another example, there is Eliphaz in 4:7: “Think now, who that was/ innocent ever 
perished?/  Or where were the upright/ cut off?”    
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part of the “justice” of God’s judgment.65 The friends’ speeches attempt to prevent any 
claim to knowledge from issuing directly from Job’s suffering.66 Rather, any instruction that 
is ‘of occasion’ is only that which comes with the seal of past ages (8:9). Far from being 
challenged by Job’s suffering, Job’s suffering becomes the occasion for Job’s friends to 
demonstrate their wisdom’s applicability. Job’s friends take it upon themselves to speak on 
God’s behalf. 67 
The reasonableness that sees horrible, barbaric events as punishment from a just God 
is just as prevalent today.68 The lesson Job’s friends impart is that if only Job would 
abandon his complaint, then there is hope that his suffering will be made utterly past.69 Job’s 
friends demonstrate an inability to experience Job’s suffering through their reference to a 
distant realm of theological “facts.” Their simple act of designation attempts to substitute for 
redress. 
The force of Nietzsche’s attack is that, just as with the speech-makers in the 
Symposium, the desire to see a God as having certain attributes turns out to be just desire 
through and through. As Nietzsche reminds us, the values are allegedly beyond our ability to 
                                                           
65 “He will deliver you from six/ troubles;/ in seven no harm shall/ touch you.” (5:19)  “He will yet fill your mouth with/ 
laughter,/ And your lips with shouts/ of joy.” (8:21)  “Agree with God and be at/ peace;/ in this way good will come/ to 
you.” (22:21) “If you return to the Almighty,/ you will be restored.” (22:23) 
66 Cf. Lyotard refers to this conundrum as “damage accompanied by the loss of the means to prove the damage.” Jean-
Françios Lyotard, The Differend, Phrases in Dispute, Theory and History of Literature Vol. 46, trans. Georges Van Den 
Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) 5. 
67 Which is precisely what Elihu declares that he is doing: “I have yet something to say/ on God’s behalf” (36:2) Zophar 
warns Job that “Should your babble put others to/ silence,/ and when you mock, shall no/ one shame you?/ For you say, 
‘My conduct is/ pure,/ and I am clean in God’s/ sight./ But O that God would speak,/ and open his lips to you” (11:3-11:5).   
68 Take, for example, Fundamentalist Christian minister Jerry Fallwell’s comment on the 700 Club religious program three 
days after the attacks of September 11th: 
“The abortionists have got to bear some burden for this because God will not be 
mocked. And when we destroy 40 million little innocent babies, we make God 
mad. I really believe that the pagans, and the abortionists, and the feminists, and 
the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that an alternative 
lifestyle, the ACLU, People For the American Way, all of them who have tried to 
secularize America. I point the finger in their face and say ‘you helped this 
happen’.”    
Paul Johnson, “‘Gays to Blame’ Falwell,” 365 Gay.com, 14 Sept. 2001. Accessed 30 Sept. 2003, 
<http://365gay.com/lifestylechannel/intime/months /911/Falwell.htm>. 
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revalue (allegedly in the jurisdiction of the divine) are disavowed, human valuation.  Until 
these categories are acknowledged to be the legacy of a human (resentful) response to 
slavery, reflection finds no motivation to consider whether the (ultimately self-imposed) 
moral binary represented a denuding of human potentiality.  In place of a Platonic view that 
takes “good” and “evil” in their ultimate (timeless and universal) sense to be beyond our 
control, genealogy reminds us that “good” and “evil” are the result of a material, historical 
cause rather than a transcendent one.  Because to be wise in the conventional sense is to 
already be sufficiently reflective, Job’s friends are incapable of reflection upon the fact that 
their wisdom consists in a set of false attributions to God – an ideal of their own making.70 
Christianity absorbed the Platonic thought of eternity as outside of time, becoming 
radically monotheistic and transcendentalist as a consequence.71  The opposition between 
spirit and matter is a legacy of Platonism and not the result of a biblical inheritance of the 
Hebrew bible (where soul is nephe&, “breath”). Negative freedom of a theological type 
(envisioned in terms of an eschatological horizon) is complicit with the reproduction rather 
than transformation of damaged life.  The predominant “philosophical” “beginning” is 
envisioned as transcendence from a series of the same (a kairos that is the essence of 
Platonism72). Transcendence is a desire for an angelic (i.e., not situated and therefore 
                                                           
69 The attribution of either past or future tense to ancient Hebrew is a tricky matter, for it only has perfect and imperfect 
tenses. 
70 Job’s friends think of the alternative, that God is responsible for injustice, as patently absurd: “Is it for your piety that he 
reproves you/and enters into judgment/ with you?” (22:4)  “Does God pervert justice?/ Or does the Almighty pervert/ the 
right?” (8:3)   
71 Alexandre Kojève. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit. trans. James H. 
Nichols, Jr.,  Allan Bloom, ed. (Ithica: Cornell UP, 1969) 112. 
72 Introduction to the Reading of Hegel,104. 
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impossible) intuition.73 Platonism or the gaining of access to a realm of an eternally 
unchanging and self-identical knowledge is only possible for an “angelic” intelligence.74   
In contrast to this eschatological tradition, the down-going (Untergang) of 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra indicates an effort to think against the grain. As passivity, 
Untergang is difficult to think in Nietzsche because the conditionality of reflection is always 
a moment of past willing. Once we can no longer disavow that values are human creations, 
the first image of the will is “anything goes.” To think of the will in Nietzsche as “anything 
goes” is still too Platonic: the legacy of Platonism is not just realism but also relativism.75 
Envisioning a will thoroughly without constraints is simply the Platonic image with a 
negative sign before it.  An “inverse Platonism” is under the aegis of Platonism and an 
enactment of history rather than its evasion.  Whatever constrains the will “apart” from how 
constraints are normally envisioned (as legislated from “above” by a transcendental 
authority) must be discovered, as it were, through the activity of reflection itself. Perhaps 
that is why writing a Zarathustra could only have been an exploratory gesture.  Thus 
whereas Nietzsche is instructive as to the history of valuation with respect to the attribution 
of “un-revisable” truth, passivity remains difficult to think in Nietzsche and requires a more 
persistent treatment of the role of the body and desire in valuation – presently in terms of 
values projected upon Job.  
A harmony and unity of narrative is imposed upon Job for the sake of verifying 
theological commitments that are held in advance. If we must tell a story that neglects the 
text let it be that the original audience, in protest at the normal logic of divine punishment 
for transgression, required the debates in Job to give voice to outrage at unmerited and 
                                                           
73 Cf. “infinite intuition” Martin Heidegger, Kant and The Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: 
Indiana UP, 1997) 18-24.  
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recurrent disaster. My goal, however, is not to supply a narrative, but rather to contest 
narratives as such.  Such a contesting of the synthetic moment of dialectic is possible due to 
the superabundance of indeterminacy in Job. Indeterminacy is evident, for example, in the 
wager between YHWH and ha##$%$n, the disruption of place by heavenly administration, 
and also Job’s trial as the conjoining of material moments in without a super-ordinate law. 
Due to the divine speeches that occur at the beginning of Job, the reader knows that 
Job suffers because God has made a wager and not due to a divine value assigned to 
suffering, such as punishment or education. As anti-theodicy, Job contests the 
Deuteronomistic calculus (a convention of retributive justice). Job’s friends are the 
mouthpieces of prevailing wisdom.76  In the Deuteronomistic texts, only those acts in 
accordance with heavenly order are rewarded and those acts at variance with heavenly order 
are punished: the northern tribes were wiped out in 722 as “punishment.” The typical 
argument presented by wisdom literature is that one will prosper if one can discern the order 
of creation and conduct one’s life accordingly.77 The example of integrity that Job sets, as 
opposed to the standard set by wisdom literature generally, is to act when justice is 
demanded even from God.  The alternative, according to the JPS translation, would be for 
Job to abandon his “face” (9:27). 
The disruption of place by El necessitates that Job deploy law differently. As the text 
modulates place from domesticity, the body, Job’s immediate community, a council at law, 
                                                           
74 Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 126. 
75 Cf. The Many Faces of Realism, 23-40. 
76 When Job’s friends take turns praising God and expounding His infallibility, the youngest – and least well versed (Elihu) 
– must defer to the elders as if their greater “experience with matters of God” should count toward accuracy in what they 
attribute to God.  In actuality, however, the elders are just better masters of the form.  Ultimately, what the arguments of 
Job’s friend’s reveal is that they have taken stock out in God’s justice.  However, with regard to reward for virtue, the God 
in Job is not a reliable partner to enter into contracts with.   
77 “The fundamental assumption, taken for granted in every representative of biblical wisdom, consisted of a conviction 
that being wise meant a search for and maintenance of order.” James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom (Atlanta: John 
Knox Press, 1981) 19. 
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and the cosmos, El “The Maker” is the un-maker of place. Job’s cry of pain must 
continually reach outward from community, council and cosmos, for throughout there is 
neither hope (Job 14) nor justice (Job 21). From catastrophic loss, physical affliction, the 
absence of loyalty ('esed, 16:14-21), the unavailability of a redeemer/arbiter, the 
impossibility of arraigning El, and finally the tempest that sends Job’s pain back into 
silence, suffering happens as a series of nested dislocations.  My reading as to these 
displacements occurs principally in the chapter, “A Homeless Cry of Pain and El the Un-
maker.” From Job tearing his robe (1:20) to El’s speeches from the whirlwind (Job 38-41), 
we are at an audible margin as opposed to the Seeing Eye (7:8). Job reworks the margins of 
law from a visual register (e.g., the ocularity of Plato) to an audible register. If he is to be 
heard, Job must protest his innocence by using the terms and modalities of law differently. 
Unless Job can estrange moralistic language, then the piety and partiality that his “painful 
consolers” (16:2) display will remain fixed as the only manner in which guilt and innocence 
is intelligible.  The place that Job must contest is none other than the cosmic order of El and 
the way felicity to this order has been memorialized in traditional wisdom. 
 
The necessity of Undergoing as a philosophical focus 
Because transcendence of the past is its principle mode of reenactment, history is 
desired as something to be with-in a transformed way-rather than permanently overcome. 
Because the desire for emancipation is manifest as subjective mastery, however, a moment 
of passivity must mark a transformed philosophical reflection. A moment of heteronomy 
(with respect the presumption of subjective mastery over “passive” materiality) must be 
preserved inside philosophical reflection. Transformed philosophical reflection seeks to 
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retain a susceptibility to the objects of understanding rather than retain a bearing of 
consumptive incorporation toward those objects. Rather than merely transform philosophy 
for philosophy’s sake, a transformed philosophy worthy of the name resists a regressive 
tendency in civilization.  
Philosophy reneges on suffering as heteronomous by incorporating suffering into an 
aesthetic (lawful) whole (for example, in the reflective working-through of Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit).78 As just an internal moment to a perfected system, philosophy 
becomes consonant with the reconciliation of the sufferer with the order of things. The 
aspiration of a perfect system is the appetite of an intelligible order that legislates over 
bodies. As allegedly identical with history, the realization of self-knowledge absorbs alterity 
over time.79 Akin to how the epistemological subject (armed with the rules for the proper 
conduct of reason) understands a “purely passive” object, alterity is repressed through an 
assertion of subjective mastery, now gone megalomaniac as world history. Hegel, to be sure, 
is anti-theological in the sense that he equates the concept with history rather than relating it 
to an eternity.80  Yet Hegel is eschatological: history (time) is the vehicle of the concept’s 
fulfillment. For Hegel, “Reason is reconciliation with ruination” as Gadamer observes.81   It 
is Hegel’s “self-apotheosis of thought” that Adorno contests by asserting that the whole is 
not true, but false.82 Consequently, a consideration of the incapacitation of novel reflection 
must take into account the tendency for the relationship of history to philosophizing to 
remain concealed even, or especially, in “historical” orientations. The eschaton is immanent 
                                                           
78 Yet it is also possible to reemphasize Hegel’s preference for a torn sock rather than a mended one [ref.] in order to read 
Hegel against Hegel. 
79 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 
trans. Mary Quaintance, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992) 3. 
80 Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, 139. 
81 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic, Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale 
UP, 1976) 105. 
82 Hegel’s Dialectic, 110 
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to philosophy as the myth of progressive human rationality. Repetition, the truth of history, 
is disguised by the myth of progressive history.83 Reflection upon the presumption of 
subjective mastery over history is a minimum condition for the possibility of any genuinely 
novel reflection. Unless we are capable of philosophizing out of our immanent sense of how 
we are participating in history (though not at all in a way that can be fully present to us), 
then our continued participation in the brokenness of our age is guaranteed.  
Only if it can compel us in terms of its non-identity can suffering indict philosophy 
to begin differently.  Because suffering happens as deformed experience, the relationship of 
undergoing to reflection is damaged.   
By reflecting upon the danger that reflection may disappear, I engage the 
philosophical question that Heidegger took himself to be engaging: how to begin to 
philosophize.  Heidegger’s provocation is aimed at the tendency to imagine that philosophy 
can proceed on purely self-determined grounds. As assuredly as we are as we do (one of the 
meanings of Dasein), there is no “later time” when the consequences of the things that I do 
catches up to me. In short, the question of how to begin to philosophize is necessarily 
connected to the question of how I should live. In what manner are we still holding out 
behind philosophy as if the question of how to live was elsewhere? The question of how to 
begin to philosophize is the question of how I should live (unblocked84), which in turn is the 
question of Eros (I am blocked willingly – out of some complicity or displacement). Unless 
I can notice the ramifications in what I am living through, it is far too easy to be dismissive 
in general, as we should expect. In the atmosphere in which so many decisions are 
                                                           
83 Eva Geulen, “Theodor Adorno on Tradition,” The Actuality of Adorno: critical essays on Adorno and the postmodern, 
ed. Max Pensky (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997) 190. 
84 The attempt to raise the question of the meaning of Being is accompanied by ready-made reasons why one should 
dismiss the question and abandon the effort.  The way that roadblocks function in Being and Time (anonymously, 
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experienced as not decisions at all but simply as the way things are, there rarely exists the 
motivation to discover otherwise.  Fixed within the plight of not being able to reflect upon 
the grounds of the ease with which we are dismissive, “thinking” cleaves to a closed 
ontological circle (that is, remains caught within the aegis of Western Onto-Theology). 
Desires tend to be allocated otherwise, which permits the dominant atmosphere (of real 
objects for a properly attentive subject) to recur unreflectively. In other words, we need to 
be reflective about how the desire for a totalizing view enacts, rather than evades, the 
conditionality of thought – for then, what would be left to motivate a totalizing view? 
A retreat from experience can take institutional form in philosophy as a cleaving to a 
competent reiteration of exemplarity rather than experience of the alien. The fate of many 
philosophers is to become lost in a doctrine85 that is attributed to them and for that 
substitution to be lost as a possible item for reflection: the philosopher is thereby taken up 
within the same atmosphere of sanctioned neglect that was the initial subject of complaint. 
The actual encounter with historical effects within one’s own reflective efforts is forgone in 
favor of the analysis of the “argumentative content” of various narratives as to what 
constitutes our philosophical inheritance.  If committing to a philosophical beginning 
devolves into simply requiring that one select from among competing accounts, then 
philosophy as undergoing is lost: the disengaged, and therefore self-deceived, standpoint 
from which such a choice would be made is the epistemological subject all over again. As a 
                                                           
authoritatively) encourage us to fall back into routine and to lose the capacity to reflect on that routine.  Instead, we tend to 
see ourselves in the “reflected light” of our normal activities.    
85 For example, we are all too familiar with the standard Plato where the progression toward the really real departs from 
images and fulfills itself by contemplating the Good.  Plato tends to be received as advocating the superiority of the 
intellectual realm (e.g., love of what makes all beautiful conversations beautiful) over the sensible realm.  We are not as 
familiar, however, with the Plato that can not be summarized: philosophy progresses by desire and the condition for desire 
is a lack.  As the uncanny character Diotima conveys, to progress in love requires that we be between wisdom and 
ignorance.  A “positive” reading of Plato might assert that this between-ness is incompatible with doctrine: if we are loving 
properly, we are always only on the way to understanding lest we delude ourselves that we lack nothing.  Because desire 
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response that is dependent upon its singular conditions, refection carries along the 
fingerprint of an undergoing, which however must be responded to with cognizance of 
philosophy’s tendency for a flight to unconditionality. 
We have perhaps also grown comfortable with ways to think historically in 
philosophy about the determinative-ness of reflection.  One need only notice how easily one 
can acknowledge the determinative-ness of refection while remaining blind to how this 
admission is made too as if from nowhere. A loss of experience occurs immanently to 
philosophy today in the form of an admission that all thought is historically conditioned 
without discovering what that admission, made too as if from nowhere, could mean as a 
transformation of one’s philosophical practice. If one admits that thought is historically 
conditioned without foregrounding how history plays itself out in one’s thinking, one has 
made no admission at all. Insofar as it devolves into just an optional representation for 
today’s theorizer of the real (i.e., taken up within a “philosophical” stockpiling), the 
admission of the conditionality of thought fails as an impetus for novel reflection, for that 
admission can only point toward an experience rather than substitute for one. Because of the 
tendency to regard philosophical inheritance at an imagined distance, and because this 
position of the disengaged subject is always more familiar than a transformed thinking, it is 
possible to simultaneously 1) acknowledge inheritance as an un-excisable element of the 
anticipatory structure of understanding and 2) make that acknowledgment a substitute for 
reflection. 
                                                           
stems from lack, and only the gods are wise, one would have to be embodied in a deformed way (displaced desire) to 
imagine oneself as wise.   
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Even today when postmodernism is taken to be the predominant ethos, an 
eschatological desire to render history utterly past tends to repeat itself in disguise.86 Even 
philosophical post-modernism subtly performs its opposite when it is taken up as a portable 
method. Derrida identified a danger to deconstruction worse than its dismissal; namely, that 
it may become a portable method (a methodological option for an untransformed 
epistemological subject). In our “age of theory,” this danger has come to pass. Literary-
critical interpretation, even “deconstruction,” reverts to the latest set of rational principles to 
deal with presumably passive texts.  The arbitrariness of “choice” that coincides with the 
panorama of visual culture has rendered “deconstruction” available, when in fact Derrida’s 
thought is saturated with the unavailability of reflection due to the unreflective seizing of a 
“philosophical” beginning. By its worst practitioners, it has become part of the epicycles of 
fashion (concealing a stasis, an inactivity within an alleged difference). Or it has, like 
surrealism, become merely reactionary by either forming an alliance with irrationalism 
(thereby surrendering its claim to law altogether) or hypostasizing today’s irrationality as an 
irreducible strata of humanity. Thus we may regard deconstruction, despite its best efforts to 
be indigestible to a regressive tendency in society, to be susceptible to incorporation by an 
untransformed philosophical practice, even (perhaps) in virtue of its signature resistance to 
eschatology. Rather than license a reinvigorated dismissal of Derrida, however, the criticism 
above is an indication that we should read him all the more carefully in order to take the 
danger that he indicates with due seriousness. Like any philosopher that can become the 
subject of imitation while leaving a deformed embodiment intact, admission to the 
“acceptance-world” of untransformed practice indicates a failure, a regression. 
                                                           
86 Thought of the “post” in postmodernism largely revolves around the question of the role and status of history to 
philosophizing. Cf. Philosophy in History, ed. Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: 
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Critical reflection is possible, but by no means guaranteed, whenever progressive 
history skips a beat and belies its mythological grip upon imagination. As in Atget’s 
photographs that were telling of the decay of high capitalism for Benjamin, the ending of a 
way of life is the material condition for reflection upon its afterlife in regression. By 
disrupting philosophical depictions of site that still cleave to the tendency of mystification, 
we might sensitize our discrimination of today’s iteration of the loss of history.  Philosophy 
is likely to participate in barbarity unless we are capable of noticing how it can be recruited 
for a retreat into a myth of progress. Like Tillich’s iteration of Heidegger’s existentialia as 
spiritual a priori, one can simply enact an impoverished “history” (committed to the 
eschaton) even after having been inspired by a philosophical practice that begins by 
acknowledging that all thinking is historically conditioned.  
Were we to fully appreciate the difficulty with beginning to philosophize, we would 
concern ourselves with how reflection is blocked for us here, with the concomitant demand 
that we understand what this here is exactly. How does suffering happen such that reflection 
is prevented? One could proceed “philosophically” and describe without experience what it 
“means” to undergo our broken world by careful exposition of this or that thinker. Or (and it 
is this latter approach that I attempt), we can attempt to sustain reflection upon undergoing 
as a broken capacity for experience. Thus the question here is still the question of how to 
begin to philosophize, but modified so that what is at stake is whether we can begin to 
philosophize given this brokenness. 
 
 
 
                                                           
University Press, 1984). 
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The form (law) of philosophizing. 
Job, like K, is before the law. Because the setting of Job is pre-historic (before the 
law of the covenant), Job is literally before the law and, consequently, displays a displacing 
of purposes, destinies, fate and necessity that is evident in Kafka’s works as well. Like Job, 
K’s claim to innocence comes too late, for it leaves intact the law in terms of which things 
can’t fail to initially appear. The notion of law that emerges from these considerations is of a 
routinization, and thus the deadening, of life and the standardization of modes of 
apprehension. At stake is situating in the double sense of administration (placing things in 
their place) and also the administered world (site) as a field of integrating and marginalizing 
force.87  
From my reading of Job as a trial of law, a possibility emerges to estrange 
philosophical notions of site (the ‘situatedness’ of reflection) as trial. The notion of site 
(clearing/open region) is Heidegger’s critical concept that reminds philosophical reflection 
that philosophy tends to enact an effort to turn away from tradition,88 an effort that tends to 
be heard by one as resolvable by a properly attentive subject.  In Heidegger’s later language, 
site is that ontological atmosphere where/when things are “cleared” to be real in accordance 
with a dominant sense of the really real. This site legitimates our focus upon entities “as 
(actually or possibly, objectively, presently) cleared” and not on the eventuation of 
                                                           
87 I am employing “administration,” not in its narrow sense as administrative bureaucracy, but rather an ordering principle 
in society that is irrational in that it is “alien to the immanent ratio of the object”: “For that which is administered, 
administration is an external affair by which it is subsumed rather than comprehended…administration necessarily 
represents – without subjective guilt and without individual will – the general against the particular…the administrative 
instance – according to its own prescriptions and nature – must for the most part refuse to become involved in questions of 
immanent quality which regard the truth of the thing itself or its objective bases in general.” Theodor Adorno, “Culture and 
Administration,” The Culture Industry, Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge, 1991) 
112-113. 
88 Roughly, tradition is thought here as traditional conceptions of 1) site (our cosmic surroundings), 2) clearing (cosmic 
comings and goings of “entities”), 3) revealing/concealing (making the meaning of these comings and goings conceptually 
explicit and accessible to ourselves by the adoption of the right method), and 4) errancy (and thus avoiding error and 
irrationality). 
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clearing/withdrawing.89  My displacing of Heidegger’s site as trial is my attempt to be 
rigorously consistent with Heidegger’s mandate to respond to beings, and this displacing 
will avail itself of Adorno’s attempt to remain responsive to the ontic, although differently 
there as well. 
Even philosophical discourses that are designed to hold in reflection a tendency to 
overwhelm the object of understanding can nevertheless carry an apprehension or lawful 
detaining of the object.  In Heidegger’s meditative Denken, and differently in Adorno’s 
determinate negation, undergoing is figured through the manner of philosophical 
“composition.”  Formal indication, through successive passes, of where thinking finds itself 
(Heidegger), reveals a certain outline of undergoing.  Differently, negative dialectic and 
determinate negation (Adorno) reveal another outline of undergoing. I attempt to have my 
reading of Job arraign90 competing philosophical modes of composition in order to weigh 
attempts to have thinking transform in response to undergoing rather than remain appetitive 
with respect to it. 
The proximity with which I will place Adorno and Heidegger is meant to be 
disturbing so that my motivations for their separateness can be more readily discerned. The 
trial in Job is another taboo conjunction (albeit for those who ascribe to a divine, infallible 
moral system): a public declaration that attempts to bring into an intelligible relation the co-
occurrence of innocence and suffering. The disconcerting proximity of these incompatible 
orientations is not my choice as a “free” epistemological subject who stands at an allegedly 
neutral position between competing “philosophies,” but rather an attempt to describe where 
my thinking finds itself after having been challenged by an experience of “critical theory” to 
                                                           
89 Heidegger’s notion of site/clearing is the ontological atmosphere that ‘clears’ (for appearances and modes of 
comportment) by withdrawing (from thematization).  Cf. Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” Basic Writings, ed. 
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reorient my thinking from an initially Heideggarian orientation. As with conversation 
(which requires a willingness to be changed), the pain of defamiliarization, the threat of 
difference, tends to ward away the challenge of experience. Social brokenness registers in 
the institutions of philosophy in terms of a tendency to use one’s orientation as a defense: 
“orientation” degenerates into a defense against an experience of other orientations. Just as 
experience is always of alterity, the demand of beginning to philosophize from experience 
necessitates that we betray any substitution for experience in the best possible way.  
I attempt to engage the question of how to begin to philosophize (as Heidegger takes 
himself to be doing) by recognizing my participation in, and deformity with respect to, what 
Adorno describes as a damaged capacity for experience. Insofar as Heidegger’s thinking 
translates the violence done to beings into a rarified idiom from which it becomes difficult 
to recognize violence in my own case (and thereby to initiate reflection), Heidegger’s idiom 
must be translated into the Da- that governs today.  Insofar as the ending of the tradition of 
metaphysics is inflected differently today, reflection finds its opposite within a mere 
reiteration of ‘ready-to-hand’ phraseology. Formulations of site (the “ending of 
metaphysics”) show by their ‘ritualistic,’ academic availability the necessity for their 
translation, especially insofar as the ending Heidegger detects is both never simply past and 
is iterated rather than frozen. Even if a simple replication of the ‘results’ of SZ were all one 
desired (a perversion of thinking in any event), historicity is always only history differently. 
Ritualized speaking is the apophatic in disguise. 
                                                           
David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 113. 
90 A term that we encounter in Job as y‘d in 9:19. 
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The “magical” reconciliation of universal and particular is protected by a silence, a 
transcendental ineffability.91 In addition, silent decisions are made when you put a premium 
on being human to the extent that you are capable of taking the third-person perspective 
(i.e., to be objective). While Adorno is certainly committed to critique silence,92 a silence 
surrounds non-identity. On Adorno’s account, philosophy typically lapses into a false 
identity93 that only the negation of the “positivity” of experience can remedy.  Adorno’s 
descriptions of the endangerment of experience (the “absence” of subjectivity, judgment, 
reflection…) flirt with negative totality (i.e., complete occlusion) that cannot literally be true 
without undermining the very possibility of the thought that Adorno purports to be 
entertaining.  Adorno’s position cannot be that a genuinely critical vantage is unavailable 
altogether without rendering mysterious the possibility of reflection. While effective in 
preventing an identification of the non-identical that would enable philosophy to 
“capitalize” upon it, Adorno’s expression of negative totality tend to obscure the bit of non-
identity that informs negative dialectic from the start. Consequently, while in many ways 
my project favors a “critical theory” orientation, I also attempt to address the following 
questions that emerge:  Is any “positive” conception of an experiential beginning fated to 
substitute a mythical immanence for critical practice? Does having a sense of some element 
of non-identity allow for something like Heidegger’s formal indication in a “critical 
theory”?  Perhaps the notion of trial from Job can help generate a discussion of undergoing 
as enabling a creative transformation of having-been.94  As either a writing of that which 
                                                           
91 Sarah Ley Roff “Benjamin and Psychoanalysis,” The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) 125. 
92 “The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition of all truth.” Negative Dialectics 17-18  Heidegger’s silence 
regarding the Shoah is also of concern here. 
93 What H calls “Knowing” in SZ is not the same as TA’s identitarian thinking. TA’s account of identity thinking describes 
one “asserted” form of Heidegger’s knowing-the-vorhand. 
94 I will turn in a later section to Job’s “repetition” of the pious term “righteousness” as a matter of legal “innocence.” 
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presents itself as withdrawing (Heidegger) or of that which exceeds the concept (Adorno), 
these philosophical positions betray95 deep conceptions of language. 
Reading Job is a way I might come to understand better my philosophical 
commitments in order to come to be otherwise. I must be capable of something akin to 
Heidegger’s experience of being blocked,96 but in the present instance by the very 
philosophical dispositions (whether “phenomenological” or “critical”) that are to orient us to 
experience.  This experience is only possible other than either Heidegger or Adorno, for 
experience is always of difference. The ability to voice a matter differently is just what 
mastery of an orientation is: for otherwise, the redeployment of terms becomes a mere 
mentioning rather than indication of actual lived circumstances and “orientation” becomes 
appetitive rather than a revisable opening-toward.  
 
Alternate Compositional Form 
The possibility that matter in its recalcitrance to formation might orient thinking 
hibernates in philosophical aesthetics, although, as aesthetics, materialist discourse is 
marginalized (alienated from truth in its dominant form as a purportedly autonomous reason 
that determines a disenchanted, supposedly “dead” nature).97 The attempt to write suffering 
must somehow stage its inherent antipathy to a dominant regime of meaning.98 Job’s trial 
(an attempt to bring into an intelligible relation the co-occurrence of innocence and 
                                                           
95 With Derrida, I am interested here in how repression is betrayed (thereby traceable) by the attempt to have a desire leave 
no trace in terms of the textual “manifest content” of an authoritative discourse. 
96 Heidegger’s philosophy begins with an experience of being blocked. The roadblocks that Heidegger experiences in the 
introduction to Being and Time prevent critical reflection of ‘the historical and subjective mediation of truth’ (to 
deliberately borrow the idiom of Adorno). Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY 
Press, 1996) 1-3. 
97 I am gesturing toward a philosophy of the fragment, which depends upon the loss of place, a “break in tradition” that 
delivers the classified in fragments.  To impose an aesthetic harmony (a logical cohesiveness) upon fragments would 
reinstate the violence with which fragments had been rendered fragments. Cf. “Aesthetic alienation” in J.M. Bernstein, The 
Fate of Art, Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1992). 
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suffering), in particular Job’s linguistic subversion of the piety and partiality of his “painful 
consolers” (16:23), is a staging of this sort.  Textual criticism, as an attempt to rescue the 
un-subsumable moments of the text from vanishing into an intelligible, exchange value 
(“the” meaning of indeterminate meaning) is also a thinking that returns to materiality – in 
this case that of the text. 
Were Job to engage in traditional lament, he could only remain “unknown” to 
himself, 99 for the available language of protest skews what Job undergoes. Just as the lyre 
must be tuned differently so that it may “emit unaccustomed sounds,”100 Job summons his 
audience to hear what is normally a moral issue as a legal one. A cluster of legal terms in 
Job 9 signals a decisive shift in Job’s manner of speaking from traditional lament to public 
statement.101 Under the auspices of the friends’ moral wisdom, the materiality of Job’s 
suffering is sacrificed to an intelligible ideal – the oldest and most common theodicy (that 
suffering is punishment). Job’s trial attempts to disrupt the force of discursiveness (the 
ideological assumptions of Psalmic wisdom).102 
An inability to respond to suffering, to have it grip us before it is conceptualized, is 
part of an alienation from sensibility as a bearer of meaning. Contrary to the philosophically 
modern reduction of sensibility to sight, Job’s trial (literally a hearing) helps us articulate 
the conditions under which listening might occur despite its regression. Between the tearing 
of Job’s robe (1:20) and the roar of El’s whirlwind (38-41), Job initiates a public testimony 
                                                           
98 This is how we might think of Blanchot’s L'Ecriture du désastre. Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster, trans. 
Ann Smock (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
99 “I do not know myself” (9:21).  
100 James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press 1998) 103. 
101 For legal terms in Job 9-10, Cf. Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job: A Commentary (Old Testament Library) 
(Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1985) 188.  
102 Specifically, this assumption is that a contrite petitioner uses the language of praise in an “unapologetically 
transactional” manner as “inducements for deliverance.” According to Newsom, Job’s use of legal terms fulfils three 
functions: 1) to parody the allegedly self-evident correctness of hymnic praise; 2) to focus his thoughts so that he can 
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in response to the oppression of Seeing Eye (7:8) and Watcher of Humans (7:20) that must 
arrange its place of intelligibility.103 One is thereby called to appear differently in such a 
place, for to allow that which is alien to transform appearance in the direction of a new 
index is threatening – as evidenced by the repression marshaled against the inherent 
plurivocality of Job.  
Rather than argue from a determination of Hebrew terms, which in any case is 
nothing short of suspect with a text such as Job, I understand Job to be radically heterodox: 
Job’s materiality resists being placed within any convention. Interpretation of Job requires 
something akin to a trial: In expecting that every material element of Job must play a role in 
an order, understanding turns cold.  My strategy instead is to confront instances of a 
particular kind of coldness where questions of indeterminacy have been left in abeyance. In 
doing so, philosophical reflection undergoes the demand to transform its own law of 
composition (away from the normal demands of authorization, of passage), yielding to, 
instead of overcoming, impasse. 
 
The Trial of Philosophy 
There are several ways I see law as integral to the intransigence of empirical reality: 
1) the administrative ordering of bodies, 2) the order of intelligibility and legitimacy, 3) 
routinization and habituation (including the dynamic of projection and disavowal), 4) the 
standardization of modes of apprehension and recognition, 5) a regime of conceptuality (not 
conceptuality as such) 6) “necessity” ascribed to “Nature,” “God,” etc., through 
authoritative discourses such as philosophy, and 7) mythical reconciliation of the sufferer 
                                                           
envision untraditional possibilities, and 3) to explore and reconfigure his situation. Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job, A 
Contest of Moral Imaginations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 152-156. 
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with an extant order of things. The basic thought derives from Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory: 
What is lacking is a rationality that is responsive to the articulateness of material itself (the 
singularity of each occurrence of suffering) rather than assertive of presumptive 
“rationality” over the presumptive “inarticulateness” of materiality. Thus a program 
emerges for a “trial” of philosophy: to explore the possibility that suffering can yet signify 
after a precise negation of that form (law in whichever of the overlapping senses above) that 
provokes suffering to signify other than according to its own index.  With the next chapter, 
“A Wayward Passage,” the trial begins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
103 Once YHWH answers Job from the whirlwind, the sight of YHWH merely reduces Job to silence. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
A HOMELESS CRY OF PAIN AND EL THE UN-MAKER 
 
Introduction 
At an emotional high point in 16:18-21, Job imagines his cry of pain wandering 
homeless.104  Job conceives of his suffering105 as potential testimony to his innocence rather 
than guilt.  The Earth must not conceal the evidence and his outcry must continue to 
reverberate until it is heard.106 Job briefly entertains that his cry will have no place until an 
advocate hears it, but he quickly rejects this as a hope beyond hope.107 This chapter explores 
whether Job can successfully change the context within which innocence is decidable: it is 
critical that Job’s litigation forms a public place so that he can be heard. 
Place and meaning are interrelated in Job.  First, the friends are situated within a 
traditional response to suffering as affliction for moral transgression. Second, YHWH’s 
creation is one not only of order but also of chaos.  As Job contends, El disrupts creation, 
misdirecting and undermining discernment for the nations and individuals.  Third, Job 
institutes a public hearing to re-contextualize suffering as a legal case.  
                                                           
104 “Oh Earth, cover not my blood and let my cry have no place” (16:18) is possibly an allusion to Abel’s innocent blood. 
“I cry out “Violence!” [hamas] but I get no answer; I call out, but there is no litigation.” (19:7) Norman C. Habel, The 
Book of Job (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985) 274, 290.  
105 Misery or trouble is denoted by the term ‘$m$l, which carries overtones of hardship and evil. The term ‘$m$l seems to 
refer to “punishment” when used by the friends, but refers to “agony” in Job’s speeches. In addition to ‘$m$l, the term 
r!gez appears to denote turmoil.  The term ‘$m$l is a major concept in Qoheleth.  The Book of Job, 103, 109. 
106 Edwin M. Good, In Turns of Tempest, A Reading of Job with a Translation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1990) 248. 
107 There are three such emotional high points in which Job hopes for someone powerful enough to intercede on his behalf 
in his dispute with El.  The figures he calls upon are an arbiter (9:33), avenger (19:24-27) and advocate (16:20-21).  Job 
concedes that this route is fantasy, however.  Cf. In Turns of Tempest, 74, 264.  
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Terms that designate a place may also mark places of designation, in the sense that 
meaningfulness is determined by site.108 The context wherein Job’s suffering appears 
determines how it appears, as either real guilt (against the backdrop of conventional 
wisdom) or apparent guilt (against the backdrop of a court). 
As an anti-theodicy, Job takes aim at the axiomatic unreason that interprets suffering 
as guilt.   Were Job to adhere to the normal allocation of suffering to the jurisdiction of 
moral, retributive law, Job’s innocence would remain unaddressed. By employing a 
different modality of lawfulness (forensic rather than moral), Job contests the jurisdiction of 
wisdom to his case. The pursuit of litigation is a departure from the conciliatory course with 
El that conventional wisdom prescribes. Presumably, El is exempt from accountability to 
human justice. Job’s arraignment of El is a reversal of the normal role of God as the litigator 
against a wayward Israel. 
Job must initiate a change in context from retributive justice to a lawsuit.109  This 
change is accomplished through the appropriation of terms from their normal moral 
deployment. Job contests the limits of intelligibility as a limit to hearing (his friends can’t 
hear Job, literally) by initiating a hearing (trial as recontextualization). 
The hearing that Job seeks is both an audible margin and a legal proceeding against 
the oldest and most common theodicy (that suffering is punishment).110  Between the tearing 
of Job’s robe (1:20) and the roar of El’s whirlwind (38-41), Job protests through deploying 
law differently. Unless Job can establish a court through linguistic subversion, then the piety 
                                                           
108 “The term m$q!m [16:18, 28:1, and 30:23], with its specific connotation of ‘designated place’…remains suitably 
ambiguous and thus covers any “place,” be it a hiding place, a burial place, or a place of residence.” The Book of Job, 265.  
The term m$q!m comes to be an epithet for YHWH. 
109 Mi&p$%.  See 9:19, 32.  
110 Speaking of an atmosphere that pervades contemporary Christendom, Crenshaw states that “they have created an 
unholy trinity that comprises an authoritarian deity made in their own image, an inerrant and infallible Scripture, and self-
proclaimed all-knowing interpreters who alone understand this non-existent text.” James L. Crenshaw, Defending God, 
Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 117, 181. 
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and partiality of his “painful consolers” (16:23) will remain as the only manner in which 
guilt and innocence are decidable.  If Job cannot be heard, then his guilt remains a forgone 
conclusion.  Unless Job can indict El in court (hearing as a trial), his guilt is ruled out of 
court.  
Marginality in Job is audible.  Job’s public saying builds a place (court) of 
intelligibility so that Job can be heard. 
   
Oh that I had someone to hear me- 
 here is my mark; let Shaddai answer me- 
and the inscription my accuser has written (31:35 Good) 
 
Hearing normally has the educative connotation of attentive listening within Biblical 
literature.111  Just as the lyre must be tuned differently so that it may “emit unaccustomed 
sounds.”112 Job summons his audience to hear what is normally a moral issue as a legal one.  
In Job 12, Job wishes to speak (yk') to the god so that his argument (t!ka'at) and 
accusations (r(b!t) can be heard.113 Job announces a consideration of legal preliminaries by 
repeatedly imploring others to hear (13:6,16,17).  For example, in 13:17, Job says, “Listen 
closely to my arguments; Give my declarations a hearing.”  Both Habel and Scholnick see 
the verb pll in 16:17b (“my plea [pll] is pure”) as the right to be heard.114 In Job 31, Job puts 
his signature (his mark) on the claim for a trial, wishes in return that he had the formal 
charges against him in written form, and asks that a court official (a “hearer”) might take up 
his claim.115    
                                                           
111 Defending God,188. 
112 James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press 1998) 103. 
113 In Turns of Tempest, 236. 
114 The Book of Job, 265. See also Sylvia H. Scholnick, “The Meaning of Mi&p$% in the Book of Job” JBL 101/4 (1982) 
256. 
115 Cf. In Turns of Tempest, 315. 
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 The disruption of place is the immanent cause of suffering [Figure 1].  As the text 
modulates place from domesticity, the body, Job’s immediate community, a council at law, 
and the cosmos, “The Maker” is an un-maker.  El violently intervenes in nested spheres: the 
affliction of Job’s body, the destruction of his prosperity, the intimidation of the court 
should El show his face, and (appearing as Yahweh) the challenge from the whirlwind.  
Consequently, Job’s cry wanders homelessly (16:18) through these nested spheres and, as it 
encounters specific displacements, acquires form.116  From curse to legal challenge to oath 
of purity, Job’s complaint attains a range of articulations, requiring in each case a reflection 
upon place as disrupted. 
If Job’s trial is successful in negating the normal meaning of suffering (punishment 
in accord with a just deity), will his suffering still signify?  Does Job’s innocence simply 
remain unintelligible despite Job’s litigation? 
 
The Presumption of Guilt and Job’s Suffering 
Job’s description of his suffering is charged with frightening imagery.117 Job 
undergoes the murder of his children and the affliction of bodily sores from head to toe 
(1:13-19, 2:7-8). The accusation made by his “consolers of pain/painful consolers” (16:2) 
(that Job must have done something wrong to merit such “punishment”) intensifies his  
 
 
                                                           
116 Nemo writes, “no properly dramatic development can be detected…” and nevertheless, “Job’s mad discourse…albeit in 
a negative manner, acquires meaning.”  I agree but with the following qualifications: displacement is the motor of 
“dramatic development,” and consequently, “acquires meaning” is too strong to capture the sense of trial that I am 
attempting here, in which meaning is precisely what is contested but not eschewed altogether. Philippe Nemo, Job and the 
Excess of Evil, trans. Michael Kigel (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne UP, 1998) 78.  
117 When I lie down I say, “When will I rise?” The night drags on and I cry, “I am fed up with twisting until dawn.” (7:4) 
At night he [El] bores out my bones, My gnawing pain never lies down (30:17 Good). 
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Figure 1: 
El the (Un)Maker, Disruption of Place/Dislocation 
 
 
 
COSMOS: 
YHWH’s Leviathan is supernatural chaos, kept within bounds 
The cosmic insignificance of humanity, YHWH’s susceptibility to provocation 
 
CREATION: 
YHWH’s delight in the violence of animals according with their natures 
YHWH’s Behemoth is natural chaos, kept within bounds 
 
TEMPEST: 
YHWH’s terrifying presence from the whirlwind, Intimidation of Proceedings, the Arm of El 
 
OPRESSION OF THE SEEING EYE /THE SIEGE OF EL THE GIBBOR 
Darkens the world and leads nations astray 
TRIBE: 
Job’s lower status than even the outcasts, absence of consolers 
 
FAMILY: 
Murder of children and servants 
Wife’s provocation to curse God and die 
 
BODY: 
Job resembles dust and ash 
Job’s own clothes abhor him 
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suffering, for those he has loved best have turned against him (19:13-19).  The inability to 
hear Job reveals that the friends are party to a “closed horizon of technical operations.”118 
Eliphaz, Bildad, Zophar and Elihu embody the tribal wisdom of their respective 
places of origin.  But each “reasons” from Job’s suffering to Job’s “guilt.”119  According to 
the hymnic traditions, “A degraded appearance was considered public evidence of past 
debauchery or present divine affliction.”120 The presumption of Job’s guilt is based upon his 
pathetic appearance and misfortune: “My gaunt appearance testifies against me” (16:8).121 
Job’s appearance is of emphatic mortality: he is dust and ashes not just in the standard sense 
of “mortal.” Job comes to resemble the clay from which mortals are made; his appearance is 
that of dust and ashes (30:19).122 
The friend’s positions are memorials to past wisdom: “Your old maxims are 
proverbs of ashes” (13:12).123 The typical argument presented by wisdom literature is that 
one will prosper if one can discern the order of creation that is established by god and 
conduct one’s life accordingly.124 To deploy the old maxims “plasters” over Job’s 
innocence: Job’s friends are “plasterers” (fabricators) of lies (13:4). Job’s friends are less 
“consolers of pain” as they are painful consolers.125 The friends’ defense of El is 
knowledgeable partiality. 
                                                           
118 Job and the Excess of Evil, 69,70. 
119 Eliphaz’s question, can a person be more righteous than Eloah, sets the stage thematically (4:17).  Bildad emphasizes 
that it is simply impossible for God to act unjustly (8:3).  Zophar (11:6c) argues that Job’s “punishment” is lenient.  Elihu’s 
temper flares over Job’s insistence that he justify himself at the expense of God. Cf. James L. Crenshaw, Defending God, 
Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 120-127. 
120 The Book of Job, 271. 
121 The Book of Job, 166. 
122 The Book of Job, 420. 
123 Examples of this reasoning by the friends abound. To cite just one, Eliphaz states that Job’s suffering (‘$m$l ) is evil 
reaped for sin (4:6). 
124 Roland E. Murphy, The Tree of Life, An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom Literature, 2nd ed.  (Cambridge, UK: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1996) 115. Job’s pre-catastrophe piety (1:5) implies that he too “feared” El (i.e., he believed that 
righteousness garners protection and was anxious to perform rituals to protect his children). 
125 The conjunction in 16:23 of painful (‘$m$l) and consolers (n'm) allows for either reading. The Book of Job, 270. 
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According to Job, his friends lack loyalty (6:14). Job is insignificant in comparison 
to the theodicy that is to explain his plight, which is the true object of the friend’s loyalty. 
Their loyalty is to a moral regime of conceptuality.  Job is treated like something to be 
bartered over, like a commodity (6:27).126 Their “reasoning” attempts to guarantee 
suffering’s meaning by way of a context-transcendent absolute (i.e., a moral axiom).  But in 
doing so, that reasoning entails no meaning in the sense that the capacity to experience Job 
has been driven out. Rather than be experienced, Job’s consolers insist that his suffering is 
an instance of a rule (retributive justice).127  
According to his friends, Job must relinquish his complaint as misguided and 
acquiesce in the “justice” of God’s judgment, of which Job’s suffering is the only visible 
part.  Because Job’s suffering can’t be heard in any other way than as just punishment, there 
is no hearing (experience) and Job’s case is ruled literally ‘out of court.’ The friends absolve 
themselves by reference to a distant realm of theological “facts.”  
Because he is innocent, Job’s suffering is non-identical to just punishment meted out 
according to a heavenly moral order.  In order that his suffering be grounds for a critique of 
the attribution of moral order to the cosmos, Job must stage his suffering’s antipathy to its 
normal meaning. Job implores that they clasp their hand over their mouths in astonishment 
and disgust that El could have done this for no reason (21:5).128 
  
 
 
 
                                                           
126 The Book of Job, 143. 
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Order/Disorder/Place 
Job frustrates the explanation that suffering is “purposeful.” Unlike traditional 
(Leibnizian) theodicy, human suffering in Job is not part of God’s design.129 God in Job is 
fallible in the sense of being susceptible to provocation by the Adversary and does not know 
the future (for otherwise the wager would be meaningless). Job’s suffering has “divine 
purpose” only in satisfying the conditions for a wager between Elohim and “the adversary” 
or “the prosecutor”130 as to whether Job’s piety is “for nothing” (1:9, 2:3).131 Innocent 
suffering is the means of adjudication as to whether the divinity or the Adversary wins the 
wager between them.132  
Having been subject to unjustified cruelty as part of a wager, Job’s suffering reveals 
something about the character of El.  Namely, that the cosmic order is not orderly at all: El 
is responsible for the dislodging of things from their place and “we know [yd‘] not” (9:5-6). 
Job’s former place in society has been disrupted; everyone who was once near is now 
distant.133 The disruption of place occurs as the immanent place of Job’s body: El is a 
violent warrior (gibbor134) who “breaches” Job repeatedly (16:14).135 Job’s nephesh (not just 
“soul” but Job’s whole, bodily being) has been dislodged.136 To Job, God is an unrelenting 
                                                           
127 One can argue that the divine, whatever it might be, could not be experienced either in such a system, for the divinity is 
reduced to the category of reaction (In Search of Divine Presence, 491) 
128 In Turns of Tempest, 266. 
129 Gottfried W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil, trans. E. 
M. Huggard, ed. Austin Marsden Farrer (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1988). 
130 Citing the work of Vermeylen, Crenshaw states that the oldest form of the story of Job might have lacked the character 
ha##$%$n altogether, with Job’s wife and friends functioning as the Adversary. James L. Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and 
Probing Questions, Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995) 437.  
Good prefers “Prosecutor” for ha##$%$n. 
131 Defending God, 69. 
132 The wager is whether disinterested piety exists. Means-ends rationality also finds expression in the moral axiom of 
retributive justice. James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press 1998) 92. 
133 r'q. In Turns of Tempest, 255. 
134 Cf. Yahweh as warrior in Exodus 15:3 (where Yahweh is both warrior and healer), and Ps 39:13 (where the removal of 
Yahweh's gaze is similar to Job 7:19). 
135 The Book of Job, 268. 
136 Job and the Excess of Evil, 37. 
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Seeing Eye (7:8) and Watcher of Humans (7:20).  Job wishes he had a respite from God’s 
gaze, even if it is just long enough to swallow (7:19).  El’s incessant watching (7:19) is a 
cruel, oppressive presence. Because he is that faithful servant who is tasked with spying on 
creation, the Adversary magnifies El’s surveillance. 
As he pursues an arraignment of El, Job considers that God is likely to disrupt a 
hearing were one to take place. Job implores El to spare Job his terrible hand and allow the 
legal proceedings to occur without intimidation (13:21). 
In Job 12, “The disorder is both cosmic and social.”137 God destroys the established 
orders of creation and society. He darkens the world and leads nations astray. Habel notes 
that “The governing image of this intricate poem [12:1-13:5] is one of aimless wandering” 
(217). The language in Job 12 is one of subversion, deprivation and contempt, of pre-
creation darkness (v. 25a) and chaos (v. 24b).138 God deprives leaders of sanity and subverts 
their authority. Despite being the author of the order of creation, El disrupts that order (9:5-
6).139 
 
Hope 
Although the friends advocate for a reconciliation with El, the sufferer’s need for 
pain to stop immediately renders patience for a future relief an impossible burden to 
fulfill.140 “What strength have I to keep hoping?  What future have I to keep going?  Is my 
strength the strength of rocks? Or my flesh made of bronze?” (6:11,12). 
                                                           
137 In Turns of Tempest, 235. 
138 In Turns of Tempest, 235. 
139 The Book of Job, 191. 
140 On the resiliency of narrative bodies versus real ones: Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral 
Imaginations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 135.  
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Job rejects the possibility of an afterlife. 141 Trees rather than humans can expect to 
renew after being cut down.  Hope is for the trees (14:7).  Time is running out: 
 
He’s going to kill me; I cannot wait, but I must argue my ways to 
his face (13:15 Good) 
 
Job declares that he will prepare his charges against El: it is a middle way between hope (a 
tree has hope but not humans) and despair (relinquishing his claim to innocence). Job also 
considers the possibility that a powerful third party might intervene on his behalf, but he 
abandons this thought.142  The alternative to pursuing his case, according to the JPS 
translation of 9:27, would be for Job to abandon his “sorrow,” (literally “face”).143 The 
regimen of acceptable speech prevents Job from airing, or even articulating in a way that 
might be heard, that his suffering is to be mourned.144 Perhaps, in the seven days of Job’s 
silence following Job’s catastrophes – when his world was effectively un-made,145 Job 
contemplated the problem that the condition for his appearance as a subject already denied 
him subjectivity, for “The public sphere is constituted in part by what can appear, and the 
regulation of the sphere of appearance is one way to establish what will count as reality, and 
what will not.”146 
                                                           
141 For more on Job 14:13-17 and his rejection of an afterlife, Cf. James L. Crenshaw, "Flirting with the Language of 
Prayer,” Prophets, Sages & Poets (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2006) 6-13, 201-03. 
142 As for the notion of an intercessor (arbiter, redeemer and avenger): “This daring concept (9:33) disappears almost as 
abruptly as it occurs, only to return a second (16:19) and third time (19:25) with greater tenacity.” James L. Crenshaw, Old 
Testament Wisdom, an Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press 1998) 435. The outcry for some 
powerful agent of help appears to register moments of desperation rather than the supposition of an actual agent with the 
requisite power.  I analyze 9:33, 16:19, and 19:25 in detail in the chapter, “Fear the Text.” 
143 Face, arraign (y‘d, 9:19) and answer (‘nh; 9:3, 14, 15, 16, 32) are intermingled within Job.  When Job describes his 
friends as showing partiality as they argue God’s case, “showing partiality is literally ‘lifting the face’.” The Book of Job, 
A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 160.  Job’s vulnerability and exposure to El’s ceaseless watching and violence indicates 
a terrible, oppressive presence.  Now that he is afflicted, Job’s status concerning the outcasts has undergone a reversal and 
they show no hesitation to spit in Job’s face (30:1-11). “Yet I am not silenced by the thick darkness that covers my face” 
(23:17). On this last passage see The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 165, and The Book of Job, 346. 
144 “It is precisely because one does not want to loose one’s status as a viable speaking being that one does not say what 
one thinks.” Judith Butler, Precarious Life, The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004) xix-xx. 
145 Cf. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain, The Making and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford UP, 1985). 
146 Precarious Life, xx. 
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Undergoing 
Job announces his determination to pursue his case by stating, “I do not know [yd‘] 
myself” (9:21). Because El is the direct cause of unjust suffering, Job’s world has largely 
been rendered unintelligible.147 Job’s effort to come to know himself must contend with the 
normal grounds of intelligibility for suffering (retributive justice) which provokes the 
appearance of guilt from the occurrence of suffering.  
El’s siege against Job obstructs any way out.148 As Newsom notes, “As torture 
annihilates bodily integrity, so it destroys the subjectivity necessary for selfhood.”149 Job 
remains unknown to himself as a consequence of prevailing “order,” in the double sense of 
the retributive order and the divine wager. 
Job’s public declaration is not an argument in a conventional sense (made to advance 
a position that the lawyer does not necessarily believe).  Rather, Job’s “argument” is 
principally the prospect of shifting the context where guilt and innocence are decidable. 
Job’s argument cannot be something assembled from pre-given elements.  Job’s case is 
constituted by what he has undergone, rather than what can be known through the wisdom 
of tradition.150  Job must articulate his case as the precise difference from every way one is 
usually disposed to suffering and calamity moralistically (as punishment). 
Job’s reasoning about guilt and innocence evolves: 
 
                                                           
147 Nemo identifies this loss of world as the “excess of evil” and treats it under the concept of anxiety.  However, I 
maintain that while Job’s bodily suffering is not necessarily distinct from a loss of world, bodily suffering does occupy 
moments of its own in Job that might collapse into the concept of anxiety too quickly. Accordingly, I attempt in my 
reading to provide both moments of displacement (of meaning and bodily “displacement”). For Nemo’s argument for a 
“predominance of the theme of anxiety over that of suffering,” cf. Job and the Excess of Evil, 18. 
148 “He has walled up my roadway; I cannot pass.  He has covered my pathway with darkness” (Habel 19:8).  
149 Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 144. 
150 Whereas Job knows the wisdom his friends propose (12:3, 13:1-2), “Job’s case is the way (derek) he has lived.” The 
Book of Job, 230. Derek is “an expression which carries connotations in Job of ‘destiny / life record.’” The Book of Job, 
230.   
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Of course, the friends could not conceive that the deity could be 
guilty, and therefore to them Job was the only possible candidate.  
Job began somewhere near there, but he came to think that perhaps 
the god is wicked (“Earth is given over to a wicked hand,” 9.24), 
then to think that the god’s structure of favor and blame was the 
opposite of that of humans (chap. 21), and later to think decisively 
that he, Job, was innocent and the god was guilty (chap. 27).  In 
chap. 31 he pulled back, asserting only that he himself was innocent 
without detailing what the god was.151 
 
The law that is being tested in Job’s public statement is the law (order) of intelligibility.  
Language both opens and encloses envisioned possibilities (imagination) within a certain 
range; it inscribes the intelligible. Were Job to engage in traditional lament, he could only 
remain “unknown” to himself, for the available language of protest skews what Job 
undergoes.   
 
Deploying Law Differently 
The disruption of place by El necessitates that Job deploy law differently, for El is 
that performative force that seeks to ground law.152 Job’s case must contest the place where 
his alleged guilt is a matter of course; but the place he must contest is none other than the 
creation of El and the way fidelity to this order has been memorialized in traditional 
wisdom. 
YHWH begins his initial speech from the whirlwind by claiming that Job (if Job is 
the one to which YHWH is referring) “darkens” the divine, creative design (38:2).  
 
                                                           
151 In Turns of Tempest, 355. 
152 Nemo argues for the doxographical equivalence of God, Law, and World.  Job and the Excess of Evil, 53.  While they 
might achieve a certain conventional interchangeability in practice, I am not convinced that criticism should equate these 
terms.  Rather, it seems better to follow Butler’s suggestion of a difference between sovereignty and law in her reading of 
Foucault: “Sovereignty…seeks to supply the ground for law with no particular aim in sight other than to show or exercise 
the self-grounding power of sovereignty itself: law is grounded in something other than itself, in sovereignty, but 
sovereignty is grounded in nothing besides itself.” Precarious Life, 94. 
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It seems to me that this initial speech also addresses the charge that 
God presides over a chaotic world, for in describing the creation of 
the world Yahweh uses language of precise measurement, secure 
foundations, and cornerstones.  The same point is made differently 
when Yahweh claims to have laid a statute on the sea, 
commandments on the morning, and ordinances on the heavens.  In 
Yahweh’s view, even the rain has channels and lighting has paths, 
while snow and hail are held in abeyance until their proper time.153 
 
Despite the portrait YHWH draws of precise administration, the god that appears to Job is 
not that of traditional Wisdom.  For as Crenshaw notes, Israel’s wisdom maintained that 
“Where God and his will become manifest, life coheres.”154 In contrast, Job 12 paints quite 
a different picture of the effects of the god’s administration.  
Even if YHWH is able to refute the charges as Job articulates them in Job 12, 
Behemoth is the first of God’s works (40:19), and Behemoth represents natural evil.155  
Consequently, “The author of the divine speeches in the book of Job seems to attribute the 
creation of chaos, or evil, to YHWH, unless first here means preeminence of rank rather 
than chronological priority.”156  Good’s assessment of the divine speeches (38:2-40:2) 
echoes Job’s complaints: “Yahweh’s apparently single-minded self-glorification portrays an 
ambiguous world, whose order contains disorder, whose disorder undermines the order.”157  
Job’s legal claim is that El permits mortals to suffer regardless as to whether their 
guilt is real or only apparent.158 Job’s initial mode of protest is to utter curses designed to 
unmake the creation of the day of his birth.  Because he cannot undo his birth, Job’s co-
opting of moral language is an attempt to make his circumstances intelligible and an attempt 
to build a public place to convince his community of his innocence and restore his standing. 
                                                           
153 Urgent Advice and Probing Questions, 460. 
154 Urgent Advice and Probing Questions, 497. 
155 Urgent Advice and Probing Questions, 457.  Behemoth = natural evil, leviathan = supernatural evil 
156 James L. Crenshaw, Defending God, 187-188. Cf. Isa 45:7 for the view that Yahweh creates both weal and woe. In 
Sirach (and elsewhere under Stoic influence) dualism attempts to resolve the issue of opposites.  
157 In Turns of Tempest, 348. 
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Job’s public-saying attempts to wrest from the hegemony of moral language the possibility 
of a novel (though not utterly novel) place; that is, that one may be innocent and afflicted. 
According to convention, )dq can either mean morally pure or legally innocent.159 In 9:2-4, 
Job appropriates )dq from a moral-religious discourse (from Eliphaz’s defense of divine 
justice) to a legal discourse.160  As a moral issue, Job’s case is already decided; as a legal 
issue, Job’s case might be heard. 
A cluster of legal terms in Job 9 signals a decisive shift in Job’s manner of speaking 
from traditional lament to public statement (’mr). Due to a forensic context, Habel argues 
that the verb “speak” (dbr) in 13:3 is to “state one’s case” or “specify charges.”161 Job 
declares in Job 13 that he has prepared a case (mi&p$%) and knows that he is innocent ()dq). 
Job spells out a formula for cross examination and invites the participation of the god: “Call, 
and I will answer, / or I will speak and you respond to me” (13:22 Good). Habel also argues 
that the verb “instruct” (yk' in 9:33, 32:12) is to “argue or arbitrate a case” and that #(a' in 
23:2 is “complaint.”162  
An ideological assumption of psalmic wisdom is put on trial by Job’s shift to legal 
terms.163 Specifically, this assumption is that a contrite petitioner uses the language of praise 
in an “unapologetically transactional” manner as “inducements for deliverance.”164 
According to Newsom, Job’s use of legal terms fulfils three functions: 1) to parody the 
                                                           
158 The Book of Job, 199. 
159 The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 143, 185. In Turns of 
Tempest, 70.  
160 The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations 151. Job 6:29 is the first instance where Job indicates that )dq is at 
stake.  In 9:2-4, Habel translates Job as using )dq in a forensic sense as innocent. See also 19:14-15 for “righteous” ()dq) 
deployed as “innocent.” Cf. Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament, Vol. 14, G. Johannes Botterweck, Helmer 
Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2004) 2.  
161 The Book of Job, 223. 
162 The Book of Job, 348. The noun #(a' refers to meditation, usually thought of as a murmuring sound.  
163 Cf. The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 152. 
164 The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 156. 
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allegedly self-evident correctness of hymnic praise; 2) to focus his thoughts so that he can 
envision untraditional possibilities, and 3) to explore and reconfigure his situation.165 
 
Arraign and Answer 
In Job 32-37, without any prior mention of him, the character Elihu suddenly 
appears in the text and appoints himself the arbiter in Job’s case.166  Elihu’s contention is 
that a lawsuit to weigh one’s righteousness is privately conducted in the body of the 
afflicted and not to be publically held.167  Job is on a decidedly different course: he arraigns 
God who must appear publically. 
Whereas resignation and silence would have let his affliction appear as guilt, Job’s 
bitter complaint transforms the conditions for appearance. The wager (initiated by a God 
who is susceptible to provocation) and the court (initiated by Job) represent two different 
manners of appearance of suffering.  Job’s trial does not transform conditions utterly. 
Rather, a change in terminology occurs against a steady (psalmic) backdrop – the friends’ 
predisposition remains the same. In addition, El’s disruption of order still abounds.  Job 
declares that were he able to find God’s celestial abode, he would press his suit to His face 
(23:3-4).  However, El’s face (emphatic appearance) is terrifying if not lethal. 
It is impossible to locate El in order to arraign him. Because finding El’s heavenly 
court168 is a remote possibility, Job attempts to force El to appear in court by flirting with 
calling the god “wicked” (“May my enemy be as a wicked man,” 27:7).169 Job’s oath of 
                                                           
165 The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 153-154. 
166 Elihu’s speeches are thought to be a later, pious insertion into the text.  Elihu is the only Israelite among those 
“comforting” Job; his name means “He is my God.” Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction, 100.   
167 The Book of Job, 469. 
168 For a discussion of the notion of a heavenly council, see Defending God, 50-51. 
169 Good translates the provocation of 27:7 as, “Let my enemy be considered wicked, the one who rises against me, 
vicious.” In Turns of Tempest, 287. 
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innocence (Job 31) is a tactic to force the god to appear: El’s failure to appear is tantamount 
to ruling Job innocent, for false testimony is punishable by death.170  The forensic context 
carries the formal demand for El to be subject to disclosure.  El must show himself, for to 
fail to do so is tantamount to Job’s vindication. Job authors an order (the lawsuit) that is 
binding upon El, who must face Job.171 The forensic site is disposed (clears) to render Job 
innocent by default unless El appears and demonstrates otherwise. 
Both the curses of his birth (Job 3) and his oath of purity (Job 31) manifest the 
powers that are called upon. Being a formal response to a charge, Job’s oath of innocence 
inaugurates the legal proceedings.172 In essence, words perform the court just as a curse calls 
forces into play. Job’s speech invokes the forum of a court and the metric of law. The court 
is in session at Job 29-31 and is confirmed to be in session by the divinity, who challenges 
Job by using legal terms in 40:2.173 The conditions for appearance (time and place, presence 
and appearing as the placed) are satisfied by the lawsuit as performative speech.174 
 
Conclusions 
Eloah displaces, obscures the way (3:23), so the way (if Job is to have one) must 
happen as a contending with displacement.  From catastrophic loss, physical affliction, the 
absence of loyalty ('esed, 16:14-21), the unavailability of a redeemer/arbiter, the 
impossibility of arraigning El, and finally the tempest that sends Job’s pain back into 
                                                           
170 Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction, 95. 
171 Job’s oath and its “bindingness” upon El (its impinging upon an “absolute” freedom of a divinity), if thought in modern 
terms, would be an instance of a magical overvaluation of a psychic act – a formulation found in Freud’s Totem and 
Taboo.  Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (The Standard Edition), Trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 
1989) 105. But as Adorno indicates, there can be no overvaluation when thought and the world have yet to be radically 
distinguished.  Dialectic of Enlightenment 7. 
172 In Turns of Tempest, 311. 
173 In 40:2, YHWH challenges Job using legal terms: the divinity refers to both counsel (‘")ah, legal debate), and Eloah’s 
“arbiter” (m!k(a'). On the strangeness of arbiter in this context: In Turns of Tempest, 348-349.  
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silence, suffering happens as a series of nested dislocations.  Job’s attempts to come to grips 
with these dislocations is an attempt at locating or pinpointing the manner and nature of the 
disruption: that innocence is no protection, that piety without knowledge is cruel, and that El 
is duplicitous and violently disposed toward his handiwork.175  
Job’s lawsuit is an attempt to give form (lawfulness) where form has been deformed, 
from the violated integrity of the body to the cosmic order that permits random violence.  
The pain of these deformations (the murder of Job’s children, his sores, the perversion of 
compassion by piety) is compounded by El’s incessant watching – itself a kind of cruelty 
(7:19). The narrative effect of the displacements is a deferral of reconciliation and 
resolution.176 Job’s cry has no place (16:18) but the place of the cry itself: a cry that 
eventually seeks to locate El’s court (ch.23) but can only wander until silenced by the 
superior strength of Job’s adversary at law.  
Job “finally realized the futility of arguing with one who rose above the law” 
(Crenshaw, 1998, 103).   The friends’ error was to assume that God was answerable to a 
principle of justice that had ontological priority.177  The universe is not ruled by a rational 
principle of justice; rather, God’s administration of creation is amoral, perhaps even 
incoherent, from the mortal standpoint.  
  Job’s cry of pain must continually reach outward from community, council and 
cosmos, for throughout there is neither hope (Job 14) nor justice (Job 21) but always The 
Seeing Eye (7:8).  In the face of destruction, disorientation, and murder, to call El to 
account, to face El, is Job’s attempt to arraign (meaningfully bind) his innocence, affliction, 
                                                           
174 Austin’s “illocutionary act” is an act performed by an utterance. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed., 
ed. J. O. Urmson, Marina Sbisa (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
175 Cf., “violent intervention” and El “The Maker” The Book of Job, 191, 192. 
176 Janzen thinks resolution comes to Job in the form of the refreshing showers of El Shaddai.  Gerald J. Janzen, At the 
Scent of Water, The Ground of Hope in the Book of Job (Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2009). 
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and El’s injustice together.  From curse, indictment of false friends, pretrial declaration and 
oath of purity, Job transforms protest from traditional lament to lawsuit as an effort to think 
that which is unthinkable from the perspective of retributive justice: the co-occurrence of 
innocence and suffering [Figure 2].  A calling forth of forces (curse) and the  
invocation of law (oath as inaugurating proceedings) explore form: the poetic as performing 
forensically rather than morally.  
Because both apprehension and projection (in a word, tradition) govern the 
meaning-giving activity of the friends, there is nevertheless a human convention that 
remains viable for Job: the lawsuit.  The suit must contest the grounds of meaning as 
projection of moral order and justice upon El.  The alleged moral order of the cosmos turns 
out to be just a hopeful projection over its actual amorality.178  
 
The divine speeches make a mockery of human notions concerning 
a trial, as also do baseless accusations by Job’s three friends and 
Elihu.179  
 
The lawsuit highlights the friends’ desire to attribute moral order to El’s creative activity 
rather than a confirmation of a divinely authored moral order. Within a fundamentally 
capricious universe, suffering has no cosmic meaning. YHWH’s speeches from the 
whirlwind show innocence and guilt to be human constructions. Job’s gambit is that the 
lawsuit might be a coherent, orderly place wherein meaning (“knowing oneself”) might 
remain possible. Perhaps the riddle of Job’s final words signals that he has discovered that 
the attribution and ascription of meaning and justice to God and the cosmos is hebel (mere 
wind or futility). 
                                                           
177 Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction, 105. 
178 The Book of Job, 65. 
179 Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction, 108. 
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Figure 2 
Curse to Oath: The Evolution of Form of Job’s Homeless Cry 
    
COSMOS:  
Job’s silence and formal vindication 
 
WHIRLWIND:  
YHWH confirms that the court is in session 
 
EARTHLY COUNCIL AT LAW: 
Job’s Oath of Purity provokes YHWH to appear / initiative is with Job 
 
FRAMING OF LEGAL DISPUTE: 
Job co-opts moral language  
Accuses El of Mismanaging of Creation  
Job’s public statement (’mr) and request for a hearing 
Job’s effort to locate El’s court or to find an arbiter to arraign El (abandoned) 
 
CONSOLERS: 
Accusation of friends as lacking hesed 
Friend’s Proverbs are of Ashes 
Job’s reinterpretation of righteousness as innocence 
 
BIRTH/CREATION: 
Job curses his day / invocation of powers 
 
FAMILY: 
Refuses to Curse God and Die 
 
 BODY: 
Job does not sin with his lips 
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Job is suggestive of a set of related theses regarding theology: 1) Theology legislates 
the meaning of particularity by way of a context-transcendent absolute. It is an “axiomatic” 
explanatory order, a “kingdom of transcendent ends.”180  2) Inviolability is projected upon 
an un-revisable order that is lodged in a Platonic heaven, and that projection is disavowed.  
Following Nietzsche’s critique of the “theological attitude” in the Genealogy of Morals, an 
allegedly permanent, heavenly order is the result of valuation whose origins are occluded by 
an epochal inability to think historically. 3) Suffering is something other than itself as a 
matter of exchange value (redemptive, retributive, educative). 
Job is suggestive of a set of interrelated theses about our “contemporary” life: 
Suffering is the result of an unlivable world.  Life is given over to a regime of conceptuality 
(“regime” in the sense that the readily available means of “critique” serve only to justify its 
predominance).  As part of that conceptual regime, suffering is provoked to appear such that 
blame is attributed to the victim (thus the need for Adorno’s “turn to the subject’).181  
Suffering is in part a result of its signification: it is allegedly in accord with a heavenly, 
axiomatic, permanently present order (legitimizing its earthly, administrative, disciplinary 
counterpart). An attempt to render the meaningfulness of suffering must be responsive to its 
excess: that suffering is beyond (but always also with) the ordinary grounds of 
meaningfulness. 
 Since so much depends for Job’s success upon hearing (as a reconfiguration of the 
conditions of appearing and meaningfulness), not much has been accomplished without also 
                                                           
180 The phrase “kingdom of transcendent ends” is from Emmanuel Lévinas, "Useless Suffering," The Provocation of 
Emmanuel Levinas: Re-thinking the Other, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988) 156. 
 There is an evolution toward this heavenly realm of permanently present law, which seems to be partially a matter of the 
relationship between Platonism and Christian theology. A strange evolution toward the concept of a life after death, in 
addition to the development of a purely immaterial realm of the spirit, takes place during the first century CE.  In contrast, 
both the watery Sheol and the “soul” that is breath (nephesh) are intimately bound to the body. 
181 Theodor W, Adorno, “Education after Auschwitz,” Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) 193. 
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turning our attention to the text itself and how it is heard.  A defense of an interpretation, 
which this chapter has been, has rested upon translations that discern what is “there” in the 
archaic Hebrew of Job.  Not unlike Kant’s moment of objectivity in the aesthetic 
experience, disagreement in translation is arbitrated by reference to the object rather than the 
subjectivity of the aesthetic experience itself.182  Because translating Job is an excursion into 
the highest concentration of hapax legomena in the Hebrew Bible, however, even “good” 
translations diverge: 
  
So my lyre is tuned for lament  
and my flute to accompany mourning. (30:31-2 Habel) 
  
My lyre has become mourning, 
My flute a weeping voice (30:31-2 Good)  
 
The most we might say is, “According to a convention in translation, this word in Job means 
this….” But what about this phenomenon?  Contemporary translation appears to be 
following its own momentum, and only on occasion is brought back to the indeterminacy of 
the text (Good, at least, leaves some portions untranslated altogether183).  The grip of the 
text’s amorphousness is eluded in most instances.  The question of translatability, if you 
like, is often not accounted for directly.  So at the zenith of Job’s attempt to make sense of 
what he is undergoing, we should place the question of the text itself and its inscrutability, 
lest we make the error of his consolers and assume to know rather than know that we do not 
know. 
                                                           
182 “The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone’s agreement (since only a logically universal judgment can do 
that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely requires this agreement from everyone, as an instance of the rule, an instance 
regarding which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1987) §8, p. 60. 
183 In particular, 19:25-26.  “Having declared myself opposed to rewriting to make the passage mean what I wish it meant, I 
leave the lines blank, and I will not use them in thinking about meaning.” In Turns of Tempest, 100 note.  His comment 
regarding the hapax ‘%yn in 21:24 displays his typical candor: “Perhaps a word that can be made to mean so many things 
cannot be made to mean anything.” In Turns of Tempest, 108 note.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
A WAYWARD PASSAGE 
 
Introduction 
In satisfying the minimal requirement for a practice to be a practice, it would seem 
that philosophy must weave suffering into a story. However, philosophy is not committed to 
an attempt at meaning without any discursiveness. Rather, a transformed philosophy stands 
in a necessary relationship to those discursive practices that attempt to “say the 
unsayable.”184 The trial of philosophy that I imagine examines transformed manners of 
composition (i.e., synthetic forms other than logical syntax). Even though these transformed 
manners of philosophizing attempt to give “passive” materiality its own moment of 
intelligibility, a role for suffering nevertheless emerges in terms of form. To be responsive 
to the potential articulateness of materiality is not equivalent to an eschewing of 
conceptuality altogether. An apotheosis of meaning looms near any attempt to distance 
philosophical “production” from conventional meaning.185 The problem of whether 
suffering may yet signify apart from the ordinary grounds of meaningfulness is a problem of 
the status of this “apart.” 
It is not an overstatement to say that Job simply is its gaps and dislocations and its 
passages between elements are just what projection places there and subsequently disavows.  
Modernist composition attempts an appearance of an emerging syntax while resisting the 
                                                           
184 Those social practices that attempt to “say the unsayable” are uncommon with respect to dominant modes of knowing. 
Jay Bernstein, “Fragment, Fascination, Damaged Life: ‘The Truth About Hedda Gabler’,” The Actuality of Adorno, 
Critical Essays on Adorno and the Postmodern, ed. Max Pensky (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) 163-
164.  If philosophy wishes to protest the suffering that occurs as the result of the brute ordering of society, then it is 
committed to interpreting the dysfunctional remnants of discursive practices we call artworks.    
 64 
 
coldness of a finality to form (e.g., by resisting conventional notions of “finish”). Derrida 
calls experience a “non-road” – when an object’s alterity prevents our projects from ensuing 
as usual.  Playing on the sense of course and passage as “lawful,” the following questions 
emerge: What passage (i.e., transition between elements) can avoid lapsing into law in its 
hegemonic forms?  Is there a course other than that which would be a matter of course (i.e., 
un-routine) and thereby retain its critical force? How might practice become an “unlawful” 
passage that nevertheless remains intelligible?  Because a transformed philosophy cannot 
eschew form altogether (lest it renounce intelligibility), to call its manner of proceeding an 
“unlawful” passage is too strong.  Consequently, I have chosen the word “wayward” to 
indicate its position relative to law as at variance, blocked and un-routine.  I have composed 
a wayward passage – an arraignment of Adorno and Heidegger.  In particular, I focus upon 
these two competing philosophical orientations as it pertains to experience: the possibility 
and character of philosophical reflection. 
Heidegger and Adorno share a certain common interest with Hegel: philosophical 
reflection begins in undergoing (Erfahrung). To cease to attempt an (ultimately self-
deceived) evasion of history changes the object as well as the subject of thought – an insight 
that both Heidegger and Adorno share. For both, the fact that reflection186 continues despite 
its endangerment evidences that the thinker is no longer thoroughly beholden to a dominant 
tradition. I intend this chapter to provide the possibility of a conversation between these 
orientations by approaching their differences at the level of undergoing. 
                                                           
185 Cf. Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectic, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt 
Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1979) 188. 
186 Adorno’s conception of critical reflection is much more dependent upon the Continental European tradition of 
“Reflexion” (Cf. Herbert Schnädelbach, “Reflexion und Diskurs,” Fragen einer Logik der Philosophie (Frankfurt a. M., 
1977). than Heidegger, who starts with Dilthey’s notion of Selbstbesinnung. 
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Below, I explore difficulties associated with Heidegger’s saving grace (the 
discernment of the danger that reflection may vanish). Also below, I explore difficulties 
associated with the solicitation of reflection by the non-identical “after” Adorno’s 
hyperbolic “vanishing” of reflection altogether. Undergoing is conspicuously at work in 
either philosophical orientation in order to generate either of these different forms of 
engagement. The purpose of this chapter is to critique form in philosophical engagement.  
Along the way, I will attempt to name difficulties accurately when they resist resolution. 
My goal in this chapter is to initiate a trial in what I take to be rigorous consistency 
with Heidegger’s and Adorno’s mandate to respond to beings in their suffering. By 
arraigning Adorno and Heidegger (bringing into proximity otherwise incompatible 
orientations), the trial begins – for it is against this uneasy proximity that we might learn 
more about our philosophical commitments. In Job, suffering is threatened by a dominant 
form of intelligibility (the “guilt” of the sufferer). Just as Job risked arraigning187 prevailing 
law, “bad” form seems to be just what is called for.188  
Taking my cue from Job, I contrast Heidegger and Adorno as attempts to emerge 
from a predominant form of law (eschatological or transcendent) without lapsing into a 
mode of its repetition in disguise. The complicity of a prevailing reasonableness in 
“philosophical” quarters with the reproduction of domination lies in an authorized 
unreflectiveness about history. The loss of experience is immanent to philosophy as 
eschatological desire. The obfuscation of the role of undergoing to philosophical reflection 
(e.g., by “timeless” epistemic standards) participates in the evacuation of the 
meaningfulness of bodies by the regime of axiomatic (administrative, lawful) 
                                                           
187 …a legal term that we encounter in Job as y‘d in 9:19. 
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presuppositions of the social whole. For both Adorno and Heidegger, philosophy must 
transform its manner of making a case if it is to preserve its critical function with respect to 
the intransigence of society.  Nevertheless, each proposes a different form of intervention – 
a path of thinking (Heidegger) versus determinate negations (Adorno).  
In our philosophical climate, one’s orientation is often employed as a defense against 
another’s. To hear the others’ concerns differently than the way we are predisposed to 
categorize or “understand” demands that my typical response, rather than the other 
orientation, become the “object” of understanding. As we learn, for example, from the 
Symposium, to be willing to be changed is a matter of Eros, and not all are embodied such 
that they may be philosophers (e.g., the discerning and chaotically embodied Alcibiades). In 
order to not presume a “neutral” standpoint between Adorno and Heidegger but rather 
foreground the matter of undergoing as it pertains to this immediate work of arraignment, I 
will attempt to remain true to what my own undergoing has made a reflective possibility: an 
enrichment of philosophical orientation by reading that which is alien; an interweaving of 
trauma and recovery that in no way commits me to a romanticism; my conversion to 
Judaism as assuming a responsibility to memory; and reading Job. Through a reading of 
Job, I have been examining the condition for the possibility of reflection upon an hegemony 
of law. Compounding Job’s suffering is the perplexity of being before the law where a claim 
to innocence can only come too late.  If it is not to fall prey to the theodicy of blaming the 
sufferer and instead is to challenge law, the displacements that the sufferer undergoes must 
condition an arraignment of materiality such that the singularity of the body (repressed by 
                                                           
188 The parsing of so-called “argumentative” content of canonical philosophers for the “timeless questions of philosophy” 
is a form of decay under the implicit license of “good form.” 
 67 
 
law) has a forum. In what follows, I deploy the critical vocabulary of hearing, telling and 
arraignment where appropriate.  
 
Experience 
In distinction from the ordinary conception of lived experience as a given, 
temporalized stratum that can be formalized by science, Adorno’s conception of experience 
is neither Kant’s synthesis of concept and intuition nor Hegel’s undergoing that “sublates” 
antitheses, but rather represents engagements with these philosophers (as well as with Freud 
and Marx) in an attempt to negate forms of domination to which we are beholden.  
Experience, for Adorno, is endangered: the social whole, dominated by exchange, reduces 
subjectivity to the reproduction of a regime of conceptuality that represses the potential that 
sensuousness might signify in its own right. “Consciousness” (in the form of an a priori ‘fit’ 
of categories through which the individual thing is appropriated as an instance of a rule) 
always already exhibits the initiative to the intelligibility of events. The synergy of 
economic forces and the culture industry induces one to willingly abandon life for substitute 
satisfactions that are nonetheless unsatisfactory for life. The schematism of production 
shrewdly replaces the individual’s work of synthesis by offering technically sophisticated, 
pre-“synthesized” content. The domination of the culture industry usurps the role of 
imagination in preparing objects for their conceptualization.189 The hyper-administered 
environment yields a “subject” who substitutes a pseudo-orientation for experience.190 
Adorno portrays the authoritarian personality as having an “inability to have any immediate 
                                                           
189 Cliché is the adaptation of the imagination under “unalterable” conditions.  
190 “The senses are determined by the conceptual apparatus in advance of perception; the citizen sees the world as made a 
priori of the stuff from which he himself constructs it.” Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 
2002) 65. 
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human experiences at all.”191 Insofar as the routinization of life and mythological identity 
dominate consciousness, the “individual” is merely a token of the reified whole. Because of 
the hegemony of the administered world, therefore, Adorno asks whether there can still be 
any experience at all: even “alienation” requires a subject (rather than mere tokens of types). 
For Adorno, the term “experience” is reserved just for the discernment of our 
distance from the object as non-identical other. Experience is an encounter with alterity, 
which is threatening to the narcissistic aspirations of the ego under conditions of a damaged 
sociality. False totality reproduces itself through the power to compel the weakened ego to 
desire mythical forms of reconciliation with the whole, and to identify with forms of power 
as substitute gratification for powerlessness.  
An inability to respond to suffering, to have it grip us before it is conceptualized, is 
part of the alienation from sensibility as a bearer of meaning: The inability to experience, a 
“coldness,” an “indifference to the fate of others,” is a precondition for another disaster.192 
Such coldness will always already possess, in virtue of it being in concert with the whole, a 
ring of authority over the desire to critique the motivations behind the intransigence of 
social reality. 
 
Heidegger’s Experience 
From a Heideggarian orientation, an “apotheosis” of experience (which in any case 
is not what Heidegger claims to be threatening reflection) would be (something like) things 
only ever appearing as either knowable or useable.  As dependent upon our comportment 
toward beings as they come to be, our “experience” would be just as either theorizers or 
                                                           
191 Theodor Adorno, Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia UP, 
1998) 
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users of stockpiled things.  However, for Heidegger, these “theoretical” and “instrumental” 
manners of comportment are accompanied by a strong sense that they do not exhaust 
“life”193 and thereby give occasions to reflect upon this very hegemony. The 
‘phenomenology of phenomenology’ that Heidegger takes himself to be doing depends 
upon the manner in which entities are given not just in terms of the ‘cleared space’ of 
tradition (the eventuation of Being) but also in such a way that the tradition itself becomes 
conspicuous.  For something to be provoked to appear in terms of a dominant mode of 
disclosure is nevertheless for that something to appear precisely as provoked such that this 
‘covering over’ is itself apparent.  In the language of the later Heidegger, coming to 
presence “absences” itself; yet this absence-ing gives itself to be thought (although certainly 
never all at once or completely).  Consequently, Heidegger’s thinking attempts to sustain in 
reflection the experience of not just how one is already disposed to disclose and deal with 
things, but also the distress with falling toward (Verfallensein) this founded way of relating 
to beings.  
 According to Heidegger, meditative Denken is a possibility of thinking always-with-
yet-also-against our philosophical inheritance without either rejecting it (“rebelliously”) or 
naively repeating it (eschatologically, metaphysically).  This reflective possibility is, at the 
same time, an exploration of this possibility that depends upon the appearance of things as 
subjected to an ill-suited ontological atmosphere.  Because this ontological atmosphere 
appears as an imposition upon things, appearances are suggestive of other possibilities for 
“letting beings be.”  But these other possibilities for appearing (which remain potential 
                                                           
101, 198. 
192 Critical Models, 201-202. 
193 I place life in quotation marks due to Adorno’s critique of being-towards-death. Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 
trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973) 368. For dying and the “what” that dies, Cf. Negative Dialectics, 362. 
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rather than given) require a careful diffusing of inherited modes of dismissal and critical 
foreclosure.  
The possibility that Heidegger follows for reflection, however, is not universally 
accepted as real: the distance between rejecting one’s philosophical inheritance and being 
absorbed within it naively is, by Adorno’s lights, mythical, despite the fact that they both 
attempt to not repeat the self-deceived “emancipation” from tradition that cleaves to an 
eschatological spirit.  If thinking can be only instrumental or dialectical, and if the objective 
and subjective moments of thinking exhaust our possible relatedness to things, then the 
“beyond” moment in Heidegger’s thinking of the tradition must in some way be self-
deceived.   If self-deceived, Heidegger’s “experience” of beings in terms of the ending of 
the dominant tradition must be subjective and the thinking that follows from that 
“experience” must neglect the proper theorization of “life.” On Heidegger’s account, the 
ending of the dominant tradition allows numerous opportunities for reflection.  In contrast, 
Adorno’s interventions suggest that experience is endangered in ways that make its 
occurrence far more rare than Heidegger presumes.  
Adorno’s “theoretical” commitments are by far the most salient features of critique 
rather than anything that might amount to a “phenomenology” of determinate conditions for 
reflection.  Adorno’s descriptions of the brokenness of social reality rely heavily upon Marx 
(e.g., the fungibility of particulars), and inverted Hegel, Freud (e.g., myth as compensatory 
satisfaction), and Kant (e.g., the transcendental subject read as a cipher for hyper-
administrated reality). While Adorno deliberately “perverts” these sources where otherwise 
critique might be compromised by this legacy, Adorno’s critical position prioritizes 
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“theorizing” (as a counterbalance to praxis as tending to give way to pseudo-activity) and 
the world that is thereby theorized retains the traditional language of the object.  
The elusiveness of Adorno’s “position” is partially the result of the fact that his 
theoretical commitments appear to be modulating in response to the priority of the object 
that necessitates a particular intervention.194 It is in the context of the priority of the object – 
in particular that constellations of thought are to reflect the contradictoriness of social reality 
– that we can understand Adorno’s refiguring of, for example, Kant and Hegel.  
Nevertheless, where Adorno seems to speak from an already realized alternative account to 
the obstructing “mythological” worldview. Adorno appears to be issuing a “voluntaristic” 
“counter-revolt” to “ontology” despite his insistence that “appetitive” thinking is violent. In 
the age of Gestell, the very idea of subjective mastery is already a response to the sense that 
everything is available (beständig) as always-already “cleared” in the manner of being 
enframed and set up (ge-stellen). If voluntaristic, Adorno’s criticisms are still too subject-
centered to capture the atmosphere, the cleared site, where everything he complains about 
“happens.”   
At the same time, voluntarism cannot be Adorno’s position insofar as he insists that 
the object’s non-identity is recognizable only having undergone its variance from our 
conceptual predispositions. In the absence of a “positive” description akin to Heidegger’s 
(that an occluded something is nevertheless an appearance of that something as occluded), 
Adorno seems to speak from a priori theoretical commitments. Adorno’s determinate 
negations often appear to be dialectical “demonstrations” of the contradictoriness inherent in 
social reality rather than a description of the undergoing that it takes to have achieved that 
very critical space (or displacement). 
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 Adorno’s critical theory seems to indicate that either 1) one is engaged in a kind of 
self-hypnosis that false satisfactions are real, or 2) one is reflective about the identitarian 
whole through a kind of ego-strength (which is under normal conditions rendered weak). 
Our circumstances render an “us,” like Job, sitting upon the ashes of the social. Or so it 
seems so long as we take “the individual” to be a separate entity, and so long as the idea of 
such entities getting their very sense “in relation” is already “ontology.” Since so much in 
Adorno is about false identity, what room is left for sufferers to gain a sense of what “we” 
195 are going through that does not “automatically” become an abstract occlusion of the 
singular?  
Adorno’s reflection seems to stand in a negative relationship both to repression as 
understood by Freud and to false-consciousness as understood by Marx.  Because, according 
to these models, repression and false-consciousness are ineliminable elements of thought, 
Adorno can deduce that Heidegger’s reflection fails as alleged “instances” of denial and 
false consciousness.  But as ineliminable, we can suppose that determinate negation should 
be marked as well, and that the critical position of the analyst is not one of magical 
immunity. Adorno is, in fact, reflective of this performative dimension of his 
philosophizing, having acknowledged that dialogue, having been damaged, forces him into a 
private “dialogue” in Minima Moralia.  
 
The “Taboo” against Positivity and Solicitation by Non-Identity 
If it is not to be “eschatological,” critique must begin and end in the midst of things.  
In light of the view that it is never entirely free of its starting point, what informs negative 
                                                           
194 Buck-Morss calls this dimension of Adorno’s theory “quicksilver.” The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 186. 
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dialectic from the start?  How does it understand itself?  What grants the special 
authoritative space of the critical theorist?  If the brokenness of the world were complete, 
then where one stood in relationship to brokenness would in any case not afford any 
advantage to its diagnosis. 
Presumably, if I exhibit a desire to supply the missing moment of non-identity that 
permits reflection, I have a kind of barometer by which I can come to know more about my 
“mythical” commitments. My reading in this section attempts to resist being at the service 
of the capitalization upon non-identity while nevertheless emphasizing the difficulties that 
Adorno’s strategy seems to entail, with the intention of drawing out a greater reflective, self-
awareness.   
Experience is a moment when the way in which a routine of apprehension is 
heteronomous to the appearance of a matter. Philosophical engagement with the loss of 
experience paradoxically requires the experience of that discovery. A total loss of 
experience (which Adorno’s formulations seem to depict at times as having occurred) 
erodes the very ground upon which thinking (the negation of false identity) presumes to 
stand. Adorno’s characterizations of totality, while targeted at specific forms of identity 
thinking, are nevertheless suggestive that our predicament is that of the world’s completed 
negativity – a condition of total occlusion whereby the resources for experience are 
completely bankrupt.   
For example, by the phrase “the whole is the false,” Adorno negates both the priority 
Hegel gives to the universal and the thought of the integrated “I.”196 Adorno observes that 
                                                           
195 The “we” refers to those that I might be speaking to, who might recognize in their own experience what I am attempting 
to say.  I resume the question of this “we” in the chapter, “Outsiders:‘!ber" derek to Odradek.” 
196 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2002) 50, 
64. Negative Dialectics, 265. Cf. Alexandre Kojève. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Lectures on the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. trans. James H. Nichols, Jr.,  Allan Bloom, ed. (Ithica: Cornell UP, 1969) 139. 
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the dialectic Hegel carefully avoids is that the whole is also the individual’s otherness.197 
Because totality exhibits itself as a global ready-apprehension of things, reflection upon 
totality is “novel” only in the sense of no longer recognizing where we are (if “recognition” 
cannot fail to be instrumental). As literally true, however, “the whole is the false” is 
unthinkable.198  
 
…total despair is unintelligible, because as a minimal condition of 
the possibility of despairing determinately of the world as it is, 
consciousness must have a sense of some element which is not 
negative.199  
 
The position from which the ‘falseness of the whole’ is discerned is, strictly speaking, a 
non-position.200 Of course, the difficulty of a critical standpoint that is nevertheless not 
eschatological has not escaped Adorno, for genuine thought 
 
…is also the utterly impossible thing, because it presupposes a 
standpoint removed, even though by a hair’s breath, from the scope 
of existence, whereas we well know that any possible knowledge 
must not only be first wrested from what is, if it shall hold good, but 
is also marked, for this very reason, by the same distortion and 
indigence which it seeks to escape.201 
 
Solicitation by the non-identical remains a brute fact solely “evidenced” by the occurrence 
of reflection.  
Unless some concrete intimation of non-identity existed, some 
experience of non-identity possible, then reflection’s work would be 
indistinguishable from phantasy; or better, there would be no 
reflection.  Adorno does not rule out the possibility of radical 
failure.  Reflection does continue, we are solicited by the non-
identical, but nothing guarantees this state of affairs.202  
                                                           
197 Negative Dialectics, 315. 
198 Minima Moralia, 50. 
199 Simon Jarvis, Adorno, A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998) 212, emphasis added. 
200 Cf. The editor’s introduction in The Culture Industry, ed. J.M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge, 1991) 19.  
201 Minima Moralia, 247 emphasis added. 
202 J. M. Bernstein. The Fate of Art, Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno  (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State UP, 1992) 189. Emphasis added.     
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If literally true, negative totality (as discerned) is a view from nowhere and agency (or 
novelty) could only come outside time in the manner of apocalypticism, which is anathema 
to critical theory. Consequently, 
 
A moment of unliteralness is non-liquidable from such claims to 
despair, because if they were meant with absolute literalness they 
could not even be thought.203 
 
Bernstein “resolves” this bit of “epistemological impertinence” on Adorno’s part by 
attributing to expressions of negative totality the character of hyperbole. 204  
For Adorno, the only manner of, let’s say, “acknowledgment” of non-identity is the 
negation of precise forms of occlusion due to the rational and social whole. It is often 
possible to “reconstruct” the work of undergoing from the fact that Adorno’s interventions 
are exceedingly precise with regard to the false identity that attempts to gloss over a specific 
form of social brokenness. The negation of a specific identification “releases,” we might 
say, the experience of the difference from that identification. Just as each instance of false 
consciousness bears the trend of the whole, Adorno reassures us that “consummate 
negativity, once squarely faced, delineates the mirror image of its opposite.”205 
Does “having a sense” of “some element” of non-identity show that there is another 
alternative to either positivity or negativity as Adorno understands them?  The possibility 
that Adorno appears to be wary of is that if critique were to proclaim the availability of non-
identity, its instrumental use would be enabled. If critique were to pronounce the availability 
                                                           
203 Simon Jarvis. Adorno, A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998) 214. 
204 J.M. Bernstein, “Fragment, Fascination, Damaged Life: ‘The Truth About Hedda Gabler’,” The Actuality of Adorno, 
Critical Essays on Adorno and the Postmodern, ed. Max Pensky (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997) 163-
164. 
205 Minima Moralia, 247. 
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of a non-anthropomorphic “truth,” critique would lapse into a myth of immanence. For 
philosophy to profit from an “element which is not negative” would be an instance of 
idealism as “belly turned mind.”206 It is as if Adorno anticipates that the sense of non-
identity would, by default, become something vorhand that we would handle with our 
scientific and technocratic theories. By Adorno’s lights, any positive conception given to 
non-identity reinstates enlightenment in its regressive moment as myth.  
Because hyperbole can only ever intimate the positive moment of non-identity that 
permits “total” falseness to be thinkable, hyperbole obscures the relationship between 
philosophical practice and the determinate conditions that are, after all, the point of 
determinate negations. So long as there is no experiential account of ‘coming to see that 
experience is threatened,’ and despite its negations being determinate (i.e., targeted at a 
specific societal occlusion), non-identity remains only mysteriously tied to the hyperbole 
that it entreats. If Adorno’s expressions of negative totality are obfuscation of a critical 
beginning to which he has already somehow availed himself, then expressions of negative 
totality are the philosophical equivalent of dragging a branch behind one’s horse.  
When a non-identical element is expressed in the form of hyperbole, however, the 
articulation of that element avoids an eschatological “flight to health” (to borrow a phrase 
from the mental health profession). On this reading, hyperbole is interpretable as a 
counterweight thrown against the pull of a myth of emancipation. Hyperbole prevents the 
critical foreclosure that would result from an identification of a beginning.207 In other words, 
hyperbole might function as a kind of expression that both 1) highlights what stands in the 
way of a true account of a phenomena and 2) points us in the direction of that phenomenon 
                                                           
206 Negative Dialectics, 23. 
207 The Fate of Art, 191-192. 
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without making the pointer more important than the phenomenon towards which it is trying 
to “guide” our thoughts.  Just in these two senses, Adorno’s use of hyperbole functions 
similarly to Heidegger’s formal indication. For Heidegger, philosophy must avail itself in a 
“formally indicative” fashion; i.e., not as naming a thing or process in a representation, but 
as pointing us in the direction of an experience of relationship that we already live 
through—albeit while we are so absorbed in “ontic” matters that these atmospherics are 
“forgotten.”208 
Determinate negation seems to treat non-identity as if it were unutterable in order to 
shield it from the possibility of being possessed and instrumentalized. In the unutterable, 
mythical enlightenment and culture-critique appear to converge.  That apophatic dimension 
employed to shield law from revocability is to be distinguished however from the 
tetragrammaton, an unpronounceable that prevents divinity from becoming a possible 
possession. Due to the undesirability of shielding law from revocability, we might be 
tempted to leave non-identity as a kind of residue of a particular negation. However, if non-
identity is “experiential” but not categorizeable, then it is by definition not experienced (i.e., 
just a raw bit of intuition, on Kant’s account). Unutterability tends to be cast as mysticism or 
nonsense by a normative standard for utterability as a propositional, representative, 
objective and public account of an otherwise private “experience.” Adorno seems to have an 
ambiguous relationship to this notion of “experience,” which depends upon a traditional 
(virtually positivistic) conception of language – mostly in virtue of Adorno’s attempt to 
provide Kantian intuition with its own moment of intelligibility.   
 
                                                           
208 For letting beings “be,” Cf. Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” Basic Writings, ed. 
David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977) 373.  
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The possibility of philosophical reflection 
Adorno reserves the possibility that cogent thinking enables the “same” thought to 
occur again and elsewhere,209 and the hyperbolic “unavailability” of non-identity leaves the 
work of experience entirely up to us. Must Adorno reject Heidegger’s experience of the 
possibility of language as formal indication, especially given his employment of hyperbole?  
From what position inside of damaged life is identity thinking most readily 
detectable? Adorno tells us that the non-identical must not be at our disposal but rather 
within “layers” of reality that are “inimical to the sphere of ideas.”210  In order that 
instrumental rationality become conspicuous in a way that drives a reconsideration of our 
response to the object, to appear as ‘at our disposal’ must appear as ruinous.  
Heidegger’s phenomenology hinges its possibility upon whether one’s customary 
retreat into the familiar can be unbearable.  While things tend to disappear within our 
projects and leave no remainder, there persists (so long as there is reflection) the possibility 
of a remainder that might be responded to differently, if only as an acknowledgment of the 
endangerment of reflection. 
In contrast to Adorno, Heidegger detects opportunities for reflection everywhere. 
Heidegger reads the possibility of reflection upon the hegemonic forms of appearance as a 
sign that the tradition of Western onto-theology (a ‘being in the truth’ of everything thought 
of in terms of essence) is ending. For Heidegger, what we are living through seems 
increasingly unsatisfactory, not in this or that way, but “globally.” Heidegger’s expression, 
                                                           
209 Theodor Adorno, “Resignation,” The Culture Industry, Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (New 
York: Routledge, 2003) 203. 
210 “non-identical layers, layers that are inimical to the sphere of ideas…”Adorno, as quoted in Albrecht Wellmer, 
“Adorno, Modernity, and the Sublime,” The Actuality of Adorno: critical essays on Adorno and the postmodern, ed. Max 
Pensky (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997) 121.  
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das Ge-Stell (“commandeering everything into assured availability”211), pertains to today’s 
administrative architecture by which one is literally placed (and singularity is displaced). 
The ontological atmosphere (of real objects for a properly attentive subject) is (to use the 
language of Being and Time) a founded (i.e., derivative rather than “originary”) mode of 
being-in-the-world.” The predominance of the permanently present is reflected not only in a 
very selective interpretation of phenomena that runs through the entire tradition, but also in 
the way history is treated as if from nowhere (e.g., Historie as a general story of what has 
been) rather than that which ‘always already’ conditions the manner in which we treat 
anything, including reflective activity itself.  Undergoing ‘the past that is coming back at us 
from the future’ allows what we are living through “to be” such that other possibilities 
might be envisioned.  
Experience (the appearance of a thing “apart” from its apprehension by certain 
regime of conceptuality), reflection (a break with necessity) and imagination (the capacity to 
envision otherwise) are bound up in conditions that endanger all three of these interrelated 
phenomena. But for Heidegger, for something to be obscured is for that something to 
nevertheless phenomenally appear precisely in as obscured – what might be called 
Heidegger’s “positivity” in this context. For Heidegger, the Da- that prevents reflection 
today can not be exhausted by das Ge-Stell without eliminating reflection altogether – for 
then there could be no occasion when “commandeering everything into assured 
availability”212 might become conspicuous and solicit something other than ordinary 
“concern.”   
 
                                                           
211 Martin Heidegger “Origin of the Work of Art” Addendum. Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New 
York: Harper &  Row, 1971) 84. 
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Critique of Heidegger 
In the case of those who, in virtue of their embodiment, are a material condition for 
the vanishing of experience (Lyotard’s “the jews”213), “integration” is always precarious at 
best. Given that the necessary social constituents are always already in place (pathic 
projection214), the projection of undesirability readily intensifies into murder (as evidenced 
by the history of pogroms and the Shoah).  It is against these considerations that we have to 
understand both Adorno’s objections to Heidegger and Adorno’s exile in the United States.  
Any philosophy that fails to recognize the regressive tendency in society is a potential 
source for its renewal. 
In order to demonstrate the movement of an alleged idealism immanent in 
Heidegger’s path of thinking, Adorno must show Heidegger to be naively participating in a 
regressive tendency in society despite Heidegger’s assurances that the purpose of his 
philosophy is to contest the intransigence of tradition. Rather than show in the dialectical 
reversals of subject-object a reflection of social truth as contradictory, Heidegger presents a 
third moment (Being) as if beyond subject-object. 215 For Adorno, Heidegger attempts to 
have the objective moment of thought (“Being” understood as a cipher of the object that 
attempts to repudiate itself as that cipher) without the subjective moment of thought (Da-
sein understood as a cipher of the subject216 that attempts to repudiate itself as that cipher). 
According to Adorno, Heidegger’s turn away from subjectivity (in contrast to Adorno’s turn 
                                                           
212 Poetry, Language, Thought, 84. 
213 Jean-Françios Lyotard, Heidegger and “the jews”, trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977). 
214 Minima Moralia, 105. 
215 “He pursues dialectics to the point of saying that neither the subject nor the object are immediate and ultimate; but he 
deserts dialectics in reaching for something immediate and primary beyond subject and object.” Negative Dialectics, 106. 
216 “Dasein” is typically read erroneously as a synonym for “human entity considered as a subject rather than as an object.” 
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to the subject) abandons the work of conceptual mediation by appearing to have collapsed 
(through its idiolect) the gulf between subject and object (thus lapsing into idealism).217 
According to Adorno, the subjective and objective moments of Heidegger’s thought 
appear in disguise as a set of terms that position themselves as the relatedness between 
subject and object, but in practice avoid the remaining work of the concept: “Definition [of 
Being] would involve it in the dialectics of subject and object, in the very thing from which 
it is to be exempt.”218  Adorno characterizes the remaining dialectical work219 as dependent 
upon an experience of the concept’s non-identity to the object of understanding. Although 
Heidegger labors against the presumption of subjective mastery, his efforts allegedly vitiate 
conceptual mediation (presume access to a ‘voice of Being’) rather than sustain a critique of 
an ineliminable identitarian tendency. Adorno characterizes Heidegger’s thinking as an 
invocation of a mythical realm that sustains “the illusion that transmission is immediacy.”220 
As if immediately available through an alleged “nonconceptuality,” Heidegger’s thought of 
Being abandons the concept (without which there can be no judgment but only an “as if” 
judgment). 221  
Adorno maintains that the actual, social convolution of subject-object (e.g., their 
transposition under relations of production) is inflected (rather than sidestepped) through 
Heidegger’s path of thinking. While Adorno acknowledges that Heidegger’s thought “does 
of course presuppose a critique of the deification of Being,” Adorno detects a desire to 
redeem religious values that have lost their obviousness as transcendent through the 
                                                           
217 “…[Heidegger] becomes untrue where – not unlike Hegel – he talks as if the contents we want to rescue were thus 
directly in our minds.” Negative Dialectics, 98. 
218 Negative Dialectics, 115. 
219 The demonstration of the convolution of subject and object is an expression of social truth. 
220 Negative Dialectics, 123. 
221 “…the concept of entity – not at all unlike Heidegger’s celebrated one of Being – is the concept which encompasses 
out-and-out nonconceptuality, that which is not exhausted by the concept, yet without ever expressing its difference from 
the encompassed.” Negative Dialectics, 117. 
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subjective effort to reestablish those values in a secular register.222 In their analyses of Volk 
and Geist respectively, Lyotard and Derrida have traced the operation of a disavowed 
politics in Heidegger’s “piety of thought.” 223  
Following the maxim that “myth is the deceptive unity of the undivided,”224 
Heidegger’s penchant for myth is evident in his “jargon of authenticity,” as if the ancient 
languages were Being “speaking” without a subject.225  Adorno accuses Heidegger of 
having disguised (perhaps to himself?) his own voice as that of “Being.”226 Heidegger 
depicts Being (a non-sensual “transcendent”) as if sensed.  In The Jargon of Authenticity, 
Adorno argues that the language of existentialism trades a felt contact with objects for an 
idealism that results when self-experience is thought to be identical with the object of 
thought227 - a reneging on experience by lapsing into its identitarian opposite).  
For Adorno, the very movement in reflection through successive passes (from the 
varieties of the meaningfulness of beings, to being-in-the-world as such, to forms of caring 
and ultimately time-ish-ness) is the reifying movement of idealism that Heidegger’s 
philosophy intended to contest. Despite its explicit aim to critique Western Onto-Theology 
(the manner in which beings are provoked/enframed) Heidegger’s philosophy is, on 
Adorno’s view, a fulfillment of ontology through its insistence upon the ontic-ontological 
difference.228 Adorno therefore presents the word “ontology” as descriptive of Heidegger’s 
                                                           
222 Cf. Negative Dialectics, 97. 
223 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit, Heidegger and The Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: 
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224 Negative Dialectics, 118. 
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Negative Dialectic, 112. 
226 Negative Dialectics, 88. 
227 Theodor Adorno. The Jargon of Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston: Northwestern 
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project rather than what that project discovers as hegemonic.229  To Adorno, the thinking of 
the destining of Being, in its negative moment with respect to tradition (that is, in its claim 
to circumspection of naive repetition), is still theological in its ascension to an ‘ontological 
realm.’ On Adorno’s account, Heidegger’s tracing of the possibility of this experience into 
the poverty (i.e., untruth) of Being (that is, how the possibility of its hegemony seems to 
inhere in its scarcity as theme230) enacts “…a posture whose emigration from the profane 
powerlessly imitates the theological habit of the old doctrine of essence.”231 As Adorno 
states, “The mainspring for dressing up the deficiency of the concept [of Being] as its 
surplus is in each case the old Platonic austerity: that whatever is nonsensual is more 
elevated.”232 Despite the explicit aim to contest a delimitation of beings, Heidegger’s 
alleged desire to have history only negatively is a forgetfulness of beings. Because it is the 
ontic that is in need of rescue from ontology (as a vehicle of the world’s brokenness), 
Adorno finds in Heidegger path of thinking “an emigration from the profane”233 to an 
(ultimately chimeral) realm (something like the condition for all ontology) in which the 
ontic is abandoned through its glorification into something mysterious, poetic, and semi-
sacred.234  Heidegger’s philosophical reflection has ‘departed from’ beings to Being, beings 
can no longer signify as having weight in themselves. Heidegger’s thinking enacts a magical 
flight to a realm of essence in which the thought of beings (in their actual historical 
suffering) ceases. On Adorno’s analysis, beings are subsequently abandoned by Heidegger 
as mere remains.  
                                                           
229 Cf. Simon Jarvis, Adorno, A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998) 200. 
230 Cf. ‘Inclining indirectly toward the inexpressible.’ Negative Dialectics, 110. 
231 Negative Dialectics, 113. 
232 Negative Dialectics, 121. 
233 Negative Dialectics, 113. 
234 Of Heidegger’s “definitions,” Adorno states that, “Their astral power and glory is as cold to the infamy and fallibility of 
historic reality as that reality is sanctioned as immutable.” Negative Dialectics, 119. 
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Adorno argues that Heidegger’s historicity becomes a moment of the subsumption of 
beings and an obfuscation of their singularity. For Adorno, Heidegger’s position of thinking 
“with” tradition has the effect of making it seem immutable, whereas his position “beyond” 
the tradition has the effect of jettisoning the work of the concept.  What it means to be 
philosophizing at the “ending” of a tradition is taken by Adorno to have instantiated a 
powerlessness with respect to political and social reality by removing the possibility of 
change to a remote region of the destining of Being: “destined” as if a permanent condition.  
Adorno’s claim is that, in practice, Heidegger’s historicity renders every being equally 
remote and beings in their torment are allowed only one register – as provoked by Western 
Onto-Theology. As “transcendent,” Heidegger’s deployment of Being risks suppressing 
beings, even though he intends to highlight our involvement in the ontological “atmosphere” 
that lulls praxis into an hypnotic stasis through an “anonymous” authorization. On Adorno’s 
account, Heidegger’s historicity (a destructive history of Being in response to an ongoing 
“ending”) hardens into an “inevitability” (hypostasis): “Heidegger transposes the empirical 
superiority of the way things are into the realm of essence.”235   
Having become the official canon of a regressive “culture,” the supposedly 
“sublime” field of philosophy is enclosed within a potentially boundless delusion.236 Adorno 
detects this “sublimity” directly in Heidegger in terms of a repudiation of experience in a 
particular way, through a melancholic reaction to a “fated” Being that represses the ontic. 
Motivated by beings in their suffering, Adorno attempts to reverse the direction of 
Heidegger’s thought toward the thought of beings rather than what Adorno takes to be 
Heidegger’s reification of Being. 
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The activity of Heidegger’s “critique” and the passivity of the clearing can easily 
become conflated, such that a description of deplorable circumstances seems to take on an 
affirmative character once it is thought in terms of ontology.  The indication of the dominant 
disclosure of beings and the attempt to loosen that hegemony can become indiscernible in 
Heidegger, especially to those motivated by theological concerns.  Although thinking takes 
us back through the dominant philosophical inheritance in order to loosen that hegemony, 
Heidegger is easily received as if he were the last metaphysician, even though it is not Being 
which is central, but the question of Being. “Ontology” is taken to be Heidegger’s project 
rather than an attempt to wrest thinking from the teeth of how we tend to be with respect to 
ontology (as an hegemonic mode of disclosure). A sending from a “transcendental” 
“source” can appear to be a kind of incantation that reinvigorates myth with a potent new 
vocabulary. Heidegger’s “gift” is properly a solicitation by a non-identity to Being that 
brings a very selective interpretation of Being in the West to light. Nevertheless, 
Heidegger’s thought is precipitously near to those who would take “saving grace” to 
legitimate a further displacement of bodies into spirit – a displacement that Derrida detects 
in Heidegger as having already taken place in a way that mimes Marx (in its concern for 
bodies) but is very un-Marxian (as a “displaced” concern).237  
Heidegger’s thought begins with a strong sense that our relationship with various 
technologies speak of other possible ways in which life is not just enframed and set up as 
“one” instrumentally conceives it.  If no experience were possible (albeit not necessarily 
articulated as a “saving grace”), we could not recognize other possibilities at all and 
existence would be exhausted by perpetually becoming either knowers or users of stockpiled 
things.  In contrast, a thinking that outrageously begins “after the end of reflection” attempts 
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to take up the matter of a vanishing of experience into a regressive “subjectivity.”  Because 
myth figures prominently in regression, such outrageous thinking breaks with any “saving 
power” as having a dangerous family resemblance to regression. The “impossibility” of this 
outrageous thinking is a matter that it attempts to sustain. In contrast to our typical demand 
for instrumentality, language becomes hopeless.238   
For Adorno, Heidegger’s engagement with Being enables a use-value for Being – a 
reenlistment of philosophy for the purpose of re-mythologizing regressive elements in 
society.  
Heidegger drills in religious customs, but all that he retains of them 
is the general confirmation of dependence and submissiveness as 
surrogates of the objective formal laws of thought.  Like logical 
positivism, the structure clings to the initiate while permanently 
eluding him.239 
 
The “initiates” get their traction in the “ontological” and march headlong into an irrational 
identification with nature. 
Because Heidegger’s corpus is susceptible to mining by those who wish to revere 
Being (and thereby reproduce its violence to beings), one must ask whether a critical 
engagement other than Heidegger’s is necessary. To take up the question as to whether 
reflection today is possible at all would require ‘going to the encounter’ of Ge-Stell so that 
articulations other than Heidegger’s are possible.  The danger that Adorno recognizes is 
that, by responding to a “destining,” the language of Being becomes divorced from its 
production and fetishized as a domain of pure spirituality. That which appears to be 
“immanent” in Heidegger is properly not an illusory access to an “un-manipulated” nature, 
however, but rather a genealogy of a dominant mode of disclosure for beings – and yet the 
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two are easily conflated. As with idealist aesthetics with respect to art, Adorno takes 
Heidegger to have attempted to make the significance of Being present (an appearance of a 
nature as if untouched by domination) that misses a critical relationship to the future – an 
ideality of the non-existing.240  
 
Reconsideration 
Although it is possible to take our cue from Heidegger’s critique of the dominant 
tradition in order to undermine today’s occlusive practices, Heidegger is also a resource for 
a far more prevalent average understanding.  For Adorno, this average understanding is the 
reinvigoration of religious values with dangerous, romantic overtones.  If Adorno wishes to 
place the impact of this average understanding on Heidegger’s doorstep, Adorno must 
characterize Heidegger’s worst possible reception as latent in Heidegger’s approach.  
However, in doing so, Adorno attributes elements of an average understanding to Heidegger 
(Dasein and Being as ciphers for subject and object) that Heidegger himself complains 
about.  In other words, Adorno judges Heidegger’s technical variations on received cultural 
terms in accordance with what those terms already mean rather than in terms of what 
Heidegger says he wishes to do with them.  In order to show what Heidegger “must” be 
doing despite Heidegger’s statements to the contrary, Adorno acts as a psychoanalyst might: 
Heidegger thinks he is moving “beyond” the subject-object dichotomy when this “beyond” 
allegedly commits Heidegger to a bourgeois version of romanticism. Adorno judges 
Heidegger’s technical variations of received philosophical terms in accordance with what 
those terms already mean. Once all the translations into what Heidegger “must” be doing 
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have been put in place, we might ask whether there is any actual Heidegger left. While it is 
indeed possible that Adorno might be correct about Heidegger, what are the possibilities for 
transforming inherited terms?  
At no time is room left for the question of whether someone can think against their 
inheritance without either rejecting it or being naively entrenched within it, and no distance 
is ever put between “what one usually means” and what reflection might make of it—except 
in the granting of a special authoritative space for the critical theorist who is able to inform 
us that this “repetition” of language is self-deceived. Because Adorno’s critical theory is 
more typically in the mode of a kind of diagnosis, the dialectical complexity of Adorno’s 
thinking takes on the air of a demonstration as if from nowhere. This granting of a special 
authoritative space is in danger of becoming indistinguishable from that of the hegemony of 
metaphysics, working normatively to distort the thought of someone who, as a thinker, is a 
different “phenomenon” altogether than the social “reality” wherein we are otherwise 
entrenched. 
Plato’s dialogues show that people reveal more about themselves by speaking than 
they realize.  But just as Job’s friends are only capable of deploying their moral categories, 
how we hear another (or fail to hear another) is revealing about a kind of attunement or 
embodiment that prepares for only certain kinds of openness to others and otherwise 
remains closed off.  
Where the evidence is textual, the matter of diagnosing the “true” motivations of a 
philosopher is of course is not as ingenious (that is to say, textually immaterial) as when I 
read “between the lines” (or even against the lines). To have presumed to detect a 
                                                           
240 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Theory and History of Literature, Vol 88, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 82 Cf. l 'avenir in Jacques Derrida, 
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philosopher’s motivations is a dubious procedure, especially when such interpretation is 
contrary to their explicit statements (for reasons of counter-transference). Even, or 
especially, in cases of diagnostic “expertise,” repression merely changes its modus 
operandi.241 Due not least of all to the fact that transference is bi-directional, neither the 
expertise of the analyst nor the defenses of the analysand are proof against the sleight of 
hand of the unconscious. The ideal of a “pure” deployment of categories of neurosis is a 
distortion of psychoanalysis. Expertise is just the capacity to reflect that my motivation is 
never thoroughly a matter of my control or (what amounts to the same thing) my motivation 
to “control” is an expression of ‘always already’ being out of control; reflection in this 
context occurs as counter-transference becomes thematic as a disruption of the progress of 
critique. Projection, in the context of hearing, is when what I hear as the words and meaning 
of an “other” is actually my body.  
 
This sudden feeling is as good as a testimony, through its unsettling 
strangeness, which “from the exterior” lies in reserve in the interior, 
hidden away and from where it can on occasion depart to return 
from the outside to assail the mind as if it were issued not from it 
but from the incidental situation.242 
 
In the sense that it is bodily presented without representation, the “reserve of the 
unconscious” is that theoretical pointer towards a potential content - pointing as does the 
threatening excess that, for the traumatized, accompanies uncanny, incidental events. Once 
                                                           
Rogues, Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: Standford UP, 2005). 
241 An instructive video in this regard is Albert Ellis’ therapy session with a client, who becomes increasingly agitated (that 
is, irrational) as he informs the client (with greater and greater desperation) of her irrational thinking (to no effect). Three 
Approaches to Psychotherapy, No. 3: Dr. Albert Ellis, Psychological Films, inc. 16mm film reel (50 min.) 1965. 
242 Lyotard describes the aporias associated with “memorializing” an event of shock. Heidegger and “the jews”, 12-13. 
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one admits that one’s real motivations can conceal themselves, one is thereby obligated to 
notice that the monstrous in the other is perhaps an estranged dimension of oneself.243 
Every time Heidegger takes up an uncommon possibility of thinking, he also must 
contend with the dismissive, authoritative, anonymous (largely epistemological) voice that 
claims that a novel attempt is either impossible or has already been accomplished to the 
extent possible. Thus the matter of thinking for Heidegger is never one of being traditionally 
ontological one moment and then magically emancipated the next.  Rather, the matter is one 
of going into the future through a creative transformation of having-been (Wiederholung, 
altering repetition) as opposed to applying knowledge via decisions of the will to three 
separable “now” times of what has been, what we would like to become, and what we 
should do presently.  Heidegger “repeats” tradition by resisting the (ultimately self-
deceived) attempt to abandon or replace its contents.  For Heidegger, one “repeats” in a 
novel way precisely by refusing to “abandon” anything or look for any “replacements.”  
Adorno’s insistence that Heidegger has “ontologized” (hypostatized) history and 
also wishes “to discard tradition” washes out Heidegger’s distinction between an ongoing 
‘awaiting’ versus a ‘taking up and handing down’ of tradition. Rather than attribute 
immutability to Being, Heidegger attempts to loosen the hegemony of a very selective 
interpretation of Being that has congealed over time. The possibility of recovering 
“forgotten” dimensions of earlier figures is dependent upon whether the later figures 
through which we inherit the former can be opened up to novel reflection. In order to be 
capable of thinking Greek civilization’s “collective trauma” to the massive on-handedness 
                                                           
243 Cf. Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny, trans. David McLintock (New York: Penguin, 2003) 121.  Also, Julia Kristeva, 
Strangers to Ourselves, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia UP, 1991) 182-184 
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of Being, Heidegger must deconstruct this tradition (its ideation that grew as a forgetful 
response to massive onhanded-ness) from its latest representatives backward.  
For Heidegger, “overcoming” tradition is a going into the future through a 
“repetition” (creative transformation or reuse) of having-been.244 Like Nietzsche, the 
experience of reflection for Heidegger turns our “having been” from a necessity (that always 
already spells out our future) into a currently hegemonic possibility – a tendency rather than 
inevitability. For Heidegger, “authenticity” can only ever be the recovery of a “history for 
life”245 as opposed to the tendency to turn history into a natural object (an ultimately 
“derivative” historical consciousness that conceals thrown-projection as the historical 
condition of ordinary temporality).246  
To be philosophizing at the ending of the tradition means, for Heidegger, that we 
must try simultaneously to think the coming to pass in and for us of our inheritance and the 
creative taking up of that very inheritance in a repetition as creative re-use. If “in and for us” 
is interpreted from a third-person vantage as about the facts of a person’s life, then it does 
indeed create the portrait of someone who is determined to be what their reinforcement 
history has made her, because that is what any Historie eventually presents us – an abstract 
and general story of how things have been. Whereas, for Heidegger, “transcendence” is 
“across” the relatedness of Being and human being (or, alternatively, Dasein’s 
“transcending toward” whatever entities are encountered in terms of their Be-ing), Adorno 
appears to hear transcendence as “above” and “outside” the very ek-sistence to which 
Heidegger is trying to give voice, as a kind of as a ratification of the status quo through an 
                                                           
244 I will turn in a later section to Job’s “repetition” of the pious term “righteousness” as a matter of legal “innocence.” 
245 Cf. Historical justice as annihilation.  Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche On the Uses and Disadvantage of History for Life, trans. 
R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Charles Taylor (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1983) §7 p. 95. 
246 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY Press, 1996) § II V. 
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“anonymous authorization” of Being. 247 Experience of the conditionality of thought is just 
what the term “historicity” is supposed to ‘formally indicate’ (rather than codify) so that 
reflection avoids unconscious calamity (a denial of conditionality).  While it one thing to 
allege that Heidegger is engaging in a traditional form of transcendentalism in disguise, it is 
another to pin this “transcendentalism” to an ahistorical viewpoint248 in contradiction to 
Heidegger’s development through 1919-29 of a conception of thinking of what it means to 
“be” historical, to always be “in the midst of things” factically. For Heidegger, thinking 
comes to see by degrees how the desire for an emancipatory and comprehensive grasp of its 
situation is itself part of a predominating, inherited sense of the really real as permanent 
presence. For Heidegger, thinking no longer takes for granted how beings are “supposed” to 
be without noticing that tendency itself, yet the tendency is not thereby totally illuminated.  
At least since Descartes, reflection (Reflexion) is a kind of decontextualization of 
thinking in which one merely deals with things as they are already available (baständig), 
enframed and set up (ge-stellen) as “objects to be represented.”  On this account, Reflexion 
fails to reflect in a transformative way upon its very possibility.  As a matter of describing 
experience, Reflexion is inadequate to, for example, the reflectiveness of a traumatized 
person who comes to know as a matter of having-been that they’re engaging in a coping 
behavior, say dissociation, to ward off pain.  Instead, Reflexion has more in common with 
dissociation, as both dissociation and Reflexion leave intact the condition for the possibility 
of “repetition” in the decadent sense, even (or especially) if that condition is formally 
“understood.”  Heidegger’s conception of reflection comes primarily from Dilthey’s notion 
                                                           
247 “Added to the mythologization of Being as the sphere of “sending” was Heidegger’s mythical hubris, his proclamation 
of the subject’s decree as a plan of supreme authority and his disguise of his own voice as that of Being.” 
Negative Dialectics, 88. 
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of Selbstbesinnung – an enhancement of self-awareness. In SZ, Heidegger says that we must 
already be “in the truth” of a “world” (which we must hear verbally, as a process) that can 
be “represented,” in which entities “get their reality” from “possessing properties” before 
we can discuss them in terms of “what” those entities “essentially” are, handle true and false 
propositions about them, etc.  But this coming-to-be of this dominant possibility of world 
usually is neglected such that one simply handles true- and false-propositions in the 
customary way.   
Heidegger’s deconstruction can be misunderstood theologically, metaphysically, 
transcendentally and “ontologically,” if by “ontological” we mean the transposition of ontic 
matters to an ontological realm as an effort to “cast off” tradition.249 In Adorno’s terms, 
Heidegger’s notion of withdrawal attempts the preservation in reflection of ‘that which 
exceeds the concept.’ For Heidegger, reflection is “formally indicative,” as pointing us in 
the direction of an experience rather than as the naming of a thing or a process in a 
representation. For Adorno, however, Heidegger has overreached articulation into the 
“expression of inexpressibility” that accounts for the “suspended state” of philosophy that 
might, like music, be in danger of falling silent.250   
 
Heidegger has innervated this [suspended state] and literally 
transformed that specific trait of philosophy – perhaps because it is 
on the point of extinction – into a specialty, an objectivity of quasi-
superior rank: a philosophy that knows it is judging neither facts nor 
concepts the way other things are judged, a philosophy that is not 
                                                           
248 Adorno: “…Heidegger, to save the privilege of Being, must condemn the concept’s critical labors as a history of decay, 
as if philosophy might occupy a historical standpoint beyond history while on the other hand obeying a history that is 
ontologized itself, as it existence.” Negative Dialectics, 118. 
249 Adorno: “Under the weight of tradition, which Heidegger wants to shake off, the inexpressible becomes explicit and 
compact in the word “Being,” while protest against reification becomes reified, divorced from thinking, and irrational.”  
ND 110. Or,  “There is no other way to break out of history than regression.” ND 106.  For the contrary view and 
explanation of various misunderstandings, Cf.  Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Destruktion u. Dekonstruktion,” Dialogue and 
Dialectic, (New York: SUNY Press, 1989). 
250 Negative Dialectics, 109. 
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even sure what it is dealing with, would seek a positive content just 
the same, beyond facts, concepts, and judgments.251 
 
Adorno argues that where ‘expression of the inexpressible’ succeeds, as in music, its quality 
is evanescence and transitoriness attached to a process, and “not an indicative ‘That’s it.’”252  
But part of the impetus for Heidegger’s thinking is that beings are conscripted to appear as 
representations owned by us.253  Both Heidegger and Adorno appear concerned to remember 
something absent and to present it to the imagination in its plural possibilities (rather than 
render it present).  But Adorno is committed to preventing that concern to register in 
‘Heideggerese.’ In short, Heidegger might say, with Adorno, “Language becomes a measure 
of truth only when we are conscious of the nonidentity of an expression with that which we 
mean” 254 – but strangely with an entirely different experience of language in mind. 
 
Compositional Form: Heidegger’s Path 
In the introductory remarks to Being and Time, Heidegger foregrounds the matter 
that will never be exhausted throughout his career: the notion that the beginning of 
philosophical reflection is not initiated by the philosopher, but by what the philosopher 
undergoes.  From the age that “sanctions the neglect” of the Being-question onward, 
Heidegger embarks on an elaboration on this original problem of the situatedness of 
thinking. For Heidegger, the matter for philosophy becomes the coming to presence (event) 
of an ontological atmosphere that devalues forms of reality other than the permanent present 
as ‘always already’ secondary. Speaking in a critical theory vein, Heidegger’s thinking 
                                                           
251 Negative Dialectics, 109-110. 
252 Negative Dialectics, 110. 
253 The dominant sense of the real arrives in such a way that it implies that it is somehow “owned by us.”  That is, we 
already tend to hear “thinking about the real” as a representational act, which makes things real insofar as they are real for 
a subject.  
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explicitly attempts to monitor the fact of mediation in other than a mode of evasion. In its 
self-consciousness about naïve repetition, Heidegger’s philosophical reflection appears to 
not be so distant from Adorno’s observation that, 
 
The more passionately thought denies its conditionality for the sake 
of the unconditional, the more unconsciously, and so calamitously, 
it is delivered up to the world.  Even its own impossibility it must at 
last comprehend for the sake of the possible.255 
 
Heidegger’s philosophical hermeneutics follows the consequences for thinking of an ending 
of a naïve occurrence of a closed ontological circle (Being as the ‘really real’ of phenomena 
as the permanently present); once thematic, our location relative to repetition shifts, but 
never such that we attain the metaphysical opposite, an “utterly open” ontology. For 
Heidegger, thinking no longer takes for granted how beings are “supposed” to be without 
noticing that tendency itself, yet the tendency is not thereby totally illuminated. Our location 
(in relation to “what” is ending) shifts, we might say, “progressively” but only so long as 
our location is itself the “object” of thought. It is in the continued articulation of the 
unavailability of absolute novelty that hermeneutical phenomenology advances, which is to 
say that “advance” might no longer be a relevant term. Heidegger’s thinking “resolutely” 
stays with the poverty of Being’s materials (the instances of our philosophical inheritance) 
in order to loosen its hegemony on thinking so that Being (as a constraint upon ways beings 
can appear) might appear otherwise than permanent presence. 
Heidegger’s thinking, although also having discursive, argumentative, and 
explicatory moments, exhibits a path.  Through repeated passes, a downward spiral of 
Heidegger’s thinking turns in on itself, asking the condition of possibility for the prior 
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formulation of the Da- in which thinking finds itself. Formal indication articulates a precise 
sense of ‘that which withdraws’ from a prior articulation of situatedness – a demand that an 
indication be transformed precisely.  In so doing, the possibility/endangering of thought (as 
it progresses through articulations as it discovers more about its situation) is the 
compositional form of Heidegger’s thinking, with the caveat that this form appears in the 
wake of thinking rather than as something decided upon in advance. The possibility of 
being-open for a possibly different future is worded differently on different passes. 
Heidegger describes the rigor of a downward hermeneutical spiral as following a “logic that 
is stricter than logic itself”256 – with and beyond the ordinary use of words rather than 
following a logical syntax. 
Heidegger’s middle terms (Dasein, historicity, being-in-the-world, temporality) 
attempt to name the co-determination of subject and object257 while having also recognized 
that theorizing is not an “originary” mode of relatedness to things. Despite the dogma of 
native thinking as a proto-theorizing, subject and object are the articulations of a “founded 
mode of being in the world” that cannot tells us much of either the relation of Being and 
human being, or of their being given together.258 Heidegger attempts to think “with but 
beyond” the subject-object dichotomy through a phenomenology of Da-sein (by which 
Heidegger attempts to name our relatedness to things rather than a being) and a genealogy 
of Being (understood verbally rather than as a “super-object”).  That is, Heidegger 
recognizes the hegemony of instrumentality.259 For Heidegger, “subject” and “object” are 
                                                           
255 Mimima Moralia, 247. 
256 Cf. Being and Time, 6. 
257 Subject and object are articulations of a “founded mode of being-in-the-world” and thereby remain incapable, on 
Heidegger’s account, of illuminating how they are given together as a pre-thematic understanding of Being. 
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strength and candid [i.e., not formulaic] self-reflection. Negative Dialectics, 31. 
259 TA’s account of identity thinking describes one “asserted” form of Heidegger’s knowing-the-vorhand. 
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names for the theoretical orientation that obtains when instrumentality, a more common 
mode of relatedness, breaks down.  Having detected two modes of being-in-the-world, 
Heidegger can then make being-in-the-world as such a topic. Heidegger then can 
characterize ‘being-in-the-world as such’ as Sorge and the senses of timing that 
accompanies varieties of Sorge. 
Historicity is not the condition of a subject nor object, but rather the ground from 
which thinking of things as subjects and objects constitutes a privileged mode of being. On 
Heidegger’s account, each enactment of thinking is a singular encounter with what thinking 
has already come to understand about its determinativeness. Once the eschatological 
moment of epistemology is discovered to be an enactment of history rather than its evasion, 
the very motivation for forgetfulness of the situatedness of thinking is eroded.  Historicity is 
nothing apart from its enactment: Even if a simple replication of the ‘results’ of SZ were all 
one desired (a barbarization of thinking in any event), historicity is always only history 
differently. To understand historicity is to understand the situatedness of thinking, which 
(because it is always singular) could not possibly just reanimate Heidegger’s destruction of 
Metaphysics without a distortion of historicity itself. Thus thinking never encounters its 
historicity as an invariant, which (properly understood) is the very possibility of articulating 
through successive passes where thinking finds itself. 
Heidegger understands his thought as responding to the necessity to name (with all 
the precision that a found/made language can muster) a sense of “that which withdraws” 
from the ordinary deployment of truth.  Whereas Heidegger finds and makes a new idiolect 
(employing the resonances of Old High German) in an attempt to be accurate to the sense 
that withdraws from truth in its normal deployment, Adorno retains “subject” and “object” 
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and attempts to allow the contradictoriness of empirical reality to appear within dialectical 
reversals. The most obvious way in which both thought and the object transform as the 
result of a path of thinking is Heidegger’s turn after Being and Time. The preoccupation 
with questioning in Being and Time (which is human/active/subjectivist) carries the 
expectation that the meaning of Being will appear as a kind of object.260   For Heidegger, the 
notion of the ‘richness’ of phenomena261 that remains elusive to thinking is not extra-
conceptual.  Rather, the effort to articulate a relationship to a ‘richer something’ is 
qualitatively different from the effort to reform the subject, for it is a circumstance that is 
not only of a conditioned subject, but also the object as well. 
 
Compositional Form: Adorno’s Constellations 
Rather than develop a new critical vocabulary, negative dialectics demythologizes 
how “subject” and “object” are inflected within the structure of a damaged social reality.  
Adorno’s complex reversals of subject and object is a critical engagement that is cognizant 
of, and is thereby already somewhere other than, embedded within a naïve redeployment of 
these terms.  As already somewhere else, Adorno can be said to be responding to a sense 
that the terms subject and object do not exhaust our relatedness to things. That they tend to 
constitute our normal reflective equipment is part of the problem under consideration.  
Adorno attempts to give priority to the object against the tendency to exhibit subjective 
mastery.  Adorno insists that “cognition of the non-identical…is only possible as the 
collapse of subjective misrecognition of it.”262  I take Adorno to be describing here the 
                                                           
260 In the introductory sections of SZ (e.g., Being and Time, 37), Heidegger states that he will be looking for “a more 
authentic notion of Being.” Cf. Otto Poeggeler “Heidegger Today,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 8/4 (1970). 
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moment when my desire to have something appear in a certain way runs up against a 
resistance or interruption that throws me back upon my conceptual predispositions.  Because 
the way I have ‘come to be’ is implicated, such an experience arouses repression in those 
who, weakened by social conditions, are incapable of withstanding being turned about.  The 
manic that simply overwhelms the object in any case appears in Levinas’ thought that one 
can only kill a face. 
Although skeptical about thought’s ability to transform its own means of production 
into something ultimately other than the structure of domination, Adorno is concerned to 
keep at bay the emergence of domination in theory by resisting the dominance of any term 
under consideration.263  The presupposition that any particular concept is self-identical (and 
consequently can remain a stable horizon upon which analysis may appear) repeats 
domination immanently. If any term were to be given an “ontological” function, the 
structure of domination reappears (even if that term is a “horizon” despite its attempt to 
undermine philosophical first principles).  The whole of social reality is contradictory; 
consequently (and in order to be true), theory must reflect this contradictoriness in the 
dialectical movement of concepts.  By a rigorous process of negation, Adorno allows these 
contradictions to transform the model of presentation, such that each category (e.g., culture) 
shows a transmutation into its polar opposite (e.g., nature).  Demythologization is achieved 
in such a compositional form because the intransigence of social reality depends upon the 
mythological claim that each category is self-identical – the dominance of a particular term 
is a cipher for dominance in social reality. 
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Because domination is in any case intractable, Adorno’s critique exhibits an aspect 
of domination that is discernable, but not entirely eliminable, from thought. Unless it 
commit itself to alleging a total response to domination (and thereby lapse into eschatology), 
determinate negation must be marred by the very conditions that cannot be entirely 
“overcome.” Rather than claiming to have suspended identity thinking altogether, therefore, 
negative dialectic attempts determinate negations of those forms of domination it discerns. 
Negative dialectic offers only concrete instances (thought models) of critique rather than 
any totalizing opposition.  Given that any philosophical composition must reflect the 
conditions of its production (despite its best efforts to negate those conditions), determinate 
negation must reflect the brokenness of social reality – a “brokenness” that cannot be 
complete lest critique render its very possibility a mystery. Adorno attempts to thwart how 
identity thinking inhabits the space of philosophical composition – in particular those forms 
of composition that retain a mythical component.  
 
Inward Turning of an Aesthetic Theory 
Unless it claim a complete evasion of traditional philosophy, determinate negation 
must be damaged by the conditions of its production that can be found nowhere else but 
within the broken world that it aspires to critique. The wound of the broken social whole 
finds expression in Adorno in writing as refuge. Buck-Morss recognizes that Adorno, as 
exiled from Germany, underwent a displacement that required writing to be a home.264 As 
an expression of the woundedness of exile, writing could never fulfill the task of being a 
home.  Adorno takes pains to articulate the damage incurred by thinking especially in 
Minima Moralia, in which thought is driven into an “interior dialogue” (an abomination) as 
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the result of the deformation of social reality, particularly the loss of real conversation 
partners such as Benjamin.265  
According to Adorno, so long as action is motivated by fear of amorphous nature, 
only pseudo-activity can result: “Pseudo-activity is the attempt to preserve enclaves of 
immediacy in the midst of a thoroughly mediated and obdurate society.”266  In 
“Resignation,” Adorno holds out the possibility that non-participation (nicht-mitmachen) 
produces unmanipulated thought.   
 
Repressive intolerance toward thought not immediately 
accompanied by instructions for action is founded in fear.  
Unmanipulated thought and the position that allows nothing to be 
deduced from this thought must be feared because that which 
cannot be admitted is perfectly clear: this thought is right.267 
 
I interpret Adorno’s insistence on non-participation in terms of an “inward turning” of 
theory – a transformation of theory that models itself after Adorno’s consideration of 
aesthetic modernism. Non-participation has to be understood as a specific kind of 
“resignation” that still allows for the possibility of transformation. Buck-Morss detects in 
Adorno’s manner of composing essays a steady development of categories into their 
opposites – a kind of perpetual motion268 – that ultimately undermines theory as something 
that informs action.269 But how is the generation of a livable practice to find traction? 
Adorno’s concept of non-participation asks that we resist damaged life without 
retreat into compensatory and false “satisfactions.”270  In contrast to those who portray 
Adorno as a “mandarin,” Adorno’s commitment to empirical study of the authoritarian 
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266 The Culture Industry, 201 
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personality, his “turn to the subject” and concern for education, and his radio addresses 
attest to a sustained involvement with the possibility of transforming the conditions 
amenable to a catastrophe such as the Shoah. Against this continued involvement in political 
life, Heidegger’s silence regarding the Shoah appears to be an “inward turning” of an 
entirely other sort.  
In Aesthetic Theory (itself intended to be an oxymoron), Adorno describes how 
modernist artworks not only turn away from the spectator and are only “for” the spectator 
by not being for the spectator, they also turn away from each other. The authenticity of the 
work is that it is an exemplary act of self-binding that nothing grounds except itself. They 
have an intelligible ludicrousness: an absence of a natural fit between their internal 
perspective and the external perspective. The embodied form of art is in the state of 
suspension; that is, it is only a promise. The modernist artwork appears completely self-
absorbed.  
In emulation to artworks, theory must carry the burden of the promise by showing 
that which is not present.271 Through the presupposed authority of non-contextual axioms 
and absolutes, discursiveness sacrifices particularity and sensuality to the ideal of being 
fully communicable, without remainder. According to Adorno, what is lacking is a 
rationality that can be material in the world; that is, a rationality that is responsive to the 
articulateness of material itself (the singularity of each occurrence of suffering) rather than 
assertive of its order over the presumed inarticulateness of materiality. To avoid the 
incorporation of suffering into a system, Adorno transforms discursiveness (e.g., the 
requirement of logical consistency) away from hierarchical presentation. Just as reflection 
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upon the ‘falsehood of the whole’ is not part of the routine practices of society, Bernstein 
explains that those social practices that attempt to “say the unsayable” (an equally 
hyperbolic expression) are uncommon with respect to dominant modes of knowing.272 
Adorno’s anti-theories estrange truth from its conventional deployment, but Adorno 
recognized that his attempted “revolution” in philosophy’s “material production” comes at a 
cost. As Adorno notes of Schönberg, unconventional manners of arranging elements risk 
obscurity and ineffectuality.  Taken as a model for critical theory, the dependent response to 
the artwork (a moment of seizure or arrest, of being undone) results in an ‘aestheticized’ 
theory – an arrangement of materials that, like the modernist artwork, attempts to give the 
sensual its own moment of rationality. But like modernist artworks also, aesthetic theory has 
no ‘natural fit’ between its ‘internal and external perspective’ but rather shows the 
domination of reified society.  Hence Adorno appears to carry along with him what he wants 
to avoid with negative signs before it.  Said differently, if reason can only be either 
instrumental or dialectical, then critical theory “has” at its “disposal” only determinate 
negation of reason in its instrumental or dialectical moments, which is puzzling for: 
 
Grayness could not fill us with despair if our minds did not harbor 
the concept of different colors, scattered traces of which are not 
absent from the negative whole.273 
 
Non-identity is glimpsed only as a kind of “after-image”, as blue-green can be glimpsed 
once our retinas have been saturated with red. The discovery of the non-identity requires the 
appearance of the excess of the object beyond its routine conceptualizations. Is the imagery 
evoked by determinate negations responsive to the experience of excess? 
                                                           
271 Art needs critical philosophy to establish a new relationship to the world. “Aesthetic experience is not genuine 
experience unless it becomes philosophy.” Aesthetic Theory,131. Art is not legitimate by itself. If art were legitimate by 
itself, it would instantiate a ‘Platonic heaven.’  
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With the rendering an experiential beginning “necessarily” indeterminate (as with 
the aesthetic object), philosophical practice is brought into proximity with aesthetic 
consciousness. 274 Like artworks themselves, an aesthetic theory is cut out of practical life 
(i.e., is a priori dead) and yet also is the product of a lived practice. The thoroughness in 
suspending the possibility of theory’s instrumentality (i.e., licensing pseudo-activity) risks 
fetishizing theory an end-in-itself.275 Because hyperbolic expressions of totality efface the 
condition of the possibility of reflection, critical theory risks fetishism – i.e., appearing to be 
independent from its production (as do artworks that are charged with false consciousness as 
if exhibiting a domain of pure spirituality).  But if Adorno’s caution against any positivity 
appears as wariness about the possibilities of transformation, Heidegger’s formal indication 
appears in contrast as an “overreaching” of articulation. 
 
Conclusion 
On the one hand, despite Adorno’s accuracy with which determinate negation 
detects the conditions that impair reflection, the intervention is coined in traditional 
formulations that, on the one hand, pick up deformations in social reality (e.g., the subject as 
the source of categories that produce an unlivable world) and yet, on the other, suggest that 
critical reflection is always also something traditional – a kind of voluntarism against a 
thoroughly occlusive external world.  Adorno’s interventions suggests that thinking cannot 
help but be representational even though theorizing, as scientists sometimes disclose (and 
                                                           
272 The Actuality of Adorno, 163-164. 
273 Negative Dialectics, 377-378. Emphasis added 
274 An experience of difference from instrumentality must be akin to the moment of uselessness that Kant required for 
aesthetic experience. In being of no use, modernist artworks show us what the world might look like if our practical 
interests, our acquisition of property, and our need for self-preservation could be suspended.  But without something in our 
lives to which artworks (an element of non-identity in the social whole), we would have no grounds to care what art is said 
to be showing us. Beyond that precipice is transcendental illusion. Cf. The Fate of Art, 191-192. 
275 The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 189. 
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Freud displays openly), can be a deeply reflective affair. On the other hand, despite 
Heidegger’s detection of a possibility of a language that resists its representational 
moments, the possibility of thinking with and against the dominant philosophical tradition 
(and against its ordinary instantiation as Gestell) rests with a “saving grace.”  The 
dependency of Denken upon a quasi-mythical “source” is a dangerous gamble, especially 
wherever allusions to the founding of a folk, for example, undermine an attempted 
displacement of (onto-theological) Geist and appear to retain a role in legitimizing the worst 
politic precisely by claiming to be “before” all politics (via an alleged anteriority to 
undergoing). Curiously, Adorno suggests a kind of anteriority as well as that which 
“transmits the facts” to negative dialectics: “the objectivity heteronomous to the subject, the 
objectivity behind that which the subject can experience.”276 By highlighting that these 
“pious” moments of Heidegger are problematic, but also taking seriously an antinomy 
regarding positivity in Adorno, I am attempting to selectively reinforce the political work I 
take Adorno to be doing in his criticisms of Heidegger, while also attempting to allow 
Heidegger to continue to speak regarding the possibilities of transforming inherited terms. 
Insofar as philosophy incorporates “passive” materiality by means of rational 
assertion, suffering is absorbed back into the world of practice; that is, suffering is assigned 
a role. Philosophy’s penchant for rational assertion is part of the problem to be considered 
for both Adorno and Heidegger; either can be said to have attempted to preserve undergoing 
in reflection rather than “assign a role” to undergoing per se. In that it exceeds 
intentionality, experience cannot serve as a standard for ‘how to begin’ to philosophize out 
of undergoing, just as it cannot serve any “purpose,” conventionally understood.  Even the 
phrase ‘how to begin’ has subjectivist, activist overtones that already signal a difficulty in 
                                                           
276 Negative Dialectics, 170. 
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the sense that experience is a dependent response that is bodily undergone rather than 
chosen (a dimension that Heidegger recognized as requiring a turn from the “questioning” 
stance of Being and Time).   
Heidegger’s thought of the event of Being is the result of articulating, through 
repeated passes, the ontological ‘atmosphere’ that reveals beings as, for example 
predominantly “for” representation.  As such, Heidegger’s “Being-language” is not intended 
as a further violence to beings but rather an attempt to defuse the authority of “what 
everybody knows” from the dominant philosophical tradition. Nevertheless, Heidegger’s 
reflection takes us from beings (e.g., technology, the artwork, mathematics, the thing) 
toward the inner possibility of appearing as a coming-to-presence that conceals itself. My 
efforts at philosophical reflection requires that I experience beings other than exclusively in 
terms of a predominant mode of disclosure, yet precisely how beings are damaged is but a 
moment in the trajectory of Heidegger’s thought toward the eventuation of Being.  In 
contrast, Adorno’s determinate negations provide detail as to deformations of experience 
wherein thinking is to survive, and tend to remain decidedly “ontic.”  
Akin to how the place of designation in Job is transformed by Job into a trial of law, 
the trial of philosophy is an arraignment in which the form or law of philosophizing (of 
incompatible philosophical orientations) is exhibited with respect to undergoing. The 
response of Job’s “consolers of pain/painful consolers” (16:2) seems to exhibit what 
Heidegger would term an “average understanding” or what Adorno might term “identity 
thinking.”  Rather than rely upon spurious identifications, however, I take the materiality of 
the text of Job itself as my guide. Job, after all, asks that we respond to his suffering other 
than as materiality to be subsumed under a predominant regime of conceptuality 
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(“punishment” due to a divine, retributive calculus). Just as Job must contend against an a 
priori meaning of suffering as consonant with an allegedly infallible order of creation, my 
task is to read Job against the presumption to “discover” in the text an alleged a priori 
meaning of suffering. The arraigning of Heidegger and Adorno is an instance of arraigning 
as calling us to appear, and reading Job de-familiarizes texts away from an aptness “for” 
form. The fragmentary aspects of the text of Job recalls Adorno’s descriptions of the 
fracturing of form by the modernist artwork.  
The portrait of place in Job that emerges is a there that estranges Heidegger’s Da- of 
Dasein: an administered world of integrating and marginalizing forces that place (provoke, 
apprehend) the singularity of Job’s suffering and displace his attempts to discern what he is 
living through and to be heard. El’s disruption of creation (Job 12) and the “certainty” of 
orderliness professed by Job’s consolers displays a family resemblance to Kafka’s The 
Trial: a world that is broken-as-administered and K’s “guilt.” The matter of undergoing that 
emerges from my reading of Job is that suffering is a being-displaced by prevailing law and 
its administration, a circumstance in which the sufferer must somehow contest a manifest 
intelligibility of suffering that is in service of the conditions that create suffering in the first 
place. 
Job’s linguistic subversion appears to be consonant with Heidegger’s formal 
indication, a finding and making of language. However, the “pious” moments in Heidegger 
are opposed to Job’s creative repetition of pious terms (“righteousness”) in a legal context 
(“innocence”).  Job’s obstacle is a moral “understanding” that wishes to reconcile Job’s 
presumed iniquity with a presumed, divinely authorized, orderliness in the world.  In order 
to warrant the interpretation of Job’s plight as consonant with Heidegger, “pious” moments 
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in Heidegger (e.g., “saving grace”) would have to be evidenced by Job’s recourse to, as it 
were, a grace “before” piety  (as with Heidegger’s sending “before” ontology277).  As is 
evidenced in Job’s abandoning both his claim to innocence278 and the possibility of an 
intercessor,279 Job contests the given-ness of piety without appealing to piety in another 
form, but rather by contesting El’s chaotic administration of creation.   
Adorno’s notion of the “culture industry” is significant as a portrait of a hyper-
administered world, where, like Job, the ability to discern our circumstances differently is 
thwarted by standardization and exchange (e.g., the friends’ promise to Job that 
reconciliation with El will follow from Job’s admission of his “guilt”).  While it is possible 
that Heidegger’s Gestell might accomplish the same interpretive task, Adorno also describes 
how the capacity for experience is covered over by narratives of mystical reconciliation and 
amelioration in a way that is consonant with Job’s plight: the disavowal of the projection of 
a divine, retributive calculus “in” the world. 
Heidegger’s engagement with “religious” language (e.g., “only a god can save us”) 
reflect his affinity for Hoderlin rather than an affinity for an explicitly Christian God.  
However, it is possible to claim (as Adorno does) that Heidegger thereby betrays certain 
religious commitments that “leak through” Heidegger’s otherwise critical engagement with 
the intransigence of social reality.  Alternately, it is also possible to claim that these 
“religious” moments are rather attempts to displace a damaging religious footprint in 
society.  According to this last reading, Heidegger’s “religious” moments are at worst a 
hubristic playing with fire (“spirit is flame”).280 A critical engagement may always be 
                                                           
277 For “Sending” as Führung, Cf. Of Spirit, Heidegger and The Question, 32. 
278 42:6.  Job’s claim to innocence can only come too late with respect to law. 
279 By “intercessor” I refer to 9:33 (the arbiter), 16:19 (the witness), and 19:25 (the avenger), all of whom Job abandons as 
possible sources of assistance that might stand somehow authoritatively prior to El and Job. 
280 Of Spirit, Heidegger and The Question, 84. 
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misunderstood.  In contrast, Adorno’s hyperbole as to “total” domination cannot be taken 
otherwise than as a condemnation of a broken sociality. In either case, however, critical 
engagement is not possible without some repression being in effect.281 
To be sure, Heidegger’s Geist (as the possibility of thinking) is re-appropriated and 
displaced from its onto-theological counterpart in the dominant philosophical tradition. In 
particular, Heidegger appears to be concerned to displace Hegel, but in a way that remains 
susceptible to “military transposition.”282  In order to indict Heidegger’s “ontology” as a 
new Aquinas,283 much of what Heidegger says must be translated into what he allegedly 
“must” be doing despite his insistence to the contrary. Nevertheless, a danger persists that in 
Heidegger’s prioritization of undergoing, the “sending” of Being attains a kind of ur-
metaphysics.284 Because of the persistence of “reading” Job as part of a redemptive story of 
suffering, Heidegger requires (on my reading) a further “turn” – not just the turn from a 
subjectivist-imbued fundamental ontology, but also something like Adorno’s “turn to the 
subject:” So much of my reading of Job depends upon deconstructing pious distortions to 
the materiality of the text that a more complete analysis of desire and myth is warranted 
(one akin to Adorno’s critique of the “authoritarian personality”).   
Whether writing is either of that which appears-as-withdrawing or of that which 
exceeds the concept, texts betray deep conceptions of language (e.g., writing is either of 
‘that which presents itself as withdrawing’ or of ‘that which exceeds the concept’). Must the 
                                                           
281 The regression in culture can be evident in aporias in texts. The warding off of memory by repression tends to mask 
more objects than just the intended trauma. Having pulled the trauma underground, the symptom of an elevated readiness 
for trauma remains available to consciousness only as an unspecified fear in otherwise incidental circumstances. As Freud 
observes, a traumatized organism will attempt to prevent future trauma by maintaining a raised guard – a hyper-vigilance 
that, contrary to the impression that “vigilance” is enhanced awareness, is nevertheless motivated by the unrepresented (the 
traumatic event itself).  Under conditions of this elevated readiness, ideation, no matter how rigorously “theoretical” or 
“philosophical,” is a defense against memory (a memorializing).  In fact, the greater authority that a scientific or 
philosophical discourse carries, the greater its effectiveness in foreclosing matters in the form of “already known truths.” 
282 David Wood, Thinking After Heidegger (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002)  110, 112-113. 
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possibility of passage be thought solely in “recuperative dialectical terms”?285 While my 
reading of Job requires something other than the reconfiguring of religious values in a 
“saving grace” (Heidegger), Adorno’s alternative (hyperbolic description of the world’s 
“completed” negativity) appears to function like Heidegger’s formal indication:286 a 
pointing without making the pointer more significant than what is being indicated.  In this 
respect, Adorno seems to avail himself to a language that is different than “positivity” and 
“negativity” as he tends to describe them. 
Buck-Morss observes that Adorno’s contribution to critical theory is in the novel 
arrangement of materials rather than the contribution of novel materials.287  Such a 
contribution of novel materials would seem to require exilic wandering rather than refuge 
per se.  For example, Man Ray wandered by a shop window and discovered the iron that 
became “Cadeau” (1921). He declared to himself, “Now there’s something almost 
invisible!” 288 In contrast, Adorno was reluctant to travel. Despite Adorno’s affinity to 
Benjamin, Benjamin’s ‘contribution of novel materials’ derives from a wandering through 
the debris left in the wake a stasis in mythical disguise. Benjamin devoted himself to the 
rescue of fragments – the ejected remains of broken social reality. The picture that emerges 
of the philosophical life is one marred by expulsion from the whole: the wounded subject 
wanders through apocryphal realms289 wherein the possibility of experience has retreated.  
                                                           
283 I am playing on Werner Brock’s assessment of Heidegger as the “new Aristotle” about human beings. Werner Brock, 
Existence and Being, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949). 
284 Cf. Theodor Adorno, “The Actuality of Philosophy,” trans. Benjamin Snow, Telos 31 (Spring 1977) 120-122. 
285 David Wood, Thinking After Heidegger (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2002) 32, 36.  Wood describes the possibility of an 
experience of language that preserves the ethical as a finite, continually open engagement with alterity. 
286 Heidegger’s formal indication as both a finding and making of language in order to name, with as much accuracy as can 
be mustered, that which withdraws from conventional language for phenomena. 
287 Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 186. 
288 “Cadeau” is a flat iron to which Man Ray had affixed tacks (on the ironing surface) in a vertical line. Tate 18 July 2010 
<http://www.tate.org.uk/images/cms/13767w_t07883manraycadeau_1small.jpg> 
289 Because everything is leveled by the dominance of exchange, “apocryphal realms on the edges of civilization move 
suddenly into the center.” Adorno, quoted in The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 189. 
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The philosopher who attempts a transformed philosophy also an outsider of sorts 
who exhibits a sojourn, an inability to be at home, that is constitutive of undergoing one’s 
difference from the whole (despite myths of reconciliation with the given-ness of things) 
and yet is also not self-deceived as to transcending one’s circumstances altogether.  In other 
words, the philosophical life resembles Benjamin’s sojourn during the destruction of 
European Jewry – an incapacity to be at home – to “dwell” – even or especially poetically 
insofar as poetry becomes a melancholic refuge from, rather than a critical engagement with, 
social reality.    
Perhaps like all passages, this wayward passage (like the modernist artwork) is a 
determinate failure.  But in failing determinately, I perhaps stand to learn from this failure in 
conversation with others as to how I have externalized my own otherness as an attempted 
passage.  While formally inconclusive, I have nevertheless exhibited a sojourn between 
orientations akin to Benjamin’s reluctance to form a united front, even (as he reports) if it be 
with his own mother. What we undergo as damaged life is in no way merely imitative of an 
extant philosophy, but rather responds (as Heidegger and Adorno require of us, after all) to 
the demands of experience. A transformed (better, transforming) philosophy demands a 
continually revisable Halakah290 – a walk without a ground.  With the subsequent chapters, 
the trial continues as this sojourn.   
 
 
 
 
                                                           
290 Halakhah (the body of Jewish law) has no doctrine (is not an ordered whole). Besides parables, it also contains 
instruction. It is subject to quotation, extrapolation, and elaboration. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
OUTSIDERS: ‘!BER" DEREK TO ODRADEK 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I consider suffering as a loss of experience.  The loss of experience is 
authorized (i.e., lawful, “correct”).  Its signature is a prevailing reasonableness that, however 
efficient it renders one (for example, the capacity for reflection has largely been reduced to 
quantification), also is a regression in which the presumed “subject” is not the locus of the 
synthesis required for experience. Damaged society weakens the ego; lack of self-love and 
disorientation is the impetus for rigid adherence to a pseudo-orientation provided by 
allegedly intrinsically true, supra-individual laws (e.g., stories told from the perspective of 
the eschaton). Suffering thereby occurs not just as the initial damage to ego-strength, but 
also as a loss of experience that issues from an abandoning of the reality-principle.  Having 
come to require the “truth” of these supra-individual laws, the “individual” represses 
perceived threats to these truths by sanctioned violence against difference – difference itself 
having become a projection of characteristics upon socially permissible targets rather than 
the actual experience of difference.  Once “the different” suffer dereliction like Job, the 
calculus that the sufferer must contest is presumed to be unrevisable because its origin in 
human valuation is disavowed.  
The loss of experience has several dimensions pertaining to the book of Job: Job’s 
consolers presuppose a divine calculus of retributive justice; this presupposition prevents 
Job’s consolers from experiencing Job’s suffering as non-identical to divine punishment.  
Job’s suffering is compounded due to the fact that the materiality of Job’s suffering cannot 
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signify in its own right. The axiomatic presupposition that suffering has a redemptive value 
(provided one accepts one’s “guilt”) results in the loss of the capacity to experience the text 
of Job. Job has historically been “read” as part of a whole “story of redemption” with the 
“new” testament as a fulfillment of “the meaning” of suffering. As an anti-theodicy 
(opposed to a redemptive story of suffering), Job is an outsider-text. Teleology is also 
apparent in textual scholarship on Job: allegedly, the significance of the text depends upon 
the resolution of its numerous hapax legomena and dislocations, whereas I view gaps and 
fissures in intelligibility to be generative of possible meaning.  
First, I will consider how Job is replete with characters from elsewhere.  Next, I 
discuss attempts to reconstruct the history of Job in terms of the “death” of the original. I 
then discuss the lack of hope in Job against the backdrop of the founding of law and 
eschatology.  The discussion of hope will prepare the way for Kafka to enter the discussion 
in terms of how Job is before the law.  By the introduction of Kafka (and later Georg 
Büchner and contemporary artist Rodney Graham), I deliberately cross the law of genre in 
order to enrich notions of law as administration and myths of transcendence.  I then describe 
the instability of margins in terms of Job’s lack of a written indictment, the wager between 
YHWH and ha##$%$n, and YHWH’s “limiting” of the chaos embodied by Behemoth and 
Leviathan.  The hegemony of law requires that I question whether there can still be any 
outsiders at all, for “alienation” requires a subject. Because Job is outcast from a theological 
administration (the created “order” and its depiction in wisdom literature), Job speaks to the 
wounding of the individual who, as a mode of violence, is de-legitimated and expelled. This 
prepares the way for a discussion of the possibility of having stories (Benjamin), the 
alienation of art, and finally Job’s trial as akin to modernist composition (Adorno). From 
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Kafka’s character of Odradek who resembles Job by its many loose threads, to the ‘!ber" 
derek (“wayfarers” in 21:29) whose word from afar is discounted, this chapter considers the 
notion of the “outsider” in its multi-dimensionality. 
 
Outsiders 
In Job, we find ourselves among a cast of characters from elsewhere. Among those 
present in YHWH’s courtly assembly are the “sons of God.” Among these heavenly beings 
is ha##$%$n or “the satan.”  The article ha- indicates that ha##$%$n is a title or sign of office. 
Ha##$%$n is a position; it is a functionary whose role as “the adversary” is to seek out 
contradictions in creation and challenge its creator. The roving challenger, ha##$%$n, who 
has been stomping about creation, indicates a troubling ambiguity with respect to Job’s 
piety: Job might be pious simply because YHWH has “hedged” him around with protection 
and bounty. In addition to a roaming challenger, we encounter the afflicted and exemplary, 
Job. Job is from Uz, a place legendary for its wise inhabitants.291 In 13:24, Job (’iyy!b) is 
perplexed why El should count him as “the enemy” (’!y"b). Job is castigated by the outcast: 
 
Between the bushes they bray, 
huddled together under the nettles –  
churls, nobodies, 
whipped out of the land. 
And now I am their song, 
I’ve become the word for them (30:7-9) 
 
These nobodies are of fathers that Job “disdained to station among my sheepdogs” (30:1).  
Job is lesser than the nobodies, for his former status counts against him. 
                                                           
291 Norman C. Habel, The Book of Job: A Commentary (Old Testament Library) (Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1985) 
86. 
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To the characters of the roving challenger, Job and the nobodies, we must add elders 
of distant tribes. The friends, Eliphaz the Temanite, Bildad the Shuhite, Zophar the 
Naamanthite (as evidenced by their reference to the divinity by local names, Eloah or 
Shaddai) carry the wisdom particular to their respective places. To this growing cast of 
characters from elsewhere, we must add that marginality is emphatically represented 
through the elemental monsters that contest law as such; namely, behemoth (the 
embodiment of natural evil), and leviathan (the embodiment of supernatural evil).292 Finally, 
the most impetuous and zealous among the friends, Elihu, is an outsider of another sort. His 
name, Elihu, indicates that he is not a “foreigner.”  Elihu is the only Israelite among those 
“comforting” Job; his name translates as “He is my God.”293 Habel asks, “Is it accidental 
that the only speaker with an Israelite name (cf. Sam 1:1, I Chron. 26:7) attempts, as a late 
intruder, to gainsay the arguments of those who bear alien names?”294 The sudden 
appearance of Elihu in the text is often regarded as a later, pious interpolation: a loose 
thread in the unraveling, wayward “integrity” (tumm$) of Job. Job itself is an outsider of 
sorts: like the usual story of the “canonical” thinkers in the history of philosophy (which 
excludes Judaic and Islamic philosophy), the “story of redemption” (of which Job is 
assumed to be a part) preempts reading Job. 
 
Hope for the “original” Job 
Like the human body that bears upon it the marks of repeated trauma, the history of 
the text of Job is of accumulated deformations. It is usually assumed that an older “folk 
                                                           
292 James L. Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and Probing Questions, Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom (Macon, 
GA: Mercer University Press, 1995) 457.  On the monstrous, Cf. Richard Kearney, Strangers, Gods and Monsters, 
Interpreting Otherness (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
293 James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press 1998) 100.   
294 The Book of Job, 448. 
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tale” version of Job frames the more recent poetry/debate section that was added in the 5c. 
BCE.295   What is increasingly noteworthy is not the textual difficulties in Job, however, but 
rather the scholarly desires that difficulties in Job provoke. 
 
A difference of ideas between one passage and another becomes an 
occasion for proposing different authors for different parts of the 
text.  To understand a text by this method becomes an attempt to 
reconstruct a sequence of events in the life of the text, and without a 
sense of that sequence, we think we cannot go on to understand.  
This reduces a work to a series of events outside of the work, which 
we clamp deterministically upon the work.296 
 
In an attempt to come to grips with the absence of sense, scholars attempt to designate 
untranslatable words and phrases as being “archaisms” (words that time has forgotten), 
ancient “euphemisms” (phrases that time has forgotten) or “Aramaisms” (another language 
altogether, though often lacking any definite parallel in any Aramaic text).297  Without any 
referent against which one can compare a phrase or word in Job, the designation of any 
passage as an archaism, euphemism, or Aramaism is a shaky enterprise.     
Archaisms are terms with no grammatical explanation. Rather than assist us with 
understanding Job, an “archaism” simply names an interpretive difficulty. The 
appropriateness of the designation of anything as an “archaism,” however, is uncertain: Job 
                                                           
295 The debates between the friends and Job might have emerged in retellings.  The poet(s) of Job might have been an exile 
in Babylon, in which case the outcry against unintelligible disaster finds expression through the character Job.  Cf. Edwin 
M. Good. In Turns of Tempest, A Reading of Job with a translation, (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP: 1990) 132. For the 
question of genre in Job, Cf. Robert Gordis, The Book of Job: Commentary, New Translation and Special Studies (New 
York: JTS Press, 1978) 347. 
296 In Turns of Tempest,183. 
297 Job abounds with morphological archaisms (forms of words with no grammatical explanation) (Michael Cheney “Dust, 
Wind and Agony: Character, Speech and Genre in Job, “Coniectanea Biblica Old Testament Series  Vol. 36 (1994) 227. 
The attempt is made to look for parallels in other ancient near east (ANE) languages (e.g., Ugaritic, Aramaic). If such a 
parallel is found, then the anomalous form can be designated an “Aramaism” (just in case that the parallel is in an Aramaic 
text). There are archaisms that are unique to Job in all the Hebrew Bible (219-223).   
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is in a dialect that is unique to the Hebrew Bible.  But the diversity of dialects to the Hebrew 
Bible complicates the attribution of “archaisms” to Job.298 
Job’s characterization of his competence and compulsion to speak (16:4-6) is an 
example of a particularly dense cluster of “archaisms.”  The archaism l*mô is used by 
Yahweh to address Job (38:40) and by Job to address Yahweh (40:4).  Job says in 40:4, 
“How can I reply to you? I lay my hand on my mouth.” The question of Job’s speaking is 
redoubled by the matter of such archaisms, which occur in the dialogue between Job and the 
divinity no less, where one might otherwise hope for a resolution to the narrative.   
An archaism might help locate a text historically if we could refer to an occurrence 
of the same archaic term in another text whose date we have determined.  There are not any 
such texts with respect to Job.  Even if such referents were available, there is a further 
difficulty: Is the archaic term contemporaneous with its author or was an older term used by 
the author to lend the ancient setting of Job an air of realism? If it is the former, then the 
term is archaic and can help us date the book (but only if we can find a dateable parallel 
text).  If it is the latter, then the term is “archaizing” and is a trope as in the practice of 
retrojection (the practice of temporally setting prophets before the events that they 
“predict”299). Whether we should regard any single anomalous grammatical form as either 
“archaic” or “archaizing” is irresolvable.  
Reconstructed histories of the text and presumed tamperings with an “original” are at 
best speculative.300 The competing reconstructions and histories only compound the 
                                                           
298 The dialectical diversity of the Hebrew Bible is such that the determination of an archaism or dialect can only be 
speculative at best.  
299 In Biblical Hebrew, the prophetic perfect tense is the use of a past-tense verb while speaking about the future: whatever 
is prophesized is as good as done. 
300 cf. Zuckerman’s speculative history of the text in Urgent Advice, 450. 
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fractures they were hoping to mend.301 With respect to an ultimately fictive wholeness (due 
to dislocations and interpolations302), Job wanders. Job speaks to us from an indeterminate 
historical origin.  
Reading Job places us in contact with what in the text belongs especially to 
language: the death of the original and the persistent desire to construct one.  The translator 
of Job encounters the impossibility of possessing an original Job.303 Translation 
demonstrates that the original is always already disarticulated and dismembered.304 From the 
perspective of the desire for the redemption of a pure language (reine Sprache), the “death” 
of the original is a shortcoming. Benjamin wrests theological motifs from their native 
contexts in order to call attention to the essential disarticulation of language, its permanent 
exile from idealized meaning 305 Benjamin employs messianic tropes, but also 
 
…displaces them in such a way as to put the original in motion, to 
de-canonize the original, giving it a movement which is a 
movement of disintegration, of fragmentation.  This movement of 
the original is a wandering, an errance, a kind of permanent exile if 
you wish, but it is not really an exile, for there is no homeland, 
nothing from which one has been exiled.306 
 
Benjamin’s “theological” moments counter the desire for a source and guarantor of 
reference.307  From the mythical perspective of an extra-linguistic guarantor of stability in 
reference, the wandering of language is deemed “errant.”  But the mythical guarantor of 
                                                           
301 On normal dealings with incoherence and postulating a coherent original: In Turns of Tempest,183. 
302 The possibility of interpolation that the sudden appearance of Elihu suggests that the Elihu speeches are a later 
interpolation. 
303 Cf. In Turns of Tempest,15.  
304 Paul De Man, “ ‘Conclusions’: Walter Benjamin's ‘Task of the Translator’,” The Resistance to Theory (Theory and 
History of Literature, Vol. 33) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 84.  
305 For example, Benjamin shows how Kafka’s definition of original sin in Der Prozess has been wrenched from its native 
context. Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” Illuminations, Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt 
(New York: Schocken, 1968) 114. 
306 The Resistance to Theory, 92.  
307 This is de Man’s reading of Benjamin.  Derrida, however, does not find in Benjamin a destruction capable of carrying 
off the critique of law sufficient to the memory of the Shoah.  Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical 
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“meaning” is in fact the apotheosis of meaning; for the intelligible ideal that would provide 
a guarantor sacrifices the possibility that sensuousness might signify in the world.308 The 
ability of materiality to signify has been replaced by a univocal nominalism.  The teleology 
of a restoration of wholeness is not just evident in textual scholarship, but also in the way 
Job is “read” in terms of “hope.” 
 
Hope and Law 
As anti-theodicy, Job is a trial of hope. In contrast to mythological time that is part 
of a replacement theology today, the so-called “Old Testament” is allegedly to be read in 
terms of kerygma, the “abiding truth” that is contained within all events that precede the 
coming of Christ.309 The tetragrammaton demonstrates that there is no word for hope; 
instead, it represents a prohibition against preparation and calculation.310 The form of hope 
encoded in the enlightenment (progressive human rationality) is the eschaton. Our tradition 
is haunted by a reduction of sensibility to sight and the desire for a fully-frontal ocularity.311 
A deformed embodiment, the result of damaged society, results in a regressive desire to 
ward off despair: that we might hold the past in its entirety at arm’s length through a trans-
historical “vision.” The right of law is connected to rectitude, a repression of the body.312 
                                                           
Foundation of Authority,” Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, trans. Mary Quaintance, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. 
(New York: Routledge, 1992) 63.   
308 “The reshaping of the heathen ritual of sacrifice not only took place in worship and in the mind but determined the form 
of the labor process.” Dialectic of Enlightenment, 146. According to Hartt, the Christian tradition maintains that language 
can be sufficiently relieved of its defects to make it a faithful instrument of divine truth.  The appropriateness of images 
and terms are to be decided by revelation rather than by analysis of language. Julian N. Hartt, “Language,” Handbook of 
Christian Theology, Definition Essays on Concepts and Movements of Thought in Contemporary Protestantism, ed. 
Marvin Halverson and Arthur A. Cohen (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1964) 202. 
309 Erich Dinkler, “Myth (Demythologizing),” Handbook of Christian Theology, Definition Essays on Concepts and 
Movements of Thought in Contemporary Protestantism (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1964) 242. 
310 On the political achievement in the ancient world of rendering the word for God unpronounceable – an attempt to  
prevent its possession by any single tribe, Cf. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
Philosophical Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002). 
311 Transcend (lit. to climb across): “There is no thinking of limits that does not deploy a certain model of space.” David 
Wood Philosophy at the Limit (London, Unwin Hyman: 1990) xvi. 
312 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 24. 
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The most purely formal law repudiates the truth-content of bodies, enacting law as purely 
intelligible rather than sensible.313  
Through eschatological narrative, the elimination of the outsider is given a “divine” 
mandate.  In apocalypticism as in trauma, a violent past reappears in symptomatic, displaced 
form.314 Apocalypticism depends upon repression: the agency denied actual subjects in their 
subjection to power is compensated by God’s agency at an end-time. The elimination of 
social subjects, actual in terms of mechanization and social coordination, is displaced to an 
immanent future as amorphous anxiety (cataclysm).  
The founding of law depends upon its mythical valuation in terms of a future 
anterior: a deformation of memory – a concealing of the performative violence in the right 
of law to law.  
 
In these situations said to found law (droit) or state, the grammatical 
category of the future anterior all too well resembles a modification 
of the present to describe the violence in progress.  It consists, 
precisely, in feigning the presence or simple modalization of 
presence.  Those who say “our time,” while thinking “our present” 
in light of a future anterior present do not know very well, by 
definition, what they are saying.  It is precisely in this ignorance 
that the eventness of the event consists, what we naively call its 
presence.315 
 
Law comes to legitimate itself retrospectively after the violence that founds it. The present 
consists in the debarring of reflection from “entry into” the history of law (genealogy) in 
non-law, in épokhè.316  
                                                           
313 For example, when we engage in physics we move away from sensuousness to the allegedly “real” thoughts about 
nature – a Cartesian “withdrawal of assent” from what our senses tell us. By the second Meditation, Descartes has lost the 
world for the sake of a purely intelligible realm where he ironically asserts a complete self-possession. 
314 In Freud’s analysis of trauma, “what appears to be reality is in truth the refracted image of a forgotten past.” Sigmund 
Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961) 13. 
315 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 35. 
316 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 36 
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For Kafka, decrepit courtrooms, distortions of form, and illegible circumstances 
become modalities whereby our lot before the law is told. Like Kafka’s K, Job’s claim to 
innocence comes too late, always after the founding violence of law and its subsequent 
displacement of memory.  A moment of hesitation occurs for those who wish to gain entry 
to the law:  
  
…but as he now takes a closer look at the doorkeeper in his fur coat, 
with his big sharp nose and long, thin, black Tartar beard, he 
decides that it is better to wait until he gets permission to enter.317 
 
The law of the law cannot be exhibited, for that would require an impossible place.318 Such 
a place of absolute disclosure requires the presumption of the God’s-Eye-View – the 
surveillance of the Seeing Eye that constitutes Job’s oppression (7:8, 20). 
Derrida calls for rapprochement of the guardian of the law (Huter) and the shepherd 
of Being (Hirt), but under the “proximity, or perhaps the metonymy (law, another name for 
Being, Being another name for law.” 319 I understand this rapprochement as an occasion to 
reorient Being toward an engagement with its “lawful” moments, already suggested by 
Gestell but not pursued by Heidegger as the possibility of political organization including 
the portrait of our damaged world pursued by Kafka and Adorno as a hyper-administration.  
For, the shepherd of Being attempts to be “before” all politics by being led by a “sending” 
as Führung.320  Consequently, I invite many marginal figures, not just from Job but also 
Kafka, into this chapter. By providing hospitality to a plurality of marginal figures from 
                                                           
317 Kafka “Before the Law” The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken, 1971) 3. 
318 Jacques Derrida, Acts of Literature ed. Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 1992) 196, 197.  The disclosure of the 
law as law would require a ‘fully-frontal’ understanding (an allegedly totalizing view that depends upon a repression). 
Were we to desire a disclosure of an origin of law (as perhaps with Heideggarian discourse of law as the axiomatic and its 
destiny in “Modern Science, Metaphysics, and Mathematics”) we would fall inside of the hegemony of law by desiring an 
impossible presence. 
319 Acts of Literature, 206. 
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Kafka to Job, I attempt to bring together different materials (and nevertheless preserve their 
differences) for the following purpose: The arbitrariness of the juxtapositions of materials 
(as in Benjamin’s dialectical images) might come to reflect the arbitrary social coordination 
(arbitrary with respect to singularity to which social coordination is blind) that produces 
deformed subjectivities.  It is through these deformed subjectivities that a desire to be led by 
a “saving” power is manifest – an unreflective and regressive attachment that is certainly not 
Heidegger’s intent, but nevertheless Heidegger’s language of the “saving grace” is proximal 
to the piety of the authoritarian personality. In contrast, Benjamin’s texts incorporate 
messianic tropes the way in which Manet incorporated tropes of the academy on his 
canvases, to simultaneously quote and undermine them, rather than (as I take Heidegger to 
be doing) giving them an “ontological” function.321    
As allegedly subject to a predominant rendering of all events as judgment by the 
eschaton, we are before the law as a present defined by looking back from a projected 
future. The guardian forbids access to the un-calculable moment of at the core of law. It is 
the moment of hesitation (y'l) that Job refuses to abide: by his oath of purity, Job is 
prepared to provoke the appearance of El even though to do so risks death.  
The friends’ assurances of a future reconciliation between Job and El rely upon the 
apophatic; the apophatic is theoretical negation, a postponement of responsibility for the 
sake of a projected “salvation.” From the perspective of someone undergoing pain, the 
assurance that reconciliation is an eventuality (given that Job admits his “guilt”) is empty at 
best. With respect to the “consolation” offered by his friends, Job is, as it were, before a 
                                                           
320 Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit, Heidegger and The Question, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989) 32. 
321 This is how I understand de Man’s reading.  Cf. The Resistance to Theory,103.  As for Manet, I refer to Olympia 
(1863). “Manet, Olympia 1863.jpg,” Picasa, 10 July 2010  
<http://picasaweb.google.com/lh/photo/E9_Zsrkf_uUaO9pWcWwKmA> 
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doorkeeper such as Leibniz.322 Pain, however, has made waiting (y'l) for a reconciliation 
intolerable.  Good takes exception to the KJV translation of the verb y'l in 13:15, which 
yields…   
 
Behold though he slay me,  
yet will I trust [y'l] in him.    
 
Using as evidence its usage in 6.11; 14.14; 29.21, 23; and 30.26, Good does not find the 
meaning of “trust” or “hope” in the verb y'l: “The verb has to do with waiting, tarrying.”323  
The “him” (lw, Qere) is l’ (Ketib) “not.”324  Good’s translation is as follows: 
 
He is going to kill me; I cannot wait [y'l].   
 
There is no time to waste, for futurity for the sufferer is radically truncated because of the 
intolerability of pain and the possibility of immanent death.325 Job concludes, 
 
Now a tree has hope!326  
If felled, it will renew itself… 
But mortals die and remain lifeless (14:7,10 Habel) 
 
Instead of acquiescing with the suggestion of his friends that he trust in divinely 
authorized law of which Job’s “punishment” is a manifestation, Job rejects this futurity and 
pursues a trial whereby the law of retributive justice can be shown to be a faulty projection 
in light of El’s chaotic administration of creation.  Like the predicament of Kafka’s K, it is 
the courtrooms (e.g., the heavenly court wherein YHWH’s wager with ha##$%$n was first 
conceived) that constitute Job’s principal obstacle. In opposition to the oppression of the 
                                                           
322 Parasites who live off of the administration of law. 
323 In Turns of Tempest, 39, 84 note. 
324 In Turns of Tempest, 39. 
325  Cf. Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003). 
326 While the Job of the MT complains that there is hope for a tree but not for humans (14:7), the OG “corrects” this 
situation by adding, “And it is written, He will rise again with those whom the Lord will raise” (42:17a).   
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Seeing Eye (7.8, 20), Job’s trial is an attempt to have the materiality of his suffering in its 
full sensuousness have significative weight. Job’s friends’ presumption of wisdom is akin to 
the pseudo-orientation of the authoritarian personality, who disavow their projection of 
lawfulness to an “un-revisable” heaven that is reminiscent also of the Platonic heaven where 
axiomatic truths allegedly reside in the dominant philosophical tradition. 
 
The Instability of Margins 
Sociality requires some form of unified projection.327 Paranoid projection has 
become a vital component of the social order – for example, the allegedly universal 
characteristics projected upon “the jews.”328 The margin is constructed through the 
repression of socially undesirable aspects of the self that are subsequently projected upon 
the abject.329  “Outside” is actually “inside.”  
Law is that which determines what is outside; strictly speaking, there is no “outside 
law.” The “outside” of transcendence must always remain mythical, for it corresponds to, in 
Kantian terms, a realm of an angelic (non-human), non-temporal, non-spatial intuition.330 
Law is always law of the father; thus the “outside” is also of the father.  
Law is represented in Kafka by being of the family. The place of the law is the 
family circle.331  Everything of the family is of a fate and destiny, and the distortions of 
space and form confirm the inescapability of law because its rule is indiscernable to those 
                                                           
327 Some form of repression is necessary. What is projected is a function of concrete, material conditions.  False projection 
is in response to instincts for survival – a product of ideology. Dialectic of Enlightenment,155. 
328 Jean-Françios Lyotard, Heidegger and “the jews”, trans. Andreas Michel and Mark Roberts (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977) 3. 
329 Cf. Theodor Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality. Studies in Prejudice (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969) 605. 
330 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965) B139, 145.  
Cf. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1997) 17. 
331 Walter Benjamin, “Franz Kafka,” Illuminations, Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt  (New 
York: Schocken, 1969) 116.   
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ruled.  In “The Cares of a Family Man,” Odradek is the structure of the family in miniature: 
“the whole thing looks senseless enough, but in its own way perfectly finished.”332  To be of 
the family is to be bound to a certain perplexing inheritance.333  This living, inhuman thing 
that is attached to the family (and yet too nimble to be caught) might forever be discovered 
“rolling down the stairs, with ends of thread trailing after him, right before the feet of my 
children, and my children’s children.”334  
Speaking of the father who suddenly appears in the full measure of his might to 
condemn the son, Benjamin states, 
 
The father is the one who punishes; guilt attracts him as it does the 
court officials.  There is much to indicate that the world of the 
officials and the world of the fathers are the same for Kafka.335 
 
Like Job, K’s claim to innocence in The Trial comes too late.  Being subject to an unwritten 
law, transgression for K has always already occurred. Rather than being legible, the moment 
of transgression against law for K, as for Job, is sudden and incomprehensible.  
 
Laws and definite norms remain unwritten in the prehistoric world.  
A man can transgress them without suspecting it and thus become 
subject to atonement.  But no matter how hard it may hit the 
unsuspecting, the transgression in the sense of the law is not 
accidental but fated, a destiny which appears in all its ambiguity…It 
takes us back beyond the time of the giving of the Law on twelve 
tablets to a prehistoric world, written law being one of the first 
victories scored over this world.  In Kafka the written law is 
contained in books, but these are secret; by basing itself on them the 
prehistoric world exerts its rule all the more ruthlessly.336    
 
                                                           
332 Franz Kafka Kafka, “The Cares of a Family Man” The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken, 
1971) 428. 
333 Like the Cat-Lamb of “A Crossbreed” The Complete Stories, 426. 
334 The Complete Stories, 429. 
335 Illuminations, 113. 
336 Illuminations, 114-115. Compare the “unwritten lawbooks” that prescribe ways to avoid “conscience-ridden language.”  
Minima Moralia, 137. 
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The old, dog-eared volumes of the law are, when glimpsed by K, illegible.337  They contain 
the absent-mindedness of the officials; the doodles within them – more distorted figures – 
are distortions of memory. As with Justice conjoined with Victory, the looming, shadowy 
figures of Titorelli’s pictures are as irresolvable as the lawbooks.338 Like the law books K is 
forbidden to see, it is essential to the wager made by god that Job be sentenced not only in 
innocence but also in ignorance. Job complains that he has no access to the indictment 
written by his adversary at law (31:35-31:37).  
Compounding the fact that Job’s transgression is indeterminate, Job’s suffering 
issues from indeterminacy itself: Job’s suffering issues directly from a command of YHWH 
for the sake of a wager between YHWH and ha##$%$n. Because the wager disrupts the 
axiomatic presupposition of divinely authorized justice, Job cannot discern the meaning of 
his suffering by any conventional place-marker: it cannot be punishment in accord with a 
divinely authorized, perfect order – but what else can it be?   
Job is cast out upon the ash heap and is physically returning to dust (30:19).339 The 
outskirts of the community are also outskirts where, from Job’s point of view, the normal 
sense of things is in ashes as well. Because a wager depends upon indeterminacy, the 
meaning of suffering cannot be ascribed to the theodicy of an assuredly good, but 
indiscernible, end. 
Lest one wish to ascribe to God a degree of constancy, YHWH is susceptible to the 
stories told by ha##$%$n.340 Job endures the destruction of his prosperity and the murder of 
                                                           
337 The woman that has led K to a chamber near an empty courtroom says, “it is an essential part of the justice dispensed 
here that you should be condemned not only in innocence but also in ignorance.” Franz Kafka, The Trial, trans. Willa and 
Edwin Muir, ed. E. M. Butler (New York: Schocken Books, 1974) 50-52. 
338 The Trial, 163. 
339 Cf. The Book of Job: A Commentary, 420. 
340 In 1:12, YHWH dispatches ha##$%$n with permission to murder Job’s children and servants, and destroy his 
possessions: “Very well, all that he has is in your power; only do not stretch out your hand against him!” Not only Job’s 
livestock but also his children are killed as a result.  Soon afterwards, YHWH dispatches ha##$%$n for a second time, 
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his children, and YHWH says to ha##$%$n: “He still persists in his integrity, although you 
incited me against him, to destroy him for no reason” (2:3). YHWH cannot tell the future 
and cannot discern what is in Job’s heart.  
The intelligibility of transgression depends upon a demarcation (a law) that is 
crossed.  However, the instability of demarcation in Job renders transgression itself as 
having lost its moorings.341 From ash heap to whirlwind, the limits and borders in Job are 
less stable demarcations than fluctuations within a fragmentary text. We encounter the 
notion of limit [be‘ad] in the provocation by ha##$%$n that Job is feigning integrity to save 
his own skin: “skin up to [be‘ad] skin”(2:4).342 Also, Job invokes the sense of limit in time:  
 
I wish you’d conceal me in Sheol, 
hide me till your anger stops, 
set me a limit and remember me (14:13) 
 
A legal sentence and decree ('!q) is also a boundary and limit (23:12, 14a). +!q also refers 
to natural law, as in the limits of the sea and statutes of the sky.343    
 
We are simultaneously in the languages of law and of creation – 
those two realms of thought to which Job turns so repeatedly: 
“You’ve set him limits / laws that he cannot [or ‘will not’ or ‘does 
not’] exceed / transgress [‘br].344   
 
Behemoth and Leviathan are “creatures whose very excesses are the point – whatever the 
point may be.”345 Job wishes Leviathan would awake to unmake the day of his birth (3:8). 
                                                           
resulting in the affliction of Job with sores from head to foot. Ha##$%$n has not yet developed historically into the Satan 
that is described as a world power in Rev 12:9 and the father of lies in John 8:44-45.  Instead, in Job, the satan is a 
functionary and part of the heavenly counsel. 
341 Modes of demarcation (natural, divine, juridical mi&p$%) are deployed in ways that unsettle and contest each other. 
342 In Turns of Tempest, 52 note. Good renders be‘ad as beyond or up to a boundary. 
343 In Turns of Tempest, 346. 
344 In Turns of Tempest, 239. 
345 In Turns of Tempest, 361. 
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Monolithic social reality symptomatically appears in mythical forms of the monstrous.  
These mythical monsters are forces of unmaking. 
Despite the limits YHWH has imposed upon Behemoth and Leviathan, the created 
order is disorderly in its own right.  El disrupts place (body, family, community and 
cosmos), and this disruption is the principle mode of Job’s suffering.  Punishment and 
reward become arbitrary manifestations that, without warning, exchange positions with 
respect to righteousness. Children are replaced (42:13-14). With El’s intimidating show of 
force from the whirlwind, the divine and the monstrous are transposed.  
 
Oh, any expectation of him [Leviathan] is false. 
Is El himself thrown down at the sight of him? 
None is fierce enough to rouse him. 
(Then who will take a stand before me? 
Who confronts me? I’ll repay him!) (41:1-2) 
 
Behemoth and Leviathan, showpieces for the triumph of divine law over chaos, settle the 
issue of divine strength rather than justice. The presumptive “order” of creation is a 
disorder; the vanquishing of primordial chaos (Behemoth and Leviathan) merely institute 
chaos in another register. 
 
Caravans wrench away from the road, 
go up to the waste and perish 
Tema’s caravans are eager, 
Sheba’s travelers expectant. 
They’re ashamed because they trusted; 
come to the place, they’re abashed. (6:18-20 Good) 
 
Because of a basic instability of place, the hopeful sojourn of the caravans is in vain.  Place 
is already iterability; enforcement of the seal of law upon the past requires that law be made 
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where it is to be conserved.346 The exhibition of El’s strength in pacifying Behemoth and 
Leviathan is not the only aspect of El that reduces Job to silence: Job has undergone law as 
elementally violent. YHWH’s secret weapon against chaos is that the author of law 
necessarily has resort to chaos as well. YHWH’s “limit” to chaos is a displacing, a mobility 
of marks and boundaries. 
 
“Outsiders” without Subjects? 
Each manifestation of the social whole encodes its contradictions and antitheses. In 
Benjamin’s analysis of Baudelaire, for example, the prostitute, gambler and flâneur are 
telling distortions of experience of a certain Zeitraum. Corresponding to the prostitute, 
gambler and flâneur, the “autonomous” commodity, the “progress” of fashion, and the 
“interiority” of the 19th Century Arcade represent mystifications of object, time and space.347  
Once the Arcade became an outmoded form of capitalism, its decay attracted outsiders, 
eccentrics, and collectors who correspond to the remains of the Arcade. The flâneur, for 
example, is an instantiation of marginality.348   
 
Let the many attend to their daily affairs; the man of leisure can 
indulge in the perambulations of the flâneur only if as such he is 
already out of place.349 
 
Despite being out of place, which they cultivate so that they might be conspicuous as 
“outsiders,” the perambulations of the flâneur have little transformative effect upon the 
whole.  
                                                           
346 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 38. 
347 Illuminations, 155. 
348 Illuminations, 172 
349 Illuminations, 172. 
 130 
 
Even in the diagnosis that attempts to rob the violence of the social whole of its 
blindness, the outsider performs an inescapable entanglement.  
 
The detached observer is as much entangled as the active 
participant; the only advantage of the former is insight into his 
entanglement, and the infinitesimal freedom that lies in knowledge 
as such.  His own distance from business at large is a luxury which 
only that business confers.  This is why the very movement of 
withdrawal bears features of what it negates.  It is forced to develop 
a coldness indistinguishable from that of the bourgeois.  Even 
where it protests, the monadological principle conceals the 
dominant universal.350 
 
The distance from entanglement required by critique is at the same time an entanglement. 
As Adorno discusses in Minima Moralia, criticism is caught inside of a deformed antithesis 
to the social whole.  
 
Even the man spared the ignominy of direct co-ordination bears, as 
his special mark, this very exception, an illusory, unreal existence in 
the life process of society.351      
  
Those who are ejected from the social whole are marked as de-legitimated and ghostly. 
Those who integrate, on the other hand, display a “legitimacy” but at the cost of experience. 
The administered world is of nothing but things that are designated by number rather than 
names.  “Anything that is not reified, cannot be counted and measured, ceases to exist.”352  
 
The perceiver is no longer present in the process of perception.  He 
or she is incapable of the active passivity of cognition, in which 
categorical elements are appropriately reshaped by preformed 
conventional schemata and vice versa, so that justice is done to the 
perceived object.  In the field of the social sciences, as in that of 
individual experience, blind intuition and empty concepts are 
brought together rigidly and without mediation.353 
 
                                                           
350 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2002) 26. 
351 Minima Moralia, 33. 
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Without the active passivity of cognition, would-be “individuals” are liquidated into a 
single, collective (and paranoid) psyche.  The technical fettering of consciousness is a 
placing that displaces the schematizing of the individual.   
 
According to Kantian schematism, a secret mechanism within the 
psyche preformed immediate data to fit them into the system of 
pure reason.  That secret has now been unraveled.  Although the 
operations of the mechanism appear to be planned by those who 
supply the data, the culture industry, the planning is in fact imposed 
on the industry by the inertia of a society irrational despite all its 
rationalization, and this calamitous tendency, in passing through the 
agencies of business, takes on the shrewd intentionality peculiar to 
them.  For the consumer there is nothing left to classify, since the 
classification has already been preempted by the schematism of 
production.354 
 
The inertia of society is evident in formulaic behavior and stereotypy.  The compulsion to 
repeat, which Freud identified as capable of thrusting aside the pleasure principle, belies the 
regressive character of drives.355  Read as social truth, the primordial state of 
undifferentiated nature to which reversion tends is expressed in the apotheosis of 
subjectivity by social integration. Experience (thereby enabling us to envision otherwise 
than totality) is displaced, for no experience can occur without individuals. Once articulated 
and augmented by the schematism of production, the regressive tendency of society adopts 
its characteristic shrewdness and technical sophistication. The individual’s contribution to 
experience, the “secret mechanism in the psyche,” has been relieved of its task by the 
schematism of production. Synthesis today is the vanishing of synthesis: a passivity rather 
than activity with respect to the objective social structure.356 The role of imagination in 
                                                           
352 Minima Moralia, 47. 
353 Dialectic of Enlightenment,167. 
354 Dialectic of Enlightenment, 98. 
355 Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 29-31. 
356 Socialization is displaced into the false cathexis of online socialization.  
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preparing objects for their conceptualization is usurped and imagination becomes a province 
of cliché.357 
 Rather than manifest an evasion of the social whole, the outsider is one of its 
productions, a mode of violence like the “individual.”  Because ordinary modes of 
apprehension and recognition constitute an hegemony, anyone ejected from the whole and 
having no place can scarcely recognize their whereabouts, while “Those who integrate are 
lost.”358 Even those who integrate manifest an unreal existence, for “Dwelling, in the proper 
sense, is now impossible.”359 
Following Lukács, psychological structure mirrors the structure of commodities. The 
rigidity of personality type is the result of its unmediated reflection of the social structure 
that produces it. As alienated from the processes of their “production,” people themselves 
are reified in the sense that reflection upon objective social forces is prevented. The 
“individual” is absorbed into the preconditioned reflexes of a subject-less reproduction of 
cliché and slogan.360 The social structure produces a stasis in psychological structure that 
guarantees repetition of the societal structure. According to Adorno’s description of the 
culture industry, the unity of our sensory manifold is no longer the work of synthesis of the 
subject361 but rather reflects the integration of the would-be “subject” into the structure of 
                                                           
357 Cliché is the adaptation of the imagination under “unalterable” conditions. Dialectic of Enlightenment,166. Thought 
today “has assimilated itself into the surrounding apparatus.” Minima Moralia, 197. Also, Theodor Adorno, “How to Look 
at Television,” The Culture Industry Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge, 1991) 
171. 
358 Minima Moralia, 240. 
359 Minima Moralia, 38. 
360 Dialectic of Elightenment, 166. 
361 Synthesis is for Kant our mental activity that renders its materials cognitively significant via conceptualization – a way 
of taking things up within our projects. “By synthesis…I understand the act of putting different representations together, 
and of grasping what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (B 103). Synthesis has two aspects: The first, which is 
found in the Transcendental Deduction in A, is mathematical (production in accordance with rules) – the self is depicted as 
synthesizer.  The second, which is found in the Transcendental Deduction in B, is the subordination of representations 
under a concept (and is the carrying out of the Metaphysical Deduction). It is shown that what the mind – the synthesizer – 
must have in order to have knowledge is unity of the self.  The mind’s self-awareness is then shown in its relation to 
synthesis and unity. 
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commodities, even or especially where “individuality” is proffered as a sign of a recovered 
subjectivity. The “individual” is a heightened display of individualism; its content consists 
in standardized signifiers of formulaic “difference.” To willingly integrate into the collective 
is irrational insofar as it constitutes the surrender of the rational interests of persons, and yet 
occurs under the rubric of enlightened self-interest.362  By mystifying isolation as if it could 
constitute an actualized uniqueness, one’s actual integration is made desirable.  
 
In the midst of standardized, organized human units the individual 
persists.  He is even protected and gaining monopoly value.  But he 
is in reality no more than the mere function of his uniqueness, an 
exhibition piece, like the foetuses that once drew the wonderment 
and laughter of children.363 
 
Individuality is proffered as an exhibition-piece but in actuality has been hollowed-out.  It is 
permitted non-conformism.  The emphatic “individual” only appears human in outline.  
According again to Benjamin, a vanishing subjectivity is linked to the crowd, who 
guard themselves against the shock (Chockerlebnis) of a hyper-stimulating environment.364   
 
The greater share of the shock factor in particular impressions, the 
more constantly consciousness has to be alert as a screen against 
stimuli; the more efficiently it does so, the less do these impressions 
enter experience (Erfahrung), tending to remain in the sphere of a 
certain hour in one’s life (Erlebnis).  Perhaps the special 
achievement of shock defense may be seen in its function of 
assigning to an incident a precise point in time in consciousness at 
the cost of the integrity of its contents.  This would be a peak 
achievement of the intellect; it would turn the incident into a 
moment that has been lived (Erlebnis). 365 
 
                                                           
362 “Without admitting it they sense that their lives would be completely intolerable as soon as they no longer clung to 
satisfactions which are none at all.”  Theodor Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered,” The Culture Industry, Selected 
Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge, 2003) 103. 
363 Minima Moralia, 135. 
364 Compare “Estrangement shows itself precisely in the elimination of distance between people.” Mimima Moralia, 41. 
365 Illuminations, 163. 
 134 
 
The ability to assign events to a precise time is a defense against Proustian remembrances. 
In contrast to Erlebnis, Erfahrung is always bodily undergone rather than chosen. In its 
adaptation366 to a hyper-stimulating environment, consciousness regulates stimulation. Yet 
what Benjamin credits as an achievement of the intellect – the shock defense – is not to be 
understood as the achievement of subjectivity but rather that which conditions the 
disappearance of subjectivity insofar as habituation to shock follows the path of least 
resistance toward formulae for behavior. 
The pseudo-orientation provided by the societalized environment, an unmediated 
binding of blind intuition to empty concept, is disorientation insofar as one can still attain to 
awareness of the powerlessness of the individual in comparison to the monolithic whole. 
 
Their totality is their otherness at the same time; this is the dialectic 
carefully ignored by the Hegelian one.  Insofar a the individuals are 
at all aware of taking a back seat to unity, its priority reflects to 
them the being-in-itself of the universal which they encounter in 
fact: it is inflicted upon them, all the way into their inmost core, 
even when they inflict it on themselves.367  
 
The integration of individuals, insofar as it is experienced, is the immanent otherness of the 
individual and an indication of the initiative of totality with respect to legitimating identities.  
 On this account of the outsider’s performance of an inescapable entanglement, the 
problem for Job is that he is conspicuously “outside” (e.g., on the ash heap and “blighted”) 
but not emancipated (as if his suffering could render his circumstances legible in its 
entirety).  The production of the outsider by the social whole is evident in the responses of 
                                                           
366 Progressively more potent forms of shock pierce one’s habituation to intense stimuli, as is evident in the history of film. 
Illuminations, 175. 
367 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973) 315.  Compare “In the 
culture industry the individual is an illusion…” Dialectic of Enlightenment, 154.  
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the friends: having suffered, Job has become un-mournable368 – his suffering can only attain 
meaningfulness in terms supplied by “the whole” (i.e., the heavenly mechanism of 
retributive justice).  The friends, on this model, are akin to a single, paranoid psyche into 
which contemporary, weakened egos (e.g., due to conditions described by Marx in the 1844 
manuscripts regarding human requirements369) willingly disappear in order to mend a 
narcissistic wound (a being-outmatched).  In compensation for this vanishing, they receive a 
ready-made pseudo-orientation toward the world. Those that signify difference – such as 
Job to the friends – provide the screen upon which unacknowledged aspects of the psyche 
are projected.   
 
Those who are excluded from humanity against their will, like those 
who excluded themselves from it out of longing for humanity, knew 
that the pathological cohesion of the established group was 
strengthened by persecuting them.370 
 
Job’s task, on this model, cannot be remedied except by a trial of this pseudo-orientation 
itself, and this pseudo-orientation can be a matter for experience for Job alone in that his 
suffering has demonstrated (however darkly and fragmentarily) its falsehood. 
 
Circumspection and Legibility 
The possibility of a novel account of the social whole rests with the suffering, for 
who better to critique the law of the social order than those who have undergone its 
violence? The marginalized, like Job, often literally bear the telltale marks of the violence of 
the social order upon the body. But like the condemned in “In the Penal Colony,” the 
                                                           
368 Adorno maintains that “mourning, more than all else, is disfigured” as a stigma in relation to an hegemony of purposes 
and market value. Dialectic of Enlightenment, 179. 
369 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the Communist Manifesto, 
trans. Martin Milligan (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1988) 115-134. 
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“writing” of the law upon the body has deformed it, and consequently the possibility that a 
novel perspective might be fashioned from this wounding is damaged. 
In 21:29, being a wayfarer appears as a condition both for the possibility of having 
stories and the de-legitimation of those stories. So that he might convince his friends that 
divine order is actually disorder, Job implores his friends to consider the stories of the 
wayfarers. 
 
Have you never asked the wayfarers [‘!ber" derek]? 
You cannot deny their evidence. (21:29) 
 
The evidence of the wayfarers, Job maintains, would support Job’s contention that, contrary 
to the pious view that El cannot fail to be just, the Tyrants of afar have not been obliterated. 
Their escape from divine retribution invalidates an alleged moral order of the world.371 
 
Wayfarers, “those who pass on the road” (v. 29), nomads, or at best 
traveling caravaneers – people not welcome in the polite society of 
Job and his friends – have a sense of the world better attuned, Job 
suggests, to reality.372 
 
The wayfarers bear the possibility that the social order might be taken into account 
differently, for they encounter things outside the ordinary realm of experience. The problem, 
of course, is that no one has asked the wayfarers, because they are wayfarers. 
Sitting upon ashes at the outskirts of his community, Job faces a similar dismissal of 
his testimony: Suffering might not be intelligible in any other way than that which 
authorizes his expulsion.  Having been ejected from the whole, the outcast might bear 
counsel but for the damaged legibility of what they undergo as outcast.  
                                                           
370 Dialectic of Enlightenment, 163. 
371 The Book of Job, 330 
372 In Turns of Tempest, 270.
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In Kafka’s “In the Penal Colony,” law is administered by the apparatus – revered by 
the officer as the fulfillment of enlightened governance. The writing performed by the 
apparatus culminates in a mythical moment of legibility, when the eyes of the condemned 
suddenly go wide with comprehension. The condemned in the colony receive law with the 
receptivity of parchment, like writing embedded in copper (s"per, 19:23).  
As part of their wounding, outsiders exhibit a hyper-vigilance akin to victims of 
trauma.      
 
We deplore the beggars in the South, forgetting that their 
persistence in front of our noses is as justified as a scholar’s before 
a difficult text. No shadow of hesitation, no slightest wish or 
deliberation in our faces escapes their notice.  The telepathy of the 
coachman who, by accosting us, makes known to us our previously 
unsuspected inclination to board his vehicle, and of the shopkeeper 
who extracts from his junk the single chain or cameo that could 
delight us, is of the same order.373 
 
The beggars and the scholars alike owe their attentiveness to the same order. Their 
deformation endows the outsider with a special perspicacity. Just as traumatic neurosis 
offers a clear view of the function of the psyche,374 absorption into the urban crowd belies a 
regression behind presumptive progress. For the integrated, the wounding of subjectivity 
manifests in an isolation and loss of the possibility of dialogue.  For the outsider, who incurs 
the isolation of the abject, a circumspection arises. The moment of indecision in the faces in 
the crowd draws the attention of the outcast like a wick.  This circumspection can only be a 
wounded legibility of the social whole, for the law that prescribes their expulsion has the 
initiative to legitimacy and intelligibility. 
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As instantiations of a utopian expectation or phantasmagoria, commodities take on 
attributes of subjects.  Registering the violence of subjection to exchange and 
mechanization, subjects assume the characteristics of objects.375  The transposition of 
subjects and objects, the impairment of experience and delusional screen, impairs the 
legibility of historical truth.  Paradoxically, it is from impairment that we can be afforded a 
genuinely historical perspective. For example, it is from the failure of the Avant-garde that 
we are afforded the perspective whereby we can come to know more about the possibility of 
art to be in terms of its “highest vocation.”376   The ending of a way of life is the material 
condition for reflection upon its afterlife as the inertia within civilization. 
The myth of progress becomes legible as untrue in the debris that has been ejected 
by exchange. It is in the debris of commodity-culture that the narrative of progress can be 
momentarily arrested. Exchange produces corpses in which myth can become visible as 
such. Commodities lose their ability to mystify once they are discarded as useless.  Sheen 
and allure appear instead as “a faintly disreputable quaintness.”377 Remains speak of a self-
imposed subjection, a compulsion to repeat, and regression: repetition of the same 
represents the inertia in organic life to revert to a prior, inorganic state.378   Rather than 
progress, remains betray a tendency to regress to a “primal past” of undifferentiated 
nature.379 The novelty by which they might have compensated for devalued life is visible as 
an empty promise of satisfaction.   
                                                           
375 Eva Geulen, “Theodor Adorno on Tradition,”  The Actuality of Adorno: critical essays on Adorno and the postmodern, 
ed. Max Pensky (Albany: SUNY Press, 1997) 184. 
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of the Avant-Garde. Peter Bürger, Theory of the Avant-Garde. trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
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David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004) 187. / compare Adorno, “The expression of history in things is no other 
than that of past torment.” Minima Moralia, 49. 
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Appearing as the debris of repetition rather than progress, remains allow for their 
reconfiguration and recontextualization. By their citability, fragments occasion a possible 
remembrance of repetition as such.  Having been ejected from exchange, remains can be 
recombined such that their juxtaposition renders suspect not only the violence done to 
things, but also violence done to the social outsider as neither integrated nor emancipated 
but just roaming.  
 The fragments of Job’s life – the debris left after the destruction of his prosperity, the 
corpses of his dead children, his ruptured body – are the material moments by which a 
testimony (a telling) might develop, but the means by which he might assemble (arraign) 
these material moments would immediately become falsified were he to avail himself of the 
ordinary “mode of composition”: catastrophe as the fault of the sufferer.   
 
Unfinished ones 
Adorno discovers that there is, in the authoritarian personality, an irrational way in 
which the enormity of suffering of the Shoah is made to count against those who suffered: 
 
The enormity of what was perpetrated works to justify this: a lax 
consciousness consoles itself with the thought that such a thing 
surely could not have happened unless the victims had in some way 
or another furnished some kind of instigation, and this “some kind 
of” may then be multiplied at will.380 
 
Blame for suffering is assigned to the victims. Job’s affliction is taken to be “proof” of guilt 
–suffering is allegedly in order as the mark of having transgressed.  As in Kafka, the 
ruthlessness of officialdom is exerted in the form of blindness. 
                                                           
380 Theodor Adorno, “The Meaning of Working Through the Past,” Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans. 
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The intelligibility of suffering is subject to the jurisdiction of the social whole.  If it 
is to be heard, a case of innocent suffering must be wrested from its embeddedness in law – 
to be unfolded from formation so that it can suggest to imagination possible forms while 
committing to none of them. In our hyper-administered world, the would-be subject is 
increasingly bereft of dialogue and incapable of counsel. To have counsel is to be able to 
reflect upon one’s involvement in a story that, as unfolding, presents to imagination plural 
possibilities.381 A story that suspends the finality of law (and its commandments) wrests the 
possibility of counsel from the claim of law.382 As the form of law that is immanently 
impinging upon life, administration apprehends singularity by law.  Yet insofar as the force 
of law is experienced as somehow unwarranted despite all warrant appearing to already be 
of law, despite force appearing as the only possible “realization” of the individual, the 
possibility of counsel is as endangered. Counsel shares the fate Benjamin describes of 
storytelling: “no event any longer comes to us without already being shot through with 
explanation.”383   
 
...by now almost nothing that happens benefits storytelling; almost 
everything benefits information.  Actually, it is half the art of 
storytelling to keep a story free from explanation as one reproduces 
it.384  
 
Repetition of our hyper-administered world is not inevitable, lest we ascribe to it the 
fatalism of a machine.  Nevertheless, a form that retains a perspicacity as to its 
                                                           
381 That “counsel” has an old fashioned ring indicates that the communicability of experience is decreasing. Walter 
Benjamin “The Storyteller,” Illuminations, Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt  (New York: 
Schocken, 1969) 86. 
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Illuminations, 89. 
384 Illuminations, 89. 
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“administrative” default must somehow attempt a form with moments of disruption 
“internal” to it – an attempt that raises again the matter of a perfected systematicity that 
would only consign alterity to another fungibility.    
Kafka represents the middle ground between unintelligibility on the one hand (utter 
lack of form) and ready-made apprehension on the other (hegemony of form) by his 
unfinished characters. Having escaped the spell of the law, the unfinished ones suggest 
many possible, final forms and commit to none of them.   
 
…Kafka’s entire work constitutes a code of gestures which surely 
had no definite symbolic meaning for the author from the outset; 
rather, the author tried to derive such a meaning from them in ever-
changing contexts and experimental groupings.385 
 
The normal context of human gestures is a constraint upon possible meaning. Kafka 
displaces gestures among impossible structures, deformations of space, ages of a pre-
history: “he [Kafka] divests the human gesture of its traditional supports and then has a 
subject for reflection without end.”386 
Like stories themselves, the unfinished ones exhibit a lack upon which the 
transmissibility of stories depends.  They embody transmissibility as messengers.  Not quite 
human, they are not doomed to a labyrinthine stasis as is K. Unfinished-ness mark an escape 
from law in a peculiar way. As Benjamin observes, “None has a firm place in the world, 
firm, inalienable outlines.”387 And yet, these unfinished beings are also not formless.  Utter 
formlessness would undermine stories, which necessarily have form.  Instead of being either 
finalized or formless, these figures both depend upon and twist free from formation, or law, 
in a particular way. 
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The ones who have yet to be finished off, whose formation is still ongoing (who 
bodily register the vicissitudes of experience), are drawn to things that are being worked 
upon and have yet to be finalized.  
 
For children are particularly fond of haunting any site where things 
are being worked upon.  They are irresistibly drawn by the detritus 
generated by building, gardening, housework, tailoring, or 
carpentry.  In waste products they recognize the face of the world of 
things turns directly and solely to them.  In using these things they 
do not so much imitate the works of adults as bring together, in the 
artifact produced in play, materials of widely differing kinds in a 
new, intuitive relationship.388 
 
In the remains of production, in slag and refuse, an aspect of the world turns to the 
children alone.  The children – the unfinished ones – are capable of juxtaposing the remains 
of bourgeois activity in novel, intuitive ways.  
 Job is in a sense “unfinished.”  Catastrophe has rendered Job an enfant terrible – 
deprived of everything that might visibly count toward maturation is undone (prosperity, 
children, clothing) and outrageous in his words. Unlike the assignment to time that defines 
Erlebnis, Erfahrung is unfinished. In the disparity between his “bare life” and its “waste 
products” and the order that proclaims this reduction as just,389 the “face of the world” turns 
directly to him. 
 
Evasion as Repetition 
Art cultivates an “outside.” Art relies upon its institutional separateness from society 
for its capacity to critique society.  In order to level a claim against the hegemony of truth 
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that is instantiated by reason in its dominant form, art maintains an antithesis to the social 
whole.390 Modernist artworks attempt to distinguish themselves from the everyday as a 
matter of self-definition.391 The modernist work protests against the excessiveness of a 
regime of presumptively “rational” order through a non-violent synthesis of elements (in the 
mode of semblance).  
However, an attempt at being “outside” ends in the discovery of an initially hidden 
complicity.  It is art’s institutional separateness that the avant-garde criticized: As long as art 
is entombed within the museum, it cannot make good on its critical insights.392  The avant-
garde succeeded in radically challenging principle features of the institution of art (the 
categories of genius and work, the necessity of art to have a certain ‘look’).  However, the 
avant-garde art managed to be entombed within the museum as well.  
A similar reversal occurs in the concept of the “new” in artworks with respect to the 
Neo-avant-garde.  The “negativity of form” in art is its antithesis of the everyday: the 
“new.”393 However, a limit to the concept of the new is encountered in aesthetic hardening 
such that the distinction is lost between expressions of reified consciousness and the 
denouncing of that consciousness.394 Consequently, the Neo-avant-garde “becomes a 
manifestation that is void of sense and permits the positing of any meaning whatever.”395 As 
in a film by Warhol, the camera can point anywhere. 
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Evasion is a mode of repetition. In The Trial, the character of the painter, Titorelli, is 
merely a portrait painter to the Court officials. The series of narrow staircases that K must 
climb suggests that the painter’s room atop the highest reaches of a great tenement building 
is an irregular protrusion.396 K once again finds himself cramped in an irregular space: 
uneven walls, a tilting floor, and one grimy pane of glass fixed into the ceiling.397 The only 
promise of relief from asphyxiation and heat seems to be a door behind the artist’s bed, 
which however leads directly to a hallway of the Court Offices. Titorelli explains, 
 
There are Law-Court offices in almost every attic, why should this 
be an exception?  My studio really belongs to the Law-Court 
offices, but the Court has put it at my disposal.398 
 
As if cubism had become a narrative form, Kafka’s stories employ spatial distortions and 
impossible structures. The world of Kafka often breaks open into unforeseen ventricles, not 
just with respect to space but also with respect to time, as with the “eternal return” of the 
whipping of the warders: K’s warders and a whipper with a rod stand behind a usually 
neglected door (to the lumber-room) as if eternally ready to reenact the same pleas for 
mercy and fated punishment.399 
Artworks that feature loops such as Rodney Graham’s Machine for reading Lenz 
(1983-93)400 allow us to explore further the question of suffering as it pertains to repetition 
of the same and the possibility of novelty. Machine for reading Lenz displays a modified 
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book by Georg Büchner as a sculpture.401  Graham’s Lenz loops a portion of Büchner’s 
novella.  Lenz is an unfinished work whose hero, Lenz, is an obscure author who suffers 
from psychiatric illness.   The character Lenz travels upon his thoughts:  “He felt no 
weariness, only sometimes felt annoyed that he could not walk on his head.”402 
 
Graham noticed that the words “the forest” appeared at two points 
near the beginning of the story, placed in such a way that one could 
read to their second appearance and then loop back to the first and 
continue reading without a loss of coherence.  Lenz tries to ride out 
of the town where he lives – having been effectively banished for 
his psychotic behavior – but in Graham’s version of the book he 
keeps riding back into it…By reprinting the portion of text 38 times, 
Graham made the book into an imposing physical object.  He bound 
the pages himself to make it like a sculpture.403   
 
Within Graham’s novel-sculpture, Lenz’s embeddedness is corporeal. To ride out is to 
return.  The doom of infinite repetition happens in terms of an attempted evasion. Lenz 
thereby recalls the avant-garde itself, an attempted evasion that becomes the means for 
inclusion.   
The possibility of philosophical reflection lies between the doom of infinite 
repetition of the same (Lenz) and the dream of total emancipation (e.g., the explorer of “In 
the Penal Colony” who may simply cast off404). In contrast to a presumed “transcendence,” 
transformed critical thought does not attempt an escape (which is to invite a naïve and 
calamitous repetition of eschatology). 
Job is in the “distorted space” of the siege of El as the gibbor, a distortion of Job’s 
body reminiscent of rendering nations askew.  But Job has foregone the “escape” of cursing 
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his god and dying, which would leave the matter of innocent suffering completely neglected 
and pre-categorized as punishment.  Job’s plight is that litigation is not free of divine 
intimidation and the possibility that, as the sovereign authority of the law, El might disrupt 
the proceedings by suspending law altogether.   
 
Neither free from, nor cleverly adapting to, the given 
Integration into the social whole is not uniform: the warders and guardians of 
administrative order, the parasites that depend upon a role of authority for their legitimacy, 
are qualitatively distinct from the detached observer, despite the fact that “detachment” is a 
refined mode of attachment. Kafka’s warders of law exist parasitically off the perpetual 
decay of the world in the name of the “right” (authorized, lawful) orientation. Those who 
are thoroughly claimed by law, having reconciled themselves to the “inevitable” order of 
things, willingly exhibit the vanishing of subjectivity of today’s tight interweaving of 
stimulus-response.  Having adapted to the real through an exhibition of social power 
through its normal identifiers, one is a subject with power that need only repeat what is on 
hand in any case: a legitimation of the social order.  Alternately (but not in the sense of 
manifesting an emancipation), those displaced by the social order are delegitimized and 
ghostly.  Expulsion from the social order costs the expelled the orientation to which the 
integrated cling, but preserves the possibility of subjectivity. Experience, forfeited in the 
case of the warder in exchange for becoming a vehicle of authority, hibernates in the 
                                                           
state to which it belonged…he traveled only as an observer.” In the sense that he comes from nowhere, the explorer is akin 
to the self-possessed subject who occupies the non-position of the God’s-Eye View. The Trial, 206. 
 147 
 
incomprehensibility (relative to law in its dominant instantiation) of what is undergone by 
the displaced. The un-representable is trauma.405    
Where we find ourselves can only be referred to as it is undergone but never as a 
totalizing vision which consigns thinking to the alienation from experience that, as 
stemming from a deformed embodiment, is suffering all over again.  Once we see that the 
neutral, third-person voice is part of the privileged atmosphere (an enactment of an 
inheritance that we can never be completely ‘on top’ of), there arises a particular problem.  
We do not know in whose voice we speak when we speak.  “Who’s Voice?” is part of a 
problem that embroils speaking, which is normally pervaded by purpose. The philosopher 
lets things speak to her before she knows how to deal with them.  
As subject to the integration/fragmentation of today, “we” are akin to these 
outsiders. Montage is possible when debris is legible as such (the strange ejected from 
homogeneity), and this legibility requires a kind of debris-subject. In a manner of speaking, 
we are entreated to respond to debris as debris. As an undergoing that turns us about, 
Erfahrung occurs if we can become lost in the details.  The reading of Job concretizes a site 
where reading encounters its opposite, where experience and stereotypy in their concrete 
occurrence in the text gesture outward, showing our social and political circumstances to be 
of a certain complexion and also provisionally allowing us to envision the “we” who suffers 
in measure with this complexion. My cautionary words “provisionally” and “envision” (as 
                                                           
405 “The interruptive demands of traumatic symptoms, their abortion of the mediation of past contents, suggests that what 
constitutes trauma’s psychical disability is the destruction of the very capacity to mediate the past, to transmit it into what 
might have become the psychical present…in remaining unmediated by the available forms of mediation, traumatic 
insistence is the ruination of the representational relation.” Gregg Horowitz, Sustaining Loss, Art and Mournful Life 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001) 124. 
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well as placing the “we” in quotation marks) are due to the following problem: Can there be 
a “we” that does not straightaway limit who is mournable?406 
As opposed to the regressive wish to reinstate debris to a “proper place” in an 
identitarian whole,407 the “messianic light”408 can be intimated as the non-violent association 
among debris.  Rather than require a principle of construction from the dialectician,409 the 
juxtaposition of cited fragments – by its very arbitrariness – is a monad of the social whole. 
The very arbitrariness of construction demonstrates the arbitrariness that prevails in the 
social whole.  
As with the eschewing of the coldness of form by the modernist artwork, the 
transmissibility of stories depends upon “unfinished” moments that can take hold of the 
imagination of the listener. As Benjamin reminds us, the rhythm of weaving and spinning, 
through which stories had achieved their transmissibility, is a bygone form of life.410 To 
weave a tale, form must not be eschewed altogether and yet there must be gaps where 
imagination takes hold of the listener.  
Job’s arraignment411 of El is a manner of composition that allows the sensual 
elements of suffering to be ugly – to resist form. Like Job itself (and like a modernist 
artwork), Job’s arraignment must display divergences and contradictions among its material 
elements that resist their sacrifice to law. With respect to its lack of narrative resolution and 
                                                           
406 Butler suggests that “I cannot muster the “we” except by finding the way in which I am tied to “you.” Judith Butler, 
Precarious Life, The Powers of Mourning and Violence (New York: Verso, 2004) 49. 
407 Cf. “…membra disjecta of the world of objects.” Aesthetic Theory, 169. 
408 Minima Moralia, 247. 
409 Here I take issue with Pensky’s complaint that the principle of construction in dialectical images is absent. Max Pensky, 
“Method and time: Benjamin’s dialectical images,”  The Cambridge Companion to Walter Benjamin, ed. David S. Ferris 
(Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2004) 177-198. 
410 Illuminations, 91. 
411 A legal term that we encounter in Job as y‘d in 9:19. 
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gaps of the text,412 Job resembles Odradek, who looks like it might be broken remains of a 
prior form and yet also in its own, utterly unique way “complete.”  Like Odradek, the text of 
Job will never unravel into a single, unbroken thread but rather will show “old broken-off 
bits of thread, knotted and tangled together, of the most varied sorts and colors.”413  In the 
next chapter, “Fear (y$r"’) The Text,” I pursue a mise en abyme of Job and social structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
412 Instead of offering a resolution, the text continues to distance Job’s suffering from a site where it might signify in its 
own right. Job’s charges remain unaddressed and Job’s responses to the divine speeches are wrought with ambiguity.  By 
“gaps,” I refer for example to the incomplete third cycle of speeches and the fact that Job contains the greatest number of 
hapax legomena in the Hebrew Bible. 
413 The Complete Stories, 428. 
 150 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
FEAR THE TEXT 
 
 
“Argument” from Mise en Abyme 
“Fear the text” names the desire for meaning as a defense against amorphousness.  In 
contrast to an argument that must demonstrate progress, a mise en abyme is a figure 
contained within a figure, neither of which can be discarded in favor of the other, 
irreversibly exchanged or sublated, but rather are bound in a nested recurrence. By a mise en 
abyme of Job and social totality, I indicate that 1) the discontinuities, gaps and ruptures in 
Job constitute potentialities of meaning and yet are found in dialectical tension with 2) a 
fear of amorphousness that generates a repression of experience in terms of the “truth” of 
the text. 
Sprachkritik414 finds the structure of social totality in the ruptures (Brüche) of 
texts.415 Texts contain ineliminable, unintended reflections of the antinomies, contradictions 
and antagonisms of the structure of social totality.416 My strategy, however, is not to argue 
from the universal (e.g., claims about texts in general) to Job. Job is before the law – within 
a nexus of antinomies associated with the tensions between universal (social totality) and 
particular (the singular Job). Whereas we might suppose that Job is so unique a text that no 
general claims can be drawn from it (and indeed Job is sui generis), Job is not unique in 
having been subject to the imposition of reconciliatory spiritualization. Yet my strategy is 
not to argue from particularities of Job to general claims about society – for there again, an 
ultimately false reconciliation of particular to universal is the problem under 
                                                           
414 The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 67. 
415 Cf. The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 112, 154, 188. 
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consideration.417  Rather, my reading attempts to highlight features of Job that are un-
subsumable with respect to attempts to impart (an ultimately mythical) univocality to Job.  
The purpose of this chapter is akin to Job’s efforts to contend with attempts to 
exhaust the ways his suffering allegedly can be meaningful. The thesis of this chapter is that 
a desire to have suffering sum to a meaningful whole is immanent in the drive to heal the 
wounds of the text.  Rather than argue that Job belongs within any particular determination, 
my strategy is to highlight the issue of meaning and intelligibility that tends to drive 
determinations.  The method is to explore the thread of the narrative at its frayed ends – 
where we are thrown back into the medium of the text.  I postulate that sites of rupture in the 
text (where translation is especially in question) are triggers for a symptom of supplying a 
resolution. I also postulate that the ordinary mode of establishing significances (which 
recognizes the text as just passive) hijacks meaning from the text.  
Job is an exemplary text in that 1) Job can be read as emblematic of the recurrence 
of an inability to mourn the suffering of certain “unlawful” subjectivities, 2) indeterminacy 
in Job renders efforts at mythical reconciliation especially evident, and 3) the disorientation 
of the sufferer as a result of nested dislocations allows a rethinking of thinking.418 By this 
third moment, I indicate that undergoing disorientation is both a condition for Job’s 
inauguration of a trial and a condition for reading Job today as an encounter with alterity.  
Consequently, Job entreats the reader to undergo disorientation despite a fear that evokes a 
                                                           
416 The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 63, 79. 
417 While the rescue of induction might counteract a certain kind of dominance of the social whole, a kind of ‘reasonable 
unreason’ would nevertheless be in force as insisting upon the exchange of terms: a former term being “fulfilling” its utility 
in establishing the latter.  This “reason” would do violence to Job’s untranslatable (in-exchangeable) moments, as well as 
neglect the task of describing the atmosphere wherein exchange has permeated “reason.”  
418 The objective social structure prevents reflection upon the actual causes of suffering by the trance-like immanence of a 
false, mystical unity. It is a feature of that which functions ideologically that it operates under the auspices of a particular 
repression.  Spiritualization is its symptom. Because of the trance-like immanence of spiritualization, it is difficult to 
sustain reflection upon that which is most imperative to think. Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 
Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1979) 152. 
 152 
 
desire to ward off experience of the text in its amorphousness.  As seen in the chapter “A 
Wayward Passage,” precisely how experience is endangered is a site of contestation, and 
thereby attempts to sustain experience in thinking also vary. But rather than 
anachronistically transpose Job into the contemporary, I will situate my efforts in terms of 
Medieval commentators of Job. 
In the context of this chapter, Sprachkritik is not so much a general claim about texts 
as it is a way of referring to what is discoverable in Job: An reflection of a recurrent 
antagonism between fragmentary materiality and reconciliatory thinking – an antagonism 
that, as evidenced in the text (Job’s painful consolers) is at least as old as Job.  In order to 
speak concretely as to this recurrent antagonism, I will briefly discuss the interpretations of 
Job offered by Saadiah, Maimonides, and Gersonides.419 Subsequently, I will describe how 
these philosophers (including Spinoza) are part of another tradition that is occluded by the 
dominant, purportedly univocal “history” of philosophy.  With the concerns and strategies 
of this other tradition in view, my critique of univocal “readings” of Job will have historical 
precedent. 
Saadiah attempts to carry a defense of God’s justice while “siding” with Job that 
suffering is not equivalent to guilt.  Saadiah’s view, that Job is undergoing a divine test, 
comes from the Mu‘tazilites (which he identifies with Elihu) and from rabbinic sources 
regarding suffering.420  On Saadiah’s reading of Job 19:25-27, Job gives voice to an 
assurance that his story will be passed on to future generations rather than an eschatological 
                                                           
419 As for my choice of Saadiah, Maimonides, and Gersonides, the tendency among other Medieval Jewish commentators 
is to focus exclusively upon p’shat (the “plain meaning” or sense of words, phrases and verses of the text).  Robert Eisen, 
The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004) 4. 
420 For how Saadiah is steeped in Mu’tazilite grammatical exegesis, Midrash and Tafsir, Cf. Lenn Goodman, The Book of 
Job by Saadiah ben Joseph al-Fayy!m" (New Haven: Yale UP, 1988) 33-34, 40-43, 94-95, 103-104, 136-137. 
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hope.421 Saadiah’s resolution in the position of Elihu is compromised by 42:7, in which the 
divinity accuses the friends of having not spoken the truth about the divinity as did Job, but 
is rectified by Saadiah’s reading of the passage as how the friends have not spoken the truth 
about Job.422  For Saadiah, Job’s protests are based in misunderstanding, but that such 
misunderstanding is essential lest the trial cease to be a trial.423  
Like Saadiah, Maimonides affirms Elihu’s position as being correct but ascribes the 
Mu‘tazilite position of divine trials to Bildad.424 Maimonides reads Job as instruction 
regarding the limits of knowledge concerning providence.425  While the multitude’s 
acceptance of authority might lead to adherence to the Law (a position Maimonides ascribes 
to Eliphaz), human imagination often results in a privation of knowledge.426 Error occurs as 
the imaginative ascription of anthropomorphic attributes to the divinity – evident in Job’s 
assumption that divine knowledge and governance should resemble that of human beings.427 
Allegorically understood, Job’s suffering has an educative value as to the equivocality of 
divine attributes.428 
The equivocality of divine attributes (e.g., power in the divine speeches from the 
whirlwind) is also emphasized by Gersonides.429 For Gersonides, erroneous views of 
providence have negative societal consequences, which Job – properly read – can correct.430 
Gersonides reads Job as pertaining to a thoroughly material providence (pertaining to health 
                                                           
421 Robert Eisen, The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004) 41. 
422 Saadiah’s version of Job might have contained the difference of one letter that might have justified his rendering, but 
Saadiah gives no justification.  Robert Eisen, The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004) 
32. 
423 Lenn Goodman. The Book of Job by Saadiah ben Joseph al-Fayy!m" (New Haven: Yale UP, 1988) 99-100. 
424 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 71, 72. 
425 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 65. 
426 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 48, 53. 
427 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 62-64. 
428 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 56, 63. 
429 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 168-169. 
430 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 151. 
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and well-being).431 On Gersonides’ reading of 19:25-27, Job believes in immortality but is 
intellectually deficient with respect to the correct view of individual providence in this 
life.432 Gersonides reads 42:7 as affirming that Job’s “Aristotelian” view (that there is no 
individual providence) is superior to that of the friends (who represent the rabbis), who 
attempt to vindicate the divinity by espousing a false view that individual providence 
reaches everyone as punishment and reward.433 Job experiences providential suffering (the 
view espoused by Elihu, according to Gersonides) so that, on Eisen’s reading, Job may be 
educated and attain the intellectual “perfection” required for individual providence.434   
But intellectual “perfection” is not possible on Gersonides account, if we attend 
carefully to the fact that the “material intellect” for Gersonides is nothing other than 
temporal, particular, and indefinite motions (from sensation, through indeterminate-
imaginative forms, to reason) from which time and respect (i.e., finitude) cannot be 
eliminated; consequently, individual acquired perfection or immortality is impossible.435  
Therefore it is problematic to maintain that in Gersonides’ reading of Job, Job attains the 
intellectual perfection required for individual providence; rather, it is possible that 
Gersonides more thoroughly maintained the view that the agent intellect, as a natural 
contrary to matter, in principle cannot know particulars as particular.436 As with other 
prejudices and superstitions of endoxa to which the philosophers of this other tradition 
addressed, the problem with a matter such as individual immortality is not that the 
philosophers of this other tradition concealed an explicit view; rather, contemporary 
                                                           
431 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 155. 
432 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 149. 
433 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 145, 172. 
434 The Book of Job in Medieval Jewish Philosophy, 160-161, 167. 
435 Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “Gersonides: the Last Explicit Heir of Averroes,” Problems in Arabic Philosophy (Piliscsaba, 
Hungary: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003) 84. 
436 Problems in Arabic Philosophy, 83. 
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research is often too well informed by the Christianizing appropriation (or neglect) of these 
authors to discern an explicit view – for example, where Gersonides anticipates the monism 
of Spinoza.437 
The Judeo-Islamic (Averroist, materialist Aristotelian) tradition is 
“antinomian/heterodox”438 with respect to the Christo-Platonic canon (a purportedly 
univocal, unilinear “history of philosophy” that is ahistorically constructed on the basis of 
ecclesiastico-political prohibitions).439  The ecclesiastico-political occlusion/repression 
(disappearance/expulsion) or Christianizing appropriation of the Judeo-Islamic tradition 
necessitates its genealogical discovery, which makes possible a “concrete mode of a-dualist 
philosophizing.”440 In the materialist-Aristotelian tradition, endoxa (concrete, esteemed 
opinions that derive from language and the imagination) are the always-already given 
“knowledge” against which thinking (dianoia) occurs as paradoxa – as contrary to, yet 
concurrent with, endoxa.441   
Both Maimonides and Spinoza undertake a critique of language to curb the affective 
sway of endoxa, or always already-given (concrete/historical) religio-political 
conventions.442 In the contexts in which either writes, endoxa is to be understood as 
ecclesiastico-political (e.g., “concerns for individual immortality”443) and the generation of a 
metaphysical imagination that favors an “unlimited extension of demonstration”444 in hopes 
                                                           
437 For Gersonides as a “proto-monist,” Cf. Problems in Arabic Philosophy, 69-86. 
438 Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “Thinking Desire in Gersonides and Spinoza,” Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, Ed. 
Hava Tirosh-Samuelson (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 2004) 55. 
439 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 52. Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “Whose History? Spinoza’s Critique of Religion 
as an Other Modernity,” Idealistic Studies (Vol. 33: Issues 2/3, 2003) 219. 
440 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 56. 
441 Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, “The Ambiguity of the Imagination and the Ambivalence of Language in Maimonides and 
Spinoza,” Maimonides and his Heritage, Ed. Idit Dobbs-Weinstein et. al. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009) 98. 
442 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 65. 
443 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 61. 
444 Maimonides and his Heritage, 97. 
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for a method that can be “adequate” to all ideas.445 The Christo-Platonic tradition posits 
demonstration as if it can evade desire altogether (as if a “free” will might be real rather than 
a mythological ideal of the “subject”), despite the fact that a (neither free nor rational) 
“reason” consequently exhibits a (disavowed) desire to dominate bodies (a grounding of 
politics that presumes to have escaped nature).446 The critique of the affective force of 
theological-metaphysical conventions (its power to prohibit and exclude contrary experience 
and heterodox manifestations of desirous life) becomes explicit in Spinoza,447 although it is 
strongly foreshadowed in Gersonides as well, especially in terms of a critique of a source of 
knowledge (memory) that is purportedly “independent from” sensibility and imagination as 
part of the doctrine of the self-subsistent soul.448 Both Gersonides and Spinoza advocate 
continuity between sensibility and intelligibility, and concurrence between both passion and 
action, and necessity and freedom.449 Contrary to the Christo-Platonic positing of a “will” 
that purportedly can direct itself toward “remembered,” immaterial, disembodied objects 
(“the true,” “the good”), the distinctly human difference from animals is to be able to 
manipulate represented, intrinsic perceptions without regard for what can actually exist – a 
manipulation that occurs by convention rather than nature (e.g., the imaginative desire for 
certainty).450 Without the materiality of desirative life, there can be no knowing.451  
                                                           
445 Maimonides and his Heritage, 99. 
446 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 70-72.  For “…the fiction of the separation between nature and freedom, i.e., 
on the overcoming of natural necessity/passions by means of reason for the sake of freedom” enables the “founding of the 
most repressive political regimes.” Idealistic Studies, 226. 
447 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 69, 73. 
448 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 61. 
449 Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 56. 
450 Consequently, moral qualities are products of convention rather than nature, and are manifestations of desire as 
primarily for self-preservation. Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 67-69. 
451 Human motions (both undergoing and affecting) entail desires that cannot come about but for sensation, memory (based 
in sensation), and imagination.  Intellect (nous) and thinking (dianoia), are bodily desires and are not distinct from the 
imagination. Rather, the imagination, not the intellect, provides a (represented) particular that the intellect judges to be 
good for preservation and toward which the human animal moves. Women and Gender in Jewish Philosophy, 64-65. 
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In the materialist-Aristotelian tradition, questioning the affective force of 
concrete/historical, religio-political conventions must take precedence (e.g., Maimonides’ 
insistence that the Torah speaks in terms of the imagination of the multitude, and that 
language is under the sway of the pleasure and power of the vulgar452), for the hope and 
fear453 that underpin endoxa can only be replaced by a more powerful affect454 associated 
with that which endoxa seeks to occlude: aporiae (adequate perplexities) that constitute 
experience and demand plural explanations.455 The demonstration of aporia is a discursive 
form that seeks to display its own inadequacy so that it might 1) be less susceptible to 
mimetic appropriation and adherence to authority,456 and 2) affirm, and be generative of, 
“the indefinite and diverse modes of experience and the continuous need for multiple 
discourses/inquiries.457  The destruction of endoxa is similarly generative of “ways (hodoi) 
to truth” for Gersonides.458   
In terms of a materialist, a-metaphysical and a-dualist Aristotelian tradition, 
“method” is always-already political in the sense that it is determined by the concrete 
material of the beliefs/affects in question and their representations (i.e., methodos is 
dialectical in the Aristotelian sense).  Consequently, there can be no single, unifying 
methodology – for the alleged ‘power of reason over the affects’ is fictional and based upon 
a disdain for the passions (i.e., “original sin”), and the purportedly “free will” manifests 
                                                           
452 Maimonides and his Heritage, 101. Compare Spinoza’s “systematic turn to the masses” in the TP. Idealistic Studies, 
228.  
453 Spinoza’s TTP “seeks to demonstrate that hope and fear are the archaic passions that found both religion and political 
association.” Idealistic Studies, 226. 
454 Cf. “Spinoza’s a-dualism requires that affections/beliefs about existing things cannot be changed except through 
contrary affections/beliefs (and hence contrary representations) that, quite literally, destroy or overpower the previous 
representations and thereby undermine the “truth” of the belief.” Idealistic Studies, 223-224. 
455 Maimonides and his Heritage, 97. Idealistic Studies, 229. 
456 Maimonides and his Heritage, 101. 
457 Maimonides and his Heritage, 99-101. 
458 Problems in Arabic Philosophy 76.  
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blindness to the affections of advantage to self-preservation that motivate it.459  Moreover, 
insofar as any paradoxical intervention must appear seditious and arouse powerful affects, 
its affectiveness/effectiveness rests upon the possibility that counsel to individual self-
preservation might produce a “favorable affect so that the ‘truth’ will not be hated or 
repelled.”460  
It appears a simple matter to the contemporary commentator to reject 
presuppositions as “mythical” – such as Saadiah’s defense of divine justice through ordeals 
whose meaning must remain obscure for the sufferer. However, the contemporary position 
of commentary stands along a path of disenchantment in which abstraction within which 
everything is leveled to a neutral bearer of meaning determined by the subject.  
Consequently, to challenge the exchange-value of suffering (e.g., as a divine test) by ridding 
commentary of its “mythical” commitments (e.g., God’s sovereignty) risks assisting 
exchange – since everything thoroughly disenchanted becomes fungible as mere object.  
The task is instead whether contemporary commentary might learn from Job’s lawsuit how 
to allow suffering to be a bearer of meaning despite its ordination within meaning (e.g., as 
part of sovereignty).  But that task requires that meaning itself be thought as requiring the 
vanishing of the capacity of things to signify as different than the subject, who administers 
over mere tokens of types.   Consequently, whereas I want to acknowledge as a problem that 
suffering is predominantly something other than itself as a matter of exchange (e.g., 
Maimonides’ educative value to divinely meted ordeals), an abstraction is already far too 
near us to typically be thought – that in the elaborate intertext of exegetic traditions there 
can be no adequate summation – interpretation is always already pericopic. And wherever 
                                                           
459 Idealistic Studies, 229, 223, 231. 
460 Idealistic Studies, 230.  
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coherent themes through which one might want to establish a “tradition” is attempted, such 
“coherence” is defied by the repressed details such that it is only the interests of 
interpretation that betray themselves.   
It is rather the repression of difference by a determining subject – a warding off of 
experience – that is my central concern.  The performative, or radicalized, dimension of this 
concern is to be found – not in the apophatic dimension that is in service of licensing the 
given of suffering – but in the withstanding of the amorphousness of suffering as in the 
amorphousness of “tradition.”  This “withstanding” is a suspending of the determining 
power of the subject to overwhelm difference – a thinking into rupture while resisting the 
administration of rupture that would again think rupture only in abstraction (i.e., as rupture 
“as such” in the regressive manner of an ontology separated from practice and licensing the 
application of an applied “de-construction”).  It is rather always the singularity of difference 
that is of concern and thus always a returning to, and remembrance of, the details – which in 
Job is a return to the moments which resist univocality and are thereby in dialectical tension 
with the desire for univocality.   
With an (albeit all-too brief) history of interpretation of Job in light of the 
Aristotelian-materialist tradition, contemporary perplexity as to the content of Job – 
especially regarding its Christianizing appropriation – can be brought into view with less 
risk of anachronism.   For, where contemporary interpretation and translation has attempted 
to find a truth in the text, such “truth” can be brought within the scope of the desire for a 
univocal “reading” as opposed to a plurality of readings that is in any case inevitable for a 
text replete with inherent difficulties in translation such as Job.  The burden that a defense 
of plurivocality must carry, a burden already painfully engaged by this other tradition, is that 
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plurivocality must appeal to self-preservation after it has already settled upon the fear and 
hope embedded in endoxa. 
If I am willing to undergo the displacements of the text, I will suffer the 
disorientation of having my normal location (as active, interpreting subject against a purely 
passive object) dislocated. But it is just this dislocation that allows the practice of 
interpretation to be permeated by the trial of law (form, intelligibility) in Job.  Like Job who 
must build a site for hearing to occur, I attempt to build a site to hear the text in its 
indeterminacy. My goal is not to build determinacy in the text, but to allow indeterminacy to 
stand as generative of possible meaning. “Criticism” here indicates an attempt to allow the 
non-systematic to suffuse the practice of criticism. Consequently, my reading of Job in this 
chapter emphasizes a rupturing of robe, skin and scroll as a counterweight to reconciliatory 
thinking or synthesis that aims at resolving perplexities in Job into univocality. 
 
Tearing as textual impasse 
Job potentially speaks to any age where to be true is to be “torn” in some sense 
rather than whole (to be wounded, dislocated, undergoing pain and incomprehension).  Like 
disarticulated Job with respect to efforts to mend its perplexities, today’s social brokenness 
is covered over by myths of wholeness and reconciliation. Poignancy (as literally sharp and 
piercing) comes in the form of an idiomatic imagery that resists the requisite ordering into 
sequences and syntactical relationships in translation.  The body suffers breach upon breach 
(16:14) and skin supperates (7:5). As with skin or cloth, the text bears the marks of a painful 
history in which the wholeness of Job, like the wholeness of ancient peoples to whom Job 
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first spoke, has been fragmented and dispersed. Job is a concatenation of tearing across 
robe, skin and scroll. 
Job holds in reserve a potentiality for further meanings in virtue of its perplexities 
(e.g., untranslatable moments as a result of hapax legomena), displacements (e.g., the 
contested “dislocation” of the chapters), as well as its lack of narrative resolution (all 
moments of Job’s wholeness – body, family, community, belief – are disarticulated and 
retain many frayed ends despite the theophanies and “folk-tale” “denouement”).  In terms of 
its narrative, Job is a concatenation of the unknown: a text in which God is the cause of 
innocent suffering, and a terrified sufferer who cannot locate by any familiar bearings what 
he is undergoing. In terms of its material perplexities and dislocations, the text sustains the 
disarticulation of suffering immanently: the rending of the intelligible world (that initiates 
Job’s curse of his birth and ultimately litigation of El) is immanent in the rending of 
intelligibility in the text.  
By “experience of the text,” I refer to the moments when the text diverges from our 
concepts.  Repression of experience of the text occurs as attempts overwrite (repress) the 
sensuality of the text out of fear for its amorphousness in favor of concepts that express an 
appetite for systematicity. Against the evacuation of the meaning of materiality (of bodies 
and texts) in favor of an intelligible ideal, this reading aspires to engage the textual body and 
undergo its unfamiliarity. By emphasizing below moments in which robe, skin and scroll are 
torn, I attempt a ‘story of rending’ that preserves, rather than attempts to overcome, the 
incomprehensibility that reading encounters.461 Just as the sufferer’s effort to articulate what 
is undergone occurs under the duress of disorientation, so too my interpretive efforts. The 
                                                           
461 Cf. clothes/rending: 1:20, 7:6, 9:31, 13:28, 16:15, 29:14, 30:11a, 30:18, 31:19 
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matter is of passages (a drive for synthesis and mending) and of rendering passages suspect 
by a return to the text. 
In 2:3, Job’s integrity is put in question by the conditions of the wager between 
YHWH and the Prosecutor.462  Yet the wholeness of Job has already undergone a rending or 
dis-integration.  Job reads as having been torn and mended so that we tend to see 
interlocking breaks and fractures – fragments that have fused together and inclusions within 
adjoining pieces.  The surface of Job has varying degrees of transparency and opacity, so 
that here we might think we have an “un-tampered” Job, and there we sense we might have 
an “emended or dislocated” Job.463  
When we discuss an original Job, a gulf quickly opens beneath us. The Masoretic 
Hebrew text is the text that was received and copied by the Masoretes.464  The Masoretes 
“pointed” (added vowels to) another received text (also Job) in which the letters are 
uninterrupted and contiguous (the Ket(b, what is written). The Masoretes made decisions as 
to which characters should be grouped together in order to form words, splintered the letters 
into groupings to form the Qer", what is read.465 There are at least some places where a 
different grouping of letters (that is, moving a letter over from its position to an adjacent 
word) preserves intelligibility but changes adjacent words into two different words. Job is 
nested within rival textual traditions (e.g., Ben Asher and Ben Naphtali) and Hebrew Bibles 
(e.g., Codex Leningradensis, Hebraica Stuttgartensia, etc.).  Aptly enough, one place in 
                                                           
462 The Prosecutor is the heavenly being ha##$%$n who is among the ben" h$’el!h(m, “sons of” God). Ha##$%$n is 
commonly mistaken for “Satan” of later theology. I follow Good here by rendering ha##$%$n as “The Prosecutor,” but “The 
Adversary” is more common. In Turns of Tempest, page 22-23. 
463 For example, Job 28 is considered by most scholars to be a later addition. 
464 The Masoretes are Jewish scholars that fixed the tradition of copying the consonantal texts through the centuries of their 
preservation, adding vowel pointings to indicate pronunciation. Cf. In Turns of Tempest, 37-38. There is the contention 
that the Hebrew text is itself a translation from a lost original in Aramaic, but this view is largely abandoned now.   
465 In Turns of Tempest, 38. A codex is the Qer" in the form of manuscript pages held together by stitching.   
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which the Ket(b diverges from the Qer" is in the word rendered as “judgment” in 19:29.466 
Job is displaced from an original “Job.”  
Job is notoriously difficult to translate. Job is in a different dialect than the rest of 
the Hebrew Bible.  It is linguistically unique, possessing rare vocabulary. The majority of 
Job is “poetry” rather than “prose.”467 Often, the reader is unable to determine the 
significance and sequence of a torrent of images. Where fissures occur, Job as text asserts 
itself as that which always holds in reserve more than will yield to translation. Containing 
the highest concentration of hapax legomena in the Hebrew Bible, Job is replete with gaps 
in intelligibility. The text of Job is hopelessly inward looking in its idiosyncrasy. 
Job’s third cycle of speeches is incomplete.468  Suggestions for the reason for the 
incompleteness include 1) that the order of the speeches in Job shifted in its translation from 
scroll to codex. Job suddenly says the opposite of what he had just argued and so some 
dislocation is plausible.469  2) The poet of Job is signaling that the friends have nothing 
more to say. 3) Job is an incomplete work; the author had not finished. “Completion” is a 
strange concept, however, for the speeches by pious Elihu (who is mentioned neither before 
nor after his appearance) are thought by most scholars to be a later interpolation and thereby 
demonstrate at least one other “author.”470 And as Job requires an unending task of 
translation, Job is perpetually unfinished. 
                                                           
466 In Turns of Tempest, 102.   
467 Biblical Hebrew as poetry iterates a point through at least two presentations.  The formulation is called “seconding” (“A 
is so, and what’s more, B is so”) James L. Kugel, The Idea of Biblical Poetry, Parallelism and its History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins UP, 1981) 8. Cf. In Turns of Tempest, 30. 
468 Cf. In Turns of Tempest, 14. 
469  Cf. For a chart of opinions about the dislocation of third cycle, Samuel E. Balentine, Job (Macon, GA: Smith & 
Helwys, 2006) 382. 
470 Whereas others prefer to see Elihu as a later, pious emendation to Job, Habel sees the appearance of Elihu as an ironic 
anticlimax and argues that we see Job as a whole. The Book of Job, 25-27, 32, 36. 
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Job tears his robe (1:20) at the moment that his world is upturned. The human body 
is the site of a stitching together471 and of rending apart.  When Job tears his robe (1:20), Job 
mimes the tearing of his life.   
 
My days are swifter than a weaver’s shuttle; 
They end when the thread runs out. (7:6) 
 
Job’s life is a thread nearing its end.  Job is at the end of his thread.472  
 
A human life wastes away like something rotten, 
Like a garment eaten by moths. (13:28) 
 
Job is the weave of a cloth coming undone. Rather than embedding itself dutifully alongside 
adjoining components, the thread of the narrative has many frayed ends.  Against the weave 
of narrative history, history rends apart and deposits broken bodies and broken texts. Job is 
reduced to a riddled garment, just as the text of Job arrives riddled. Job is in the state of his 
robe and in the state of the text: disarticulated. 
Were Job to attempt to purify himself, El would simply make Job filthy again such 
that even his own clothes would reject him (9:31).  The recoiling of one’s clothes from the 
skin is emphatic de-familiarization. In 30:18, Job’s robe becomes the instrument by which 
he is tied up and throttled, immobilized and silenced.   
  
With great strength he ties me up with my garment 
And strangles me with the neck of my tunic. 
He flings me in the mud 
So I come to resemble dust and ashes. (30:18-19 Habel) 
 
                                                           
471 “You clothed me with skin and flesh / And knitted me with bones and sinews” (10:11) 
472 The word tiqw$ means both “hope” and “thread.” The Book of Job, A Contest of Moral Imaginations, 134. 
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Job senses his immanent return to non-identity, a literal return to dust and ash.473  Like the 
disintegrating scroll of the Job Targum found above Wadi Qumran, the sufferer is reduced 
to fragments.  
While the image in 30:18-19 is of clothing and of great power (perhaps that of an 
attorney), the relation between the images remains obscure.474 Translators of Job invariably 
encounter difficulties,  and some translators (e.g., Good) are particularly honest as to the 
performative dimension of their endeavors.475 Job disallows passage altogether, if by 
“passage” is meant translation across gaps in intelligibility, and the syntactical relationship 
among images in 30:18-19 is an example. 
 
With great power … …, 
… … … . 
He has flung me in the muck,  
and I’m a cliché [m&l, a hapax], like dust and ashes (Good) 
 
The image of clothing in 30:18-19 rends the possibility of passage (the deployment of our 
interpretive prejudgments), requiring that we encounter our interpretive prejudgments 
differently. 
As the interior of the clay pot scrapes upon the scroll, patiently silencing the text, the 
potsherd scrapes upon the parchment of Job’s skin. Job’s suffering is marked with 
inscrutable passages, impasses, compounding the predicament of Job who struggles to mark 
his passing: 
 
                                                           
473 The Book of Job, 420. Cf. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995) 71-74. 
474 “My wish is not to close down options of understanding but to break them open, not to decide definitively that one 
alternative is to be adopted but to allow the alternatives free rein as I ask how the text plays itself.” Edwin M. Good, In 
Turns of Tempest, A Reading of Job with a translation, (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP: 1990) 130, 178. 
475 Paul de Man Resistance to Theory, Theory and History of Literature, Vo. 33 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1986) 84.  
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Oh, if only my case were recorded! 
Oh, if only it were inscribed on a stela 
With an iron stylus and lead,  
Carved on a rock forever! (19:23-24) 
 
As Good has noticed, the above plea is ironic, for we indeed have only a written Job, and 
never an “original” vocalized, unwritten Job.476  For all this scraping and inscribing, a 
critical inscription (s"per) is missing that would spell out Job’s alleged transgressions.  
 
Oh, if only someone would conduct my hearing! 
Here is my signature!  Let Shaddai be my respondent! 
Let my adversary at law draft a document [s"per, a writ]! 
Then I would wear it on my shoulder,  
I would bind it to me like a crown! 
I would announce to him the count of my steps 
And like a prince I would confront him! (31:35-37) 
 
Were it available, Job would wear the false accusation and approach Shaddai knowing that 
only the innocent may do so and survive.   But the reason for his suffering is indiscernible. 
We have only a Job that has been, as it were, recorded by rending, marked by impasse.  
Although not the usual way we think of marking or recording, rending demands a plurality 
of possible interpretations despite the fact that it also inspires a fear that motivates an 
attempt to foreclose significances.   
 
The Un-subsumable in Job 
The disintegration of Job is never fully erased by efforts to mend it; consequently 
those efforts render a portrait of the social whole that is committed to a false, subjective 
appearance of overcoming alienation.477 The way in which the matter of suffering is skewed 
gradually becomes noticeable only through repeated hands – as if interpretation belonged to 
                                                           
476 In Turns of Tempest, 257. 
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a marked deck of cards. This atmosphere gives rise to a kind of connoisseur who (despite 
being attuned to the non-systematic) attempts to push the non-systematic away in order to 
prevent undergoing. The text, like a wounded body, provokes a response akin to the 
suffering of actual bodies: that suffering should be meaningful but in terms supplied by 
domination. When imposed upon Job, the unique features of Job ensure that this imposition 
leaves noticeable traces. An alleged “redemption” (a determination or reconciliation) of 
indeterminacy in Job occasions the possibility that the countenance of myth may be 
discerned. Reading Job against synthetic efforts concretizes a site where experience 
encounters its opposite in stereotypy.  Insofar as it aspires to be not just a possible 
interpretation but authoritative, theology is committed to a harmony and unity that, when 
deployed over textual ruptures, reflect antinomies within society. 
Job draws out the manner in which a systematic temperament in the West renders 
suffering intelligible. Myth is called out by textual indeterminacy such that a theological 
desire (i.e., a desire to read what?) can become the matter for thought. The task of the 
systematic temperament, to resolve the perplexities presented by texts lawfully, is not for 
the faint at heart.  If one has the constitution for it, one takes leaps of faith over the gaps and 
fissures presented by Job. To this kind of interpretive spirit, the corporeality of the text 
issues no claim of itself. According to the dominant spirit of the West, truth-claims issue 
from a subject who comes under the auspices of epistemological rules for the correct 
conduct of rationality. The text is but a passive inkblot.  If the text can issue a claim, 
however, then the ordinary mode of establishing significance (which recognizes the text as 
just passive) hijacks meaning from the text. 
                                                           
477 The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 151, 152. 
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The interpretive challenges of texts are largely thought in terms of authorship, 
historical horizon, genre, etc. So many rifts divide Job from an ideal of a “text” that the 
traditional notions about texts (a self-identical whole with determinable authorship and 
historical horizon) are overturned.  What do we do when Job resists being determined, and 
we are left with our conceptual apparatus, unsuccessfully deployed and idle?  Having been 
thrown back upon our resources, the common thing to do is to try to re-deploy the same 
architecture of understanding with greater determination. Job is just as aptly suited to 
challenge axiomatic presuppositions about texts as Job’s suffering is aptly suited to 
challenge axiomatic presuppositions about suffering.   
Because Job resists determinations, a compulsion to impose them becomes 
noticeable. Precisely because of its difficulty, Job allows us to view the ambit within which 
desires for reconciliation are suspended. The fact that the value of Job cannot be redeemed 
in terms of standard interests is the occasion to reflect upon those interests. 
  
 
Our common scholarly practice solves any incoherence in one of 
two ways.  We can remove it historically by showing that, because 
the parts of the incoherence originated at different times and places, 
we need not consider them at the same time; they therefore cease to 
be incoherent for us.  Or we can solve it textually, by changing 
whatever in the text makes it incoherent, to restore a coherent 
“original.”478 
 
Just as instances of suffering are to mark progress toward a transcendent (natural, historical, 
divine) resolution, so the gaps and fissures of Job are allegedly to be mended. The desire to 
supplement indeterminate passages with determinate meanings in Job demonstrates a 
                                                           
478 In Turns of Tempest, 183. 
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warding off of reading.  Efforts to mend Job are an occasion for critically revisiting history 
as marked by myths of progress and identity. 
We are within a tradition that desires a “presence of the signified” (the mythical 
immanence of the meaning of texts) brought about by allegedly “transcendent” (authorized) 
signifiers.  
 
Even if there is never a pure signified, there are different 
relationships as to that which, from the signifier, is presented as the 
irreducible stratum of the signified.  For example, the philosophical 
text, although it is in fact always written, includes, precisely as its 
philosophical specificity, the project of effacing itself in the face of 
the signified content which it transports and in general teaches.  
Reading should be aware of this project, even if, in the last analysis, 
it intends to expose the project’s failure.  The entire history of texts, 
and within it the history of literary forms of the West, should be 
studied from this perspective.479  
 
Despite the fact that a writing of a “pure signified” is an impossible presence, the West is 
bound to a desire for this presence as evidenced by the proper name(s) that pose as 
unmediated. With Derrida, I understand “the project of effacing itself in the face of the 
signified content” as the ability of the signifier to pose as the irreducible stratum of the 
signified. Despite encountering the irretrievability of an original and the non-optionality of 
mediation, translation requires the illusion of accuracy.480  Precisely where this posture of 
immediacy is successful, the matter is the most mediated rather than the least. Consequently, 
Derrida advises that we study authoritative texts (e.g., Biblical, philosophical) as a history of 
the effort to conceal mediation. 
In sum, Job’s plight (the disavowal of the projection of a divine, retributive calculus 
“in” the world) is consonant with the covering over of fragmentary social reality by 
                                                           
479 Jacques Derrida, “…That Dangerous Supplement…” Acts of Literature, ed. Derek Attridge (New York: Routledge, 
1992) 104 
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narratives of mystical reconciliation. Like the amelioration of unique and un-subsumable 
elements of Job, the singularity suffering is covered over by a “redemption” in which 
sensuousness is sacrificed to an intelligible ideal.  Job’s divergences resist their sacrifice to 
a “law” – whether law is the “integrity” of Job sought after a reconciling of its dislocations, 
an historical “origin” of Job, the institutionalized “art of mistranslation,” or the 
fundamentalists’ attempt to place in the text a foreshadowing of Christ. The inability to 
experience Job is the foreground of an inability to experience suffering as other than a 
priori affective vicissitudes.   
    
The ordeal of the undecidable 
In contrast to the presumption of God’s goodness that underwrites most conventional 
theology, innocent suffering in Job issues directly from a command of YHWH for the sake 
of the wager between YHWH and ha##$%$n (“the satan”).481 The wager short-circuits any 
attempt to ascribe Job’s suffering to an assuredly good end (as in Liebniz), for a wager can 
occur only when no fewer than two competing futures are possible: either Job will bless or 
Job will curse God.482  However, the meaning of the occurrence of the word that is typically 
translated as “bless” is itself indeterminate.  
 
                                                           
480 In Turns of Tempest, 15. 
481 In 1:12, YHWH dispatches the satan with permission to murder Job’s children and servants, and destroy his 
possessions: “Very well, all that he has is in your power; only do not stretch out your hand against him!” Not only Job’s 
livestock but also his children are killed as a result.  Soon afterwards, YHWH dispatches the satan for a second time, 
resulting in the affliction of Job with sores from head to foot. 
482 The wager might still be regarded as having a purpose however, as a test of human virtue. For Crenshaw, Job stages the 
issue of the survivability of religion in terms of whether humanity can be virtuous independently of receiving God’s favors.  
“If only Job will retain his integrity when everything seems to render virtue worthless, then people need not worry about 
faith’s survival.” James L. Crenshaw, A Whirlpool of Torment, Israelite Traditions of God as an Oppressive Presence 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984) 61.  For Crenshaw, this test tempers our judgment of God’s actions because we see 
Job’s affliction as the required part of a “noble cause” and “worthy goal.” In emphasizing the wager made by god, I hope to 
place emphasis on Job’s initiative with respect to justice, which in any event outstrips whatever effects might have been 
“calculated” as part of a divine “plan.” 
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He took a potsherd to scratch himself as he sat in ashes. 
And his wife said to him, 
 You still hold fast to your integrity! 
Curse [brk] God and die! (2:9 Habel) 
 
Some translators regard this occurrence of brk as a pious, scribal emendation for ’rr  (curse).  
Habel, for example, simply states that the Hebrew for the rendering of “curse” is brk, 
“bless” and renders 2:9 with the conjunction “curse God.”483 However, there are no cases 
where ’rr occurs with ’el!h(m as its object in the Hebrew Bible that would count as evidence 
of such an original pairing.  Thus we cannot with any certainty determine that brk in 2:9 is a 
scribal emendation.484  Alternate translations leave brk as is and claim that the use of brk is 
euphemistic. However, establishing that a given word was used euphemistically for an 
ancient audience is a dubious prospect. Consequently, no definitive answer is forthcoming 
as to whether brk should be rendered as “curse” or “bless.”485 As noted by Linafelt, 
instances in Job are undecidable in meaning between curse and bless and are thereby 
instances of différance.486 
As Derrida notes, reading is drawn into the drama of translation: the decisions that 
translation necessitates are decisions in excess of any criteria (i.e., a madness487). Law 
authorizes itself in a moment of decision that occurs over the abyss of the indecipherable.488 
Translation finds itself beyond any calculable aptness of translation and obligated to 
                                                           
483 The Book of Job, 78 (note). 
484 Attributing something in the text to Tiqqûnê sôp#rîm (scribal emendations) often results in “an uncritical leveling of the 
diverse elements of a very complex tradition.” Roland E. Murphy, The Tree of Life, An Exploration of Biblical Wisdom 
Literature, 2nd ed.  (Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1996) 61-62. 
485 In order to reveal “a fundamental ambivalence about the character of YHWH”, Tod Linafelt discusses instances of brk 
as being undecidable between curse or bless and thereby being a moment of difference. Tod Linafelt, “The Undecidability 
of $%& in the Prologue to Job and Beyond,” Biblical Interpretation 4 (1996): 156. 
486 Biblical Interpretation, 156. 
487 Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 
trans. Mary Quaintance, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge, 1992) 25. 
488 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 33. 
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decide.489  Reading returns to the moment of interpretive force in translation to judge its 
decision. 
A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable 
would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable 
application or unfolding of a calculable process.  It might be legal; 
it would not be just…And once the ordeal of the undecidable is past 
(if that is possible), the decision has again followed a rule or given 
itself a rule…which in its turn is not absolutely guaranteed by 
anything; and, moreover, it if were guaranteed, the decision would 
be reduced to calculation and we couldn’t call it just.  That is why 
the ordeal of the undecidable that I just said must be gone through 
by any decision worthy of the name is never past or passed, it is not 
a surmounted or sublated (aufgehoben) moment in the decision.  
The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost – but an 
essential ghost – in every decision, in every event of decision.  Its 
ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any 
certitude or any supposed criteriology that would assure us of the 
justice of the decision, in truth of the very event of a decision.490   
 
The ghost of the undecidable haunts Job: the possibility of having decided otherwise is 
never dispelled absolutely from the arguments for a decision in the annotations. In Derrida’s 
terms, a reading that undergoes the indeterminacy of the text becomes saturated by the 
epoch" that “founds” it. 
Translation is a question of the supplement and so of indeterminacy.491  Theodicy 
must obscure these moments of decision; reading returns to them.  Like Job who must 
contend with the law of what his suffering allegedly must mean (punishment for 
wrongdoing), reading must contend with the law of attempts to speak for the text.   
Given that the production of commodity-like features of social order is hidden from 
reflection by allegedly “indestructible” features of social life, the state of reading is 
                                                           
489 Two translation techniques predominate: 1) Formal correspondence is the translation of a form (e.g., participial 
expression) in Hebrew to an equivalent form. KJV, ASV, NIV, RSV are examples of translations that use this technique.  
2) Dynamic equivalence is the translation of an ancient idiom into a modern idiom.  NEB and Tanakh are examples of this 
technique.  Neither technique alone or in concert with the other can duplicate Job or any other text. 
490 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 24-25. 
491 Cf. Acts of Literature, 76.  
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rigidified. Ever in need of law-giving discourses (that provide an eschatological horizon, the 
allegedly “eternal” and “universal”), domination undermines reflection by mythologizing 
itself. Society appears as immutable “truth” (as fate, as historical absolute) in order to 
license submission to the given. Under these rigidified conditions, reading in the sense of 
encounter with a non-identical other potentially shares features with the general strike: 
 
For there is something of the general strike, and thus of the 
revolutionary situation in every reading that founds something new 
and that remains unreadable in regard to established canons and 
norms of reading, that is to say the present state of reading or of 
what figures the State, with a capital S, in the state of reading.492 
 
A reading that remains unreadable deflects attempts to impose the norms of the State.  The 
“norms of the State” can be discernable in part through reading Job against the obfuscation 
of its inherent indeterminacy.  
Reading preserves textual gaps such that plural “determinate” readings can develop. 
As rife with disarticulation (e.g., the “dislocation” of chapters) and lack of resolution (e.g., 
YHWH does not answer any of Job’s charges), Job returns to haunt those who, as in 
Kafka’s texts, are the warders of the “law” of the given.   Kafka’s work, “a parabolic system 
to which the key has been stolen,” is as compelling as Job to the effort to understand and 
yet: “Each sentence says ‘interpret me’ and none will permit it.”493  Many perplexing 
features of Job are simply irresolvable, and as such are generative of possibilities that make 
the story memorable and worth retelling. As Benjamin reminds us, the possibility of stories 
wanes wherever explanations arrive ahead of time.494  In the spirit of resistance against the 
predominance of explanations (summarizations or pre-synthesized codifications of Job), I 
                                                           
492 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 37. 
493 Theodor Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1982) 246. 
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resist the synthetic moment of dialectic (the mending of antitheses) by a destructive reading 
of a repression of indeterminacy in the text.  
Both Job’s trial and reading Job vie495 with axiomatic presuppositions as to the 
meaning of suffering. Because the moral axiom of retributive justice (the insistence that his 
suffering indicates guilt) has the initiative as to the meaning of suffering, Job attempts to 
build a place to hear his suffering differently. Job’s trial is an attempt to bring into an 
intelligible relation the co-occurrence of innocence and suffering so that stories are still 
possible. Reading, as I am employing it here, is an experience, and as such depends upon a 
moment of non-identity between the reader’s expectations and the text. As an undergoing of 
a non-identity between myth and text, reading recognizes the unredeemability of texts to be 
an asset, for it occasions a distance from the text as non-identical other, and opens a possible 
plurality of meaning – especially readings that question a disposition toward redeemability 
and exchange.  
My textual strategy below is to return to those moments of decision when Job has 
pitched translation beyond any criteria and the translator must interpret criteria anew and 
perform their aptness. Mythical thinking is particularly evident where suffering in Job is 
“resolved” through an imputed eschatological horizon – a capitalization upon indeterminate 
moments in Job in order to confirm the “truth” of a replacement theology. This resolution, 
however, can never erase completely the indeterminacy that is constitutive of the work of 
translation. 
                                                           
494 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” Illuminations, Essays and Reflections, trans. Harry Zohn, ed. Hannah Arendt (New 
York: Schocken, 1968) 89. 
495 Both a raising of the stakes (envier) and an invitation (inv(t$re). 
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The indeterminacy of texts is the condition for the projection of theology upon 
texts.496 The passages over gaps and dislocations in Job (e.g., the bridging of the torrent of 
images with syntax and tense) are what projection (at best, convention) places there. In 
order to be authoritative, theology must claim to discover what it actively projects upon 
texts. Proponents of readings that prioritize theology can attempt to resolve indeterminacy 
through a disavowal of projection – i.e., a “literalness” of “reading.” As a defense against 
undergoing, “the subjective process is easily overlooked in the schematization, and the 
system is posited as the thing itself.”497 By concealing its own synthesis, the gaze of 
literalness in “reading” looks past and extinguishes the things that it claims to passively 
report.498  In such cases, the context of the mediation between theology and texts is 
delusional insofar as it is mediation itself that cannot be acknowledged.  
 
Identity at the cost of experience 
The damage to the possibility of experience is demonstrable in content in translation 
that stands in for (poses as and represses) the text. The prospect of arraigning the story of 
Job hinges on returning alleged “resolutions” to textual indeterminacy such that Job can 
appear against its full depths. Here we can remember Benjamin’s observation that, “it is half 
the art of storytelling to keep a story free from explanation as one reproduces it.”499  
The lack of place evident in Job’s cry of pain, which must attempt to locate itself 
through an arraignment and public testimony. As I discuss in “A Homeless Cry of Pain and 
                                                           
496 The tension between belief and texts is felt within institutions and their administration.  For example, the fields of 
Biblical textual criticism versus that of theology recently resulted in a parting of ways between the Society of Biblical 
Literature and the American Academy of Religion. The split is due in part to the SBL’s critical approach to texts that 
destabilizes the commitment of the AAR to theology.  
497 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Philosophical Fragments, trans. Gunzelin Schmid 
Noerr, Ed. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2002) 159. 
498 Dialectic of Enlightenment,158. 
499 Illuminations, 89. 
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El the Un-maker,” Job’s outcry wanders homelessly through a nested series of 
displacements. The absence of an intervening agent is a necessary condition for Job’s 
litigation to evolve in form from curse (Job 3) to oath of purity (Job 31). Job must 
meaningfully bind (arraign) his innocence and suffering together in a place (an arraignment 
or arrangement of materials) through recourse to his ability to cry out against displacement 
(a lack of a place wherein the co-occurrence of innocence and suffering are intelligible) by 
speaking publically. This narrative development is unthinkable but for a series of 
displacements of Job’s cry that require the absence of an intervening agent. 
Job’s sharp cries for an arbiter (9:33), witness (16:19), and avenger (19:23) occur as 
wishes for an intercessor. On my reading, Job’s cries are rendered ineffectual by dislocation, 
which necessitates further action from Job. Agony registers in the distance between Job’s 
outcries and the absent place where Job’s testimony might have effect. Job rejects the 
possibility of vindication by a third party because it would come too late (19:26, “after they 
have flayed my skin”). Job’s cries for an intercessor reflect the need for anyone who might 
be willing to understand and assist, under the duress of pain.  Job bemoans the absence of a 
hearer (&!m"a‘).500 In light of the difficulties facing the litigant, Job must arraign the 
divinity in person and not at a later time, but immediately, for pain will not wait. The 
absence of help casts Job back upon his own resources, and Job finds a mechanism by 
which El must appear: for El to fail to appear after Job’s oath of purity implies Job’s 
exoneration.501  In short, the absence of an intervening agent (who can arraign El, arbitrate 
the dispute and record Job’s case) is a necessary condition for Job’s pursuit of litigation. Job 
                                                           
500 The Book of Job, 452. 
501 The Book of Job, 431. 
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has no alternative but to initiate proceedings and set the terms for El’s appearance by 
himself.502 
Each outcry for an intercessor presents singular textual difficulties.503 Nevertheless, 
Job’s outcries for an intercessor become moments for “reading” a foreshadowing of Christ 
into the text.  The singularities of the text are sacrificed to a meaning of sacrifice (a telos 
purportedly “in” Job), and such a “reading” attempts to prevent a return to the textual 
details.   
Instead of a resolution, the text continues to displace the intelligibility of Job’s 
suffering. Throughout the divine filibuster from the whirlwind, Job’s charges remain 
unaddressed. In Job’s final response to YHWH (42:6), where we might expect a resolution 
to Job’s lawsuit, a verb (m’s – itself ambiguous) lacks an object (thereby compounding the 
ambiguity of the passage): “Therefore I melt away [m’s] and withdraw over dust and ashes.” 
504 Where the Masoretic text refuses us an object, the text is marked across various 
translations by the desire to supply one. Translations of 42:6 display a desire to impart 
contrition, an element of self-abnegation and self-abhorrence, to the text.505 But when left 
without the object, the meaning of the verse can depend upon the object that the reader 
                                                           
502  Job’s oath of purity (Job 31) provokes the appearance of YHWH.   
503 Translation of the hapax l!’ y"& in 9:33 as “if only there were” contends with another translation (“There is no [l!’ y"&] 
arbiter [m!k(a'] between us”).“The negative contains and discards the thought that the arbiter might intervene on Job’s 
behalf, whereas the conditional allows the thought to stand.” In Turns of Tempest, 74 note.  The “witness” of 16:19 (‘"d) is 
in the sky (&am$yîm) but is rendered as “heaven” although the ancient Israelites had no such concept – gods dwelt simply 
“above.”  In Turns of Tempest, 94 note. In contrast to the Christian “Redeemer,” the g!’"l of 19:25 “furthers the terrible 
opposition between Job and the god” In Turns of Tempest, 258. The g!’"l either avenged wrongdoing or ransomed slaves. 
504 “Job’s responses to his calamities and to the speeches from the tempest use terribly ambiguous language.” James L. 
Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and Probing Questions, Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1995) 465. 
505 For example, The NRSV supplies “myself” as the object, and translates the verb as “despise”:  “Therefore I despise 
[m’s] myself / And repent in dust and ashes.” The object of the contested verb, however, is not Job (as in “I despise 
myself”). Some, like Scholnick, read the verb m’s as indicating Job’s “retraction” or “dismissal” of his lawsuit. The Book 
of Job, 576. Cf. Scholnick, “The Meaning of Mi&p$% in the Book of Job” JBL 101/4 (1982) 303.  The object of “withdraw” 
(or “retract”), however, is “dust and ashes.”  In Turns of Tempest, 25-26, 375-378. Compare “He flings me in the mud / So 
I come to resemble dust and ashes” (30:19 Habel). 
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supplies.506  And finally, “No reading of this final speech by Job removes the perplexing 
features.”507 The supplement of an object for the verb in 42:6 illustrates the predominance of 
a certain repression, a constraint upon reading.  
It is not sufficient to simply point to the textual evidence in Job, which supports the 
view that 1) the only possible intercession has to come from Job’s initiative of a trial; 2) the 
place where Job’s words would have a direct audience with his attacker is beyond approach; 
3) an avenger would in any case come too late; and 4) Job’s final speech is ambiguous. Nor 
is it sufficient to state that the attempt to legislate an identity across sensual differences is a 
kind of “weak eyesight” that wishes to perceive similarities everywhere.508  The desire to 
apprehend a foreshadowing of Christ, or to see a contrite Job at the end, wards off the text 
such that experience itself is forfeited.  By allowing the non-systematic to suffuse the 
practice of criticism, criticism becomes utterly useless for the cathexis of fear and hope 
embedded in endoxa. 
 
Arraignment: Materiality and Form 
The beauty of Job is not that of an aesthetic harmony and wholeness.  With respect 
to the traditional notion of aesthetic beauty, it might be better to speak of the “ugliness” of 
Job: Like the modernist artwork, divergences and gaps abound in Job.  Poignancy, a literal 
shard or stylus, serrates the surfaces of robe, skin and scroll.  A “modernist” interpretation 
                                                           
506 Cf. In Turns of Tempest, 25-26, 375-378. Also, James L. Crenshaw, Defending God, Biblical Responses to the Problem 
of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 189. Also, The Book of Job, 576. 
507 James L. Crenshaw, Old Testament Wisdom, an Introduction (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press 1998) 99. 
“Job’s responses to his calamities and to the speeches from the tempest use terribly ambiguous language.” James L. 
Crenshaw, Urgent Advice and Probing Questions, Collected Writings on Old Testament Wisdom (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1995) 465.   
508 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E.F.N Jephcott (New York: Verso, 2002) 74. 
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(that is able to withstand the fear of the unfamiliar) undergoes (in the sense of a dependent 
response to the text) and is overtaken by the ugly details that bind us:       
 
And as birds seek refuge in the leafy recesses of a tree, feelings 
escape into the shaded wrinkles, the awkward movements and 
inconspicuous blemishes of the body we love, where they can lie 
low in safety.  And no passer-by would guess that it is just here, in 
what is defective and censurable, that the fleeting darts of adoration 
nestle.509  
  
The passer-by, the one of the crowd, does not suspect that the defective and censurable are 
places where love of a singular, irreplaceable body has refuge. 
Job is an encounter with the necessary divergence of a text from translation – that 
which exceeds intentionality – and pitches reading into the materiality of the text.  
 
When the intentional gives out, the material is in effect.   
The artwork, though through and through '()*+ [conventions], 
something human, is the plenipotentiary of ,-)*+ [phusei, 
“natures”], of what is not merely for the subject, of what, in Kantian 
terms, would be the thing itself.510 
 
The material of Job is “in effect” where it resists efforts to be for us. The other (not-“I”) is 
always material.511 Although itself something made, and thereby human, Job speaks as if 
nature were issuing a claim where it resists our efforts to capture and sort its meaning: 
remnants of language, deposited like silt upon river banks, excised on surfaces that have 
decayed, broken like shards of ancient pottery, and frayed like threads of a lost fabric 
extending beyond our hands.  
                                                           
509 Walter Benjamin, “One-Way Street” Reflections, Essays Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott, ed. Peter Demetz (New York: Schocken, 2007) 68. 
510 Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Theory and History of Literature, Vol 88, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor, ed. Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998) 63. 
511 Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury Press, 1973) 193. 
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Job bears a temporally dislocated or transposed resemblance to the fractured 
modernist artwork. Like a modernist painting, detail in Job appears purposeful and 
meaningful (often as striking imagery) while resisting interpretation in terms of categorical 
assessments. Because robe, skin and scroll are sites of tearing, Job uncannily mimes the 
modernist artwork’s resistance to form. In that totalizing forces are arbitrary with respect to 
singularities, singularities are violated in being-rendered subsumable.  As Adorno detects, 
the modernist artwork mimes arbitrariness by its construction and provides a moment for the 
“ugly” (that which resists form). By emphasizing the “ugly” in Job – ruptures – I attempt to 
show that attempts at reconciliation are arbitrary with respect to singularities (“ruptures” 
being merely “ugly” from a desire to subsume them). By leaving the moments of tearing in 
Job undone, I aspire not to falsify the materiality of the text in its resistances to “weaving,” 
codification and summarization.512 My emphasis upon rending in Job is a corrective, rather 
than an attempt at a definitiveness that would assert a kind of mending across rifts.  Robe, 
skin and scroll are material moments by which I attempt an unraveling of false totality, so 
that this chapter might approximate a mimesis of a social structure free of domination.513  
The drama of Job consists in the distancing of innocence and suffering from a site of 
their intelligible relation.  A deferral is evident both in the lack of narrative resolution and 
also immanently in the gaps of the text. Pain is immanent in part by its distance from 
intelligibility. An outcry wanders homelessly through a nested series of displacements; this 
placelessness is part of the wounding of Job/Job. Rather than play to the insistence that 
everything be properly placed, I allow the practice of criticism to become saturated with the 
lack of place evident in Job’s cry of pain, which must attempt to locate itself through an 
                                                           
512 “Proper thinking about art is a form of suffering, of undergoing the force of alienated thought.” Gregg Horowitz, 
Sustaining Loss, Art and Mournful Life (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001) 112. 
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arraignment (‘rk, to arrange514).  A form that does not falsify the matter of suffering must be 
as a distressed weave that unravels the many threads from their subordination to pattern, 
thus preserving elements in their differences. 
 
What cunning Penelope inflicts upon her artifacts, she inflicts upon 
herself.  Ever since Homer’s verses this episode is not the addition 
or rudiment for which it is easily mistaken, but a constitutive 
category of art: Through this story, art takes into itself the 
impossibility of the identity of the one and the many as an element 
of its unity.515 
 
By taking “into itself” the dialectic of one and many, the artwork attempts a unity that 
preserves elements as elements rather than liquidate them into the whole of a composition. 
Like the undergoing of suffering (itself a product of subsumption), aesthetic form undergoes 
(is transformed in response to) materiality in its recalcitrance to formation. Although a kind 
of “cunning,” the artwork inflicts upon itself the burden of achieving a non-violent synthesis 
of its elements.  
 
…aesthetic form is the objective organization within each artwork 
of what appears as bindingly eloquent.  It is the nonviolent synthesis 
of the diffuse that nevertheless preserves it as what it is in its 
divergences and contradictions, and for this reason form is actually 
an unfolding of truth.516 
 
A work binds elements together in terms of their material moments and resists the 
identification and fungibility of elements performed by logical inference.  
Job, like a modernist work, is the bearer of an “untranslatable” truth (i.e., it resists 
being exhaustively discursively rendered); its truth is in a negative relationship to the world 
and is sacrificed once it is rendered intelligible in terms of the world.  If it were possible to 
                                                           
513 The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 91, 131. 
514 As in 13:18, 23:4, 33:5. The Book of Job, 453. 
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thoroughly translate the content of a work into rational assertions, then it would be possible 
to discard the work.  “Its [the literary work’s] essential quality is not statement or the 
imparting of information.”517  Rather than depend upon rational assertions or linear 
narrative, the transmissibility of a work depends upon the absence of explanation by which 
it claims a place in the listener’s memory.518  A concern for the fidelity of translation and a 
work’s portability corresponds to the isolated (and exchangeable) individual and social 
contract.   
As the fracturing of a modernist artwork calls attention to its medium, so Job in its 
fractured form calls attention to its medium.  Fragments of scroll evoke their own 
fascination with the fragility and the beauty of their marks.  In the form of scrolls, Job 
survived history by being copied by hand.  Job is an attempt of a civilization to remember 
itself. The possibility that we might have just “the words” of Job apart from a given scroll or 
codex calls for closer attention to the dimension of language as allegedly just detachable 
sign and neutral bearer of information. Some scrolls survived pogroms because they were 
concealed underneath the clothes of fleeing Jews: wrapped around bodies, the words ran. 
The fragments of singularly occurring words and word-forms in Job inspires the 
spirit of the collector: diligent readers painstakingly search in the debris of history for 
approximations to other Ancient SW Asian texts so that fragments of Job may be rendered 
intelligible.519 Like the break in history that “assisted” the collector Benjamin,520 history 
                                                           
515 Aesthetic Theory, 186-187. 
516 Aesthetic Theory, 143. 
517 Illuminations, 69. 
518 Illuminations, 91. 
519 The painstaking search for the most obscure bits of information in order to construct an explanation of the riddles 
presented by the text is what Wolfers calls the institutionalized art of mistranslation.  Wolfers’ work is nevertheless highly 
idiosyncratic. David Wolfers, Deep Things Out of Darkness: The Book of Job; Essays and a New English Translation 
(Kampen: Kok Pharos Publishing, 1995). 25-45 
520 “The figure of the collector, as old-fashioned as that of the flâneur, could assume such eminently modern features in 
Benjamin because history itself – that is, the break in tradition which took place at the beginning of this century – had 
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unraveled the cord (30:11a)521 of the text: its intelligibility is as a cloth that has been pared 
down to a single thread, the linguistic context of its hapax legomena having frayed away. 
The imposing of determinations of historical origin, authorship and genre (categories that 
Job resists522) must contend with Job as fragmentary.  Job is the remains of an insistence 
upon order in the same sense that caves are a refuge from empire.  The cataclysmic 
whirlwind of history renders Job the remains of impositions. The un-subsumable moments 
of text, as not appropriated into exchange, sift through today’s net-like interpretive grid, 
joining the ash and debris that betray523 the imposition (the imprinting) of the ordered, 
administrative whole upon actual bodies.  
 
Passage across textual gaps 
A compulsion at work is evident in the effort to bridge textual gaps: At the level of 
narrative, the impasse between innocence and suffering is allegedly bridged by the 
axiomatic presupposition of retributive justice.  At the level of text, the impasse is the lack 
of an object for a verb in a critical verse (42:6) that is to be “bridged” by a supplement. At 
the level of interpretation, m!k(a', ’"d, and g!’"l are anachronistically taken by some 
interpreters to be foreshadowing Christ. However, just as Job’s robe is irretrievably torn, so 
is the text over which these efforts to mend suffering occur.524  
                                                           
already relieved him of this task of destruction and he only needed to bend down, as it were, to select his precious 
fragments from the pile of debris.” Illuminations, 45. 
521 Good translates this as El having loosed his bowstring as part of an assault against the sufferer. In Turns of Tempest, 
305. 
522 As evidenced by the Qumran Targum (fragments of Job in Aramaic), the fundamental order of the chapters is in 
question.  There is also reason to suspect that the speeches of Elihu have been inserted at a later time as a pious response to 
Job.  Because success normally depends upon textual unity, the classification of Job as dramatic, epic, or didactic, etc., is 
suspended. Whether poetry or prose, one or many authors, dislocated or emended, the most one can say is that Job 
confronts us with plural forms of address.  
523 “betray” in the special sense of telling. 
524 In particular, the verses regarding the “avenger” (19:25-26) are especially problematic. “In 35 years of trying to 
perceive sense in these verses, I have found it only in the first line [19:25a].” In Turns of Tempest, 100 note.  With the 
exception of Good, this difficulty rarely prevents translators from placing sense in the verses. 
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The insistence upon theodicy in translation attempts to consign the plurality of 
meaning of the text to a single “remembrance”: “even the past is no longer safe from the 
present, whose remembrance of it consigns it a second time to oblivion.”525  To the extent 
that Job is “remembered” via the reassignment of its non-identical elements to the 
formalized schema of the objective social structure, Job is forgotten by way of an illusion of 
immediacy.  
Efforts to “weave” across torn moments in Job resemble the densely woven, 
administered whole of the social environment: 
  
One can speak of the claustrophobia of humanity in the 
administered world, of a feeling of being incarcerated in a 
thoroughly societalized, closely woven, netlike environment.  The 
denser the weave, the more one wants to escape it, whereas it is 
precisely its close weave that prevents any escape.  The revolt 
against it is violent and irrational.526  
 
Adorno voices a word of caution against “rebellious” attempts to escape the dense weave of 
a rigidified social environment.  As opposed to an irrational revolt against this dense weave, 
reading Job as torn is generative of a plurality of readings. 
With the attempt to legislate a mythological identity across sensuous differences in 
Job, we see the effect of a kind of stereotyped thinking upon texts.  At its worst, that 
stereotyped thinking collapses the would-be “individual” into a non-individuation, such 
“thinking” represents the “preconditioned reflexes of the subjectless exponents of a 
particular standpoint.”527  Within the prejudiced “individual,” disorientation within damaged 
                                                           
525 Minima Moralia 47. 
526 Theodor Adorno, “Education after Auschwitz,” Critical Models, Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. 
Pickford (New York: Columbia UP, 1998) 193. 
527 Dialectic of Enlightenment, 166 
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society is mitigated by rigid adherence to intrinsic supra-individual laws.528  As a means of 
pseudo-orientation and mastery, allegedly intrinsic truths (in reality neither intrinsic nor 
true) are irrational because they are the means by which the individual abandons the reality 
principle.529 As a response to the threat of difference, a weakened ego imparts to difference 
a confirmation of categories of understanding. The drastic oversimplification of these 
categories (e.g., good or evil) is the principle of their appeal, since they reduce the 
complicated to the elementary.530 Rigid adherence to universal, moralistic law is an index of 
the extent to which the superego has come to reflect displaced instinctual urges.531 Once 
“reading” is devoted to a regressive desire for repetition of the same (which requires but an 
efficient semblance of subjectivity), who can be said to be reading, let alone reading Job? 
Whereas reading Job puts us in a position to reflect upon the motives to resolve 
indeterminacy in the text, reading itself has no place insofar as the creation of a single, 
paranoid psyche has become a vital component of society.532 
The screen through which reading is deformed is the mutual authorization of the 
order of intelligibility and political order:   
 
…the order of intelligibility depends in its turn on the established 
order that it serves to interpret.  This readability will then be as little 
neutral as it is non-violent.533   
 
                                                           
528 Theodor Adorno, “Prejudice in Interview Material,” The Authoritarian Personality, Studies in Prejudice (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1969) 618-619. 
529 The Authoritarian Personality, 627. 
530 The Authoritarian Personality, 619.  See also, “constant reiteration and scarcity of ideas are indespensible ingredients of 
the entire technique.” Theodor Adorno, “Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda,” The Culture Industry, 
Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J.M. Bernstein (New York: Routledge, 1991) 171. 
531 The Authoritarian Personality, 627-8. 
532 To discover “in the world” a disavowed projection is paranoia. “Paranoia no longer pursues its goal on the basis of the 
individual case history of the persecutor; having become a vital component of society, it must locate that goal within the 
delusive context of wars and economic cycles before the psychologically predisposed ‘national comrades’ can support 
themselves on it, both inwardly and outwardly, as patients.” Dialectic of Enlightenment, 171. 
533 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 36. 
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Just as false universality inhibits passage of difference (i.e., not already of the order of 
right), theodicy arrives ahead of instances of suffering as the law (legitimacy and 
intelligibility) of suffering. A root of theodicy is to be found in the desire to impart a 
magical invocation to the repetition of the same.534  
As never founded upon an authority beyond a self-authorization, the susceptibility of 
a symbolic order to deconstruction is ensured. The merely performative center535 of a 
symbolic order must be repressed through a compulsive repetition of its “legitimating” 
discourse. I am attempting to think-into a symbolic order that is read into Job in order to 
describe its typical features and conditions for its recurrence, while simultaneously avoiding 
the suggestion that this order is somehow a permanent condition. 
A history of domination can be sketched as a hand-waving in the direction of 
allegedly immutable facts legitimated by types of eschatological horizon (theological 
awakening and metaphysical transcendence).536 Just as these types of eschatological horizon 
tend to ward off memory in a particular way, law legitimates the violence that founds it 
retrospectively: “its future anterior already justifies it.”537   
 
In these situations said to found law (droit) or state, the grammatical 
category of the future anterior all too well resembles a modification 
of the present to describe the violence in progress.  It consists, 
precisely, in feigning the presence or simple modalization of 
presence.  Those who say “our time,” while thinking “our present” 
in light of a future anterior present do not know very well, by 
definition, what they are saying.  It is precisely in this ignorance 
                                                           
534 By “repetition of the same” I am alluding to Freud’s death instinct. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 
trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961) 30. Importantly, Freud prefaces his discussion of an arche 
of the death instinct by declaring it as a “myth,” by which I understand that the formulation of a death “instinct” is not to 
codify or to authorize repetition as an historical invariant. 
535 Derrida’s words for this center is a “performative tautology:” “one performatively produces the conventions that 
guarantee the validity of the performative” Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, trans. Mary Quaintance, ed. Drucilla Cornell et al. (New York: Routledge, 
1992) 33. 
536 The Origin of Negative Dialectic, 47. 
537 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 35. 
 187 
 
that the eventness of the event consists, what we naively call its 
presence.538  
 
Law relies upon the invocation of an authority that looks backward only in light of itself. 
The pretense of superior reason, universal law or the eschaton is achieved by a repudiation 
of passion (the means of concealing its own motives from itself); consequently, such “truth” 
is false. 
The peculiarity of a mise en abyme is that the juxtaposed images coincide, always 
together, and that the closer one inspects, the more this coincidental repetition is in view as 
that which permeates its “inner workings” infinitely rather than granting a terminus in which 
inspection can come to a rest.  It is for this reason maddening.  Reading Job in a 
coincidental way with Benjamin, Derrida, Heidegger, Adorno, Kafka, and others, is 
similarly maddening, for the problem of origin – a terminus or ground from which reading 
might occur – is never given, as if the problem were to simply choose a philosophical 
orientation and apply it.  In part, this problem emerges as a sign that reading has 
successfully embarked, for to apply any of the aforementioned figures would be a distortion 
and an error.  But that is only to say that a problem of history is given a chance to reappear 
more forcefully. Each orientation (if I might temporarily call each literary figure an 
orientation) can appear disconnected from my experience (and thereby disconnected from a 
history) insofar as I am incapable of experience; alternately, if I am capable of experience, 
then each stands a chance to speak to me variously as to what I am attempting to live 
through, opening a possibility that I might discern my circumstances more keenly – or, more 
precisely, that I might discern a difficulty with discerning my circumstances (i.e., that it is 
experience itself that is somehow blocked).   
                                                           
538 Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 35. 
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 It is undergoing itself that refuses, like a mise en abyme, to be given limits or telos.  
Indeed, even the appearance of the “inner” of a mise en abyme is a ruse.  Nevertheless, a 
tentative threading of discourses occurs throughout this dissertation.  I have arraigned Job 
with other texts (so that conversation about undergoing might be stimulated by their 
juxtaposition for a plurivocality of Job).  In doing so, my efforts are preceded by another, 
Aristotelian-materialist tradition (to contest a powerful affect associated with reconciliatory 
thinking while resisting a foreclosure of reading in preference for an alternate, authoritative 
univocality). 
A problem with “passage” itself is under consideration, and words as providing 
passage between Job and contemporary social conditions, and contemporary social 
conditions and Job, begin to tear and become inadequate. Here as elsewhere, I place Job in 
proximity to a certain reading of the social whole, and let this proximity engender readings 
of Job for today. To apply one to the other would tend to suggest one reading as 
authoritative. The moment of philosophical reflection is the rending of the ability to make 
sense of what is undergone, that “making sense” is in some way responsible. Once we 
acknowledge that the political and social ordering of human beings are the sites of suffering, 
we are committed to not speak of suffering in a general or abstract way, lest we perform 
with words what is done with the imposition of abstract and brute political form.539  Walls 
rend space and may themselves be rent, and (as in Kafka through a repudiation of 
expression540) passages become twisted and fractured as they approximate this rending.  
                                                           
539 For example, the rending of the land by Israel’s Security “fence” (even its name is in dispute) marks a site of 
confrontation as to what “the Land” is to mean and to whom.  It disrupts those Israeli and Palestinian practices that used to 
occur, and might resume, across integrated communities. The two-dimensionality (wall-affinity) of painting can also be 
thematically engaged, declaring openly the conventional limitations of painting.  The communities at the fringes of the 
security fence are torn.   
540 Prisms, 246. 
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As Adorno attests, Kafka’s work stands along the path of disenchantment, but at a 
specific point when the demythologized deus absconditus of the enlightenment recreates the 
archaic terror of the radically unknown.  Kafka’s work attempts to reopen a trial against 
dialectical theology’s convergence with the mythic powers of demonology. 
 
The Trial novel is itself the trial of the trial...In Kafka’s 
statement to whoever it may concern, he describes a court 
which sits in judgment over men in order to convict law itself.  
Concerning the latter’s mythic character he left no doubt.  At 
one point in the Trial, the goddesses of justice, war and the 
hunt are treated as one.541 
 
Job’s lawsuit is also a means by which law itself is convicted – that law being the allegedly 
“divinely” mandated system of retributive justice, an “infallibly just” ordering of creation 
against which any attempted novelty is rendered a priori meaningless finally by the exercise 
of brute force. In Kafka’s “mirror-writing” of late capitalism, integration, as the thoroughly 
compulsory repetition of a totally submissive consciousness, is bound within the 
disintegration of a perpetually shabby world that permits no affective cathexis.542   Joining 
Kafka’s world of the perpetually undead, Job is “blessed” with a long, long life in the 
presence of doubles of his murdered children.  As with Job, “The heroes of the Trial and the 
Castle become guilty not through their guilt – they have none – but because they try to get 
justice on their side.”543    
Job’s arraignment displaces law; the juxtaposition of Job with other texts is a 
displacement of law also insofar as philosophy is subject to a demand to not waste the time 
that a sojourn requires. Law shares its condition of possibility with history, or literature.544 
                                                           
541 Prisms, 270-271. 
542 Prisms, 252, 257, 264. 
543 Prisms, 270. 
544 Acts of Literature, 187. 
 190 
 
To the extent that each (law, history, literature) can impinge upon me as modes of address, 
each can be ways experience can open differences across these presumptively discrete 
domains. Because so much of Job is a recording, a marking as/by rending (and hence 
requiring remembrance rather than memorializing), an underpinning of textual 
juxtapositions with a single, authoritative History – between the violent piety of Job’s 
friends with the authoritarian personality, or between El’s dysfunctional, heavenly 
administration and the contemporary, hyper-administered world – would merely repeat a 
problem under consideration: that an incapacity to experience is demonstrable in the desire 
for origin. My goal with the textual juxtapositions that I employ is to mime the 
contemporary spirit of montage as the gathering of things ejected by the insistence that 
everything be properly placed.  
Today, the possibility of thriving, if not surviving, is certainly damaged (e.g., current 
economic crises and wars).  For many, literature is a refuge in which one might locate 
oneself despite the uncertainty brought upon by upheavals and displacements.  For a certain 
deformed embodiment, this effort at location occurs as part of a belonging (or worse, 
vanishing) into belief as opposed to reading, where “reading” has mere utility as a 
confirmation of belief, however much it has departed from the reality principle. In spite of 
his suffering, Job didn’t cleverly adapt to, and avail himself, of whatever power was on hand 
for use (which would have required his disappearance within acceptable piety), but rather 
initiated a trial under conditions of a deprivation of available means.  Job’s trial preserves 
the possibility of the transformation of the conditions in which the intelligibility of suffering 
is presumed to be given.  Thus my task is to enhance this transformative possibility for 
today’s sufferer, even if this effort melts away.  
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